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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introductory remarks
While reading Bertolt Brecht’s (2016) play “The Good Person of Szech-
wan”,1 many parallels can be found to the current economic discussion
about business start-ups out of unemployment and the role of govern-
mental start-up incentives in this context.
The key figure of the play is Shen Teh, a woman who lives in the Chi-
nese province of Szechwan. Like many other people in the region, Shen
Teh lives in great poverty and is unemployed. That is, even though
she is available for work and seeking work, she is neither in paid em-
ployment nor is she self-employed (International Labour Organization,
1982; OECD, 2018).
As the poverty in Szechwan “is too much for any individual to correct”
(Brecht, 2016, p. 99), another group of actors – the gods – are intro-
duced in the play. These gods, mandated by a resolution, look for good
1 The play, written in 1938-1941 and first produced in the Zürich Schauspielhaus
on 04.02.1943, is explicitly designed as a parable, which means that there is
both a factual and an interpretational level. In this dissertation, we use Brecht’s
(2016) play exclusively to present basic concepts that are important for the un-
derstanding of this thesis. The interpretative or normative question of the play,
namely how capitalism influences a society’s moral beliefs, is not in the focus
of this work but is left for the growing research area of social and sustainable
entrepreneurship (see e.g. Bornstein, 2007; Short et al., 2009; Thompson et al.,
2011; Muñoz and Cohen, 2018).
1
persons in the world and are then introduced to Shen Teh. When they
see the great poverty in which Shen Teh lives, the gods decide to give
her a gift in the form of money. Shen Teh uses the money to found a
small tobacco shop. As a result, her employment status changes from
unemployed to self-employed, comprising all working persons who per-
form work for profit or family gain, in cash or in kind (International
Labour Organization, 1982; OECD, 2018). The intention of the gods
behind this financial support is that she can thereby improve her living
condition and better seize chances available to her. That is, an external
stimulus by a higher authority in kind of a start-up subsidy is given to
put an end to an individual’s unemployment situation by starting-up.
After various confusions of action in the play, the good person Shen
Teh realizes that her generosity diminishes the economic success of her
recently founded start-up. Moreover, she lacks the necessary negoti-
ating skills and the needed assertiveness, e.g. in order to delay the
payment of outstanding receivables and encourage people to work. As,
“traditionally at least, women are not so integrated in the commercial
world as men are” (Brecht, 2016, p. 50), she pretends to be her own
male cousin Shui Ta. In this role as a male businessperson, and with
hard methods, she manages to transform the unsuccessful small retail
shop into an economically successful tobacco factory. The factory is
running so successfully that Shui Ta even becomes an employer for
other, formerly unemployed people from Szechwan. In this way, the
business founded by Shui Ta contributes to reducing unemployment in
the region, however, the methods she uses are questioned by the people
of Szechwan and the gods.
2
1.2 Structure of this thesis
Although probably unintentionally, “The Good Person of Szechwan”
introduces important questions of the current entrepreneurship and
active labor market policy (ALMP) research. Some of these research
questions are also addressed in this dissertation, which deals with the
interrelationship between unemployment and self-employment and the
role of governmental start-up incentives for unemployed persons.
Just as the gods in Brecht’s (2016) play offer the unemployed Shen Teh
financial support with which she becomes self-employed, in many devel-
oped countries, i.e. Europe, there are considerable (financial) start-up
incentives2 “that promote entrepreneurship by encouraging the unem-
ployed [...] to start their own business or to become self-employed”
(OECD, 2015, p. 3).3 Although, in recent years start-up subsidies
for the unemployed have become a broadly discussed and implemented
instrument of ALMP (OECD and European Commission, 2014; Euro-
found, 2016), data and evaluation studies thereon are scarce (Caliendo,
2016; Dvoulety` and Lukeš, 2016) – especially at the regional level. An-
alyzing detailed information on the characteristics of unemployed per-
sons, the types of businesses started and the resulting economic out-
comes is important to determine whether public investment in the mea-
sure pays off. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we fill some of this data gap
by introducing a novel dataset covering all beneficiaries of the regional
start-up incentive program for unemployed persons Existenzgründer-
richtlinie (EXI ) in the German federal state of Thuringia. In addition
to the description of the data set, we offer descriptive statistics on the
2 See Chapter 4 for a broad overview about the existing measures.
3 The terms “start-up incentives for unemployed persons” and “start-up subsidies
for unemployed persons” are used synonymously in this thesis and correspond
to the OECD (2015) definition.
3
characteristics of the founders and their companies. In all statistics, we
compare these characteristics to those of beneficiaries of other start-up
subsidy measures as well as all unemployed persons in the respective
region. Additionally, descriptives are presented separately for men and
women.
The fact that, as in “The Good Person of Szechwan”, the small tobacco
start-up is so profitable that it eventually turns into a tobacco factory
with employees symbolizes the so-called “double dividend” of start-up
incentives for unemployed persons (Caliendo, 2016). That is, beyond
the individual effect that the subsidy has brought an unemployed per-
son into the labor force, the newly started firm may also generate indi-
rect employment effects (Hart and Oulton, 1999; Caliendo and Künn,
2011; Román et al., 2013; Nightingale and Coad, 2013; Althammer
and Lampert, 2014; Caliendo and Künn, 2015). However, it is not
certain that this effect on employment will actually appear, because
the subsidies can also have negative effects (Calmfors and Skedinger,
1995; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). For example, the cost advantages
generated by subsidies may crowd out established businesses, which,
in turn, could increase unemployment. In Chapter 3, we use the data
introduced in Chapter 2 to test whether and how start-up subsidies for
the unemployed lead to a decline in the regional unemployment rate.
Further, we analyze whether the effect on unemployment rates depends
on the level of unemployment and what role the founders’ individual
characteristics play in this respect.
In the play, the financial support is considered as “a gift from the gods”
(Brecht, 2016, p. 96) to a selected unemployed individual, i.e. Shen
Teh. When allocating the funds, the gods themselves are bound by
a corresponding resolution. In economics and policy research, this is
related to the question of policy design in which it is necessary to define
4
what are the political objectives and eligible individuals or what kind
of support with how much financial benefit should be given. Therefore,
Chapter 4 reviews the relevant literature that deals with corresponding
funding instruments for start-up support out of unemployment. On
this basis, existing measures are compared in terms of their eligibility
criteria and outcomes received. The aim is to identify the most relevant
research questions on the topic of start-up incentives for unemployed
persons, which go beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Similar to Brecht’s (2016) play, in which the tobacco shop almost goes
bankrupt under the leadership of the caring but also naive female Shen
Teh, but flourishes under the leadership of the unemotional and prag-
matic male Shui Ta, in today’s real world there is strong evidence of
gender gaps in the preferences to found a business and its economic
success (see e.g. Verheul et al., 2012). Given this observation on the
micro level, in Chapter 5 of this thesis, we use country-level data to
ask whether self-employment in general – without considering possible
subsidies – leads to a reduction of unemployment and whether this ef-
fect depends on the gender of the self-employed. We are also looking
into the reverse context, namely how the level of unemployment in a
country can affect the rate of self-employment; and whether gender also
has an impact here.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed – The
Case of a Regional Program in Germany
“THE SECOND GOD: [...] We cannot meddle in the sphere of economics.
THE THIRD GOD: Wait! Just a minute. If she were better provided she might stand
more chance.
THE SECOND GOD: We cannot give her anything. We could not answer for it up there.
THE FIRST GOD: Why not? [...] He gives her money. [...]
SHEN, TEH: I have used the money to buy a tobacconist’s business. I moved in here
yesterday, and now I hope to be able to do a great deal of good.”
— Brecht (2016, p. 87f.)
Abstract.4 With the exception of Germany, data about start-up subsidy pro-
grams for the unemployed are rather scarce. However, even in Germany evalu-
ation studies are far from complete and comprehensive, as important regional
start-up support measures have complemented federal programs. Being a con-
nective link to the previously analyzed policies of the Gründungszuschuss and
Einstiegsgeld, the regional start-up subsidy of the Existenzgründerrichtlinie,
presented in this paper, is a valuable supplement to the existing literature.
For this purpose, descriptive statistics based on full data of the policy with a
remarkably high number of observations are presented. Further discussed are
the characteristics of the formerly unemployed persons and types of businesses
started in the light of determinants identified by the literature so far. In this
context the institutional framework of these kind of policies in Germany is
4 I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Heike Grimm, Dr. Tina Haussen and Lee Drewitz
as well as the participants (i.e. two anonymous referees) of the 2017 Interdiszi-
plinäre Jahreskonferenz zu Entrepreneurship, Innovation und Mittelstand (G-
Forum) in Wuppertal, Germany for many helpful discussions and suggestions.
The presentation of the paper in Wuppertal, Germany has been financially sup-
ported by the Thüringer Aufbaubank.
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described and the interdependencies with the selection process of participants
are illustrated.5
2.1 Introduction
In a recent literature review, Dvoulety` and Lukeš (2016) show that
data about start-up subsidy programs for the unemployed are scarce.
Due to missing data and therefore insufficient scientific monitoring,
economic research has failed to keep up with the times as this kind
of active labor market program (ALMP) as well as entrepreneurship
policy has become a broadly discussed and implemented instrument
by policy makers in recent years (OECD and European Commission,
2014; Eurofound, 2016). Even in Germany, where data availability is
comparatively most extensive, evaluation studies are far from complete
and comprehensive, especially because only federal start-up measures
are analyzed (see e.g. Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Caliendo et al.,
2012; Wolff and Nivorozhkin, 2012; Caliendo et al., 2015; Wolff et al.,
2016; Bellmann et al., 2017). However, there are also regional start-
up subsidy programs that complement the corresponding federal ones,
which are in terms of participation and financial expenditure partly
more important than the federal funding instruments. Further, this
focus of research on federal programs leads to a lack on regional studies
to date. These are of particular interest as entrepreneurship policies
as well as labor market policies have a local effect, are often designed
at the local or regional level and should, at best, complement federal
programs with a special focus on regional settings (Audretsch et al.,
5 JEL-Classification: L26; J08; L53; M13; O12. Keywords: Regional Policy;
Start-Up Subsidy; Unemployment; Entrepreneurship
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2007; Szerb et al., 2013; Stam and Bosma, 2015).
In this paper we introduce a unique and above all full data set on the
regional start-up subsidy of the Existenzgründerrichtlinie (EXI ) – a re-
gional support programme of the German federal state of Thuringia for
unemployed persons who are willing to set up their own business. The
policy of EXI is a valuable supplement to the existing literature since
only if researches have as full a picture as possible of the existing mea-
sures, will comparative studies result in more valuable and more precise
findings. In addition to presenting the measure itself, this paper is in-
tended to provide detailed descriptive statistics. In particular, we com-
pare EXI subsidized start-ups with non-subsidized start-ups and other
unemployed persons. All descriptive results are discussed in the light of
characteristics of founders and determinants of start-ups identified by
the literature so far. Furthermore, since policy makers, especially, need
a better understanding of different target-groups for appropriate policy
design (Rodríguez-Planas, 2010), we try to fill the existing gaps to some
extent, creating a starting-point for further research in more holistic
approaches considering all relevant start-up subsidies in Germany.
The descriptive statistics of EXI, presented in this paper, do not seek
to identify causal relationships. However, the data demonstrate that
the formerly unemployed business owners significantly differ from the
reference group of all unemployed persons, participants of other start-
up subsidies as well as from all other businesses started in Germany.
EXI is exceptionally attractive for women, as they account for almost
half of the businesses start-ups. Moreover, EXI-owners have an above-
average education compared to all unemployed persons and the start-up
subsidy is a favorite instrument of migrants to overcome their financial
constraints due to credit rationing and labor market discrimination.
The businesses are, however, mainly started in less promising industries
8
with comparatively high competition and exit-rates. Nevertheless, the
businesses managed to achieve a one-year survivability rate above 90%,
showing that the recipients usually stay in the program until the end
of the maximum subsidy period. Slight indirect employment effects are
also identified.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2 the institutional
framework is described, beginning with a description of area of study in
Section 2.2.1. The relevant start-up subsidies including EXI’s program
features and the regulatory environment are presented in Section 2.2.2.
The data and descriptive statistics are illustrated in Section 2.3, where
characteristics of the formerly unemployed business owners, their start-
ups as well as short-term survival rates and indirect employment effects
are discussed. Section 2.4 summarizes and concludes the findings.
2.2 Institutional framework
2.2.1 Description of area of study – Thuringia
Among Germany’s sixteen federal states (Länder), the area of study,
Thuringia (Thüringen), is the fifth smallest (2014: 2.157 million resi-
dents) by population and sixth smallest by area (2014: 16.173 square
kilometers). Thuringia is Germany’s most central federal state and be-
longs to the former East Germany. Since German reunification in 1990
the Thuringian economy has experienced recurring changes (see Figure
2.1a).
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Figure 2.1: Economic indicators of Thuringia
Notes: In Figure 2.1a the development of GDP per capita in EUR as well as the unem-
ployment rates between the years 1991 and 2014 in Thuringia are illustrated. In Figure
2.1b business registrations since 2000 as well as annual inflows into the measures Grün-
dungszuschuss (GZ), Einstiegsgeld (EG) and the Existenzgründerrichtlinie (EXI) between
the years 2007 to 2014 are illustred.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Thuringian Statistical Office, Statistics of
the FEA and the GFAW; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
With the exception of the economic crises in 2009 the GDP (at pur-
chasing power parity) per capita steadily increased and reached 25.504
EUR in 2014. This is 29% below the average for all of Germany and the
third lowest of any German state (2014 average: 35.908 EUR). Despite
this, the unemployment rate sits at only 6% and is middling among
the federal states. Since the 1990’s to the middle of the last decade,
Thuringia suffered through persistently high unemployment rates of up
to 19%. However, since that time the unemployment rates sharply de-
creased with the prospect of achieving full employment soon. Also the
business registrations dropped by half since 2004 (Figure 2.1b). This
decline coincides with the introduction of the “Hartz-reforms” in the
year 2003, which aimed to make the labor market more dynamic (Fahr
10
and Sunde, 2009).
2.2.2 Description of policies
Especially during the early phase of the implementation of the Hartz-
reforms, start-up support for the unemployed fostered the formation
of new businesses. The federal government of Germany complemented
its existing measure called “bridging allowance” (Überbrückungsgeld),
which was implemented in the 1980’s, with the “start-up subsidy”
(Existenzgründungszuschuss; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Caliendo
and Künn, 2011). The government replaced these programs with the
Gründungszuschuss (GZ ) in the year 2006. All of these policies tar-
geted mainly unemployed persons with recent job-experience and who
were still eligible for unemployment benefits. For unemployed persons
more in need of assistance, the government implemented the Einstiegs-
geld (EG) in 2005, which was an incentive program to encourage self-
employment (Wolff and Nivorozhkin, 2012; Wolff et al., 2016).6
Additionally and unique in Germany, the state of Thuringia created
a regional “business start-up policy” (EXI) to go along with the GZ
and EG.7 All three policies have a very close mutual relationship as
the German Social Code links them together. In sum, about a fifth of
all business registrations in Thuringia between 2007 and 2011 were by
formerly unemployed persons, receiving support by GZ, EXI or EG.
As displayed in Figure 2.1b, from 2007 until 2011 GZ was the more
frequented benefit, while after that EXI exceeded GZ in its importance
6 In fact, the grant also was paid to unemployed persons if a contributory employ-
ment was taken up. However, according to Wolff and Nivorozhkin (2012) this
was only observed for 15% of the measure participants.
7 For an comprehensive overview about other different policies for entrepreneur-
ship as well as small and medium enterprises and their funding in Thuringia,
refer to Grimm and Jaenicke (2012).
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for businesses registrations. During that time, the number of partic-
ipants receiving EG is below the other measures, accounting for only
1% of total business registrations. Table 2.1 summarizes the three poli-
cies. Even if this paper focuses on the introduction of EXI, due to its
relationship to the other funding instruments, it is necessary to first
gain an understanding of GZ and EG.
2.2.2.1 Gründungszuschuss
The economic literature has already dealt extensively with the GZ
start-up subsidy (see Caliendo et al., 2015, but also Caliendo and
Kritikos, 2009; Caliendo et al., 2012; Bernhard and Grüttner, 2015;
Caliendo et al., 2016; Bellmann et al., 2017). The Federal government
started and administrated it through the Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit – hereinafter FEA). Introduced in 2006, GZ
dealt with all German unemployed persons who received unemploy-
ment benefits I from the German Social Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III –
hereinafter SGBIII ). When entering unemployment, the jobless receive
unemployment benefits I from the SGBIII (hereinafter UB (SGBIII)),
so long as they are registered at the FEA and paid unemployment in-
surance contributions for a qualifying period. Additionally, eligibility
for UB (SGBIII) depends on the previous working income of the un-
employed. One is qualified for payments only if the benefits are higher
than the calculated basic security benefit. Typically, financial support
from SGBIII lasts for twelve months.
During an initial nine months phase, participants of GZ receive the
amount of their former UB (SGBIII) as a start-up subsidy comple-
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mented by a lump sum payment of 300 EUR per month.8 To receive
GZ, the formerly unemployed persons’ claim on UB (SGBIII) has to ex-
ceed 90 days of support. Furthermore, there is an optional extension of
support for another six months and again 300 EUR. Approval is, how-
ever, determined by the FEA. Another noticeable entry condition of the
GZ is the submission of a business plan, which an independent expert
authority reviews. The local chamber of commerce or representatives
of industry and trade groups mainly constitute these authorities. They
also have to assess the expected sustainability of the proposed start up.
Interestingly, until December 2011, unemployed persons could make a
claim for the subsidization of the first program phase, if they fulfilled
the above mentioned entry conditions. Since then, the start-up subsidy
has shifted to a nonobligatory service. Since this policy shift, admin-
istrators of the FEA are responsible and have to decide for or against
support of applicants. In addition, the remaining claim for unemploy-
ment allowance has to exceed nine months from that date. Finally, the
initial phase of GZ was reduced to six months and the extension phase
was extended up to nine months. Shortening the benefit durations, it
was the FEA’s intention to save around one billion EUR per year for
whole of Germany (Caliendo et al., 2012).
2.2.2.2 Einstiegsgeld
The EG is an active labor market instrument of the Social Code 2
(Sozialgesetzbuch II - hereinafter SGBII ). Since 2005 payments of SG-
BII (social benefits / unemployment benefits II - hereinafter UB (SG-
BII)) act as a basic security benefit for job seekers and are means-
8 The UB (SGBIII) amounts to 60% of the last net income before unemployment
occurred. To acquire a right to unemployment allowance, payments have to have
been settled in the last six months of employment.
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tested. Additionally, it supports the recently unemployed whose former
labor income and current wealth does not exceed defined thresholds.9
Additionally, UB (SGBIII) receivers, who do not find a job within
twelve months (long-term unemployed) as well as individuals who have
never worked before or who have not contributed to unemployment
insurance (e.g. self-employed), shift to the reception of SGBII.
All unemployed persons, who receive benefits of the SGBII, are eligible
for the EG, which gives them, for a period of up to 24 months, an
additional payment to their UB (SGBII). The FEA decides upon the
amount of the start-up subsidy, which should not exceed more than
100% of the basic benefit payment.10 Typically, it should not be more
than 50%. Duration of the eligible period and the amount of the sub-
sidy depend on the duration of the previous unemployment period and
the current employability of the unemployed. Pongratz et al. (2013)
demonstrate, that the average participant received 192 EUR in 2007
(230 EUR in 2011) and received support for less than seven months.
Since May 2008 again an independent external source must approve
business plans, formerly a responsibility of the FEA.
2.2.2.3 Existenzgründerrichtlinie
The EXI complemented the GZ and EG. The policy was in place be-
tween August 2007 and December 2014. EXI was unique and regionally
limited to unemployed persons in the federal state of Thuringia. With
the GZ and EXI being mutually exclusive, only those UB (SGBIII) re-
9 The claim on welfare payments is basically unlimited, but the Social Code pos-
tulates that recipients need to show effort to get employed, if they are able to
work. The tax-based payments cover the costs of living (lump sum payment per
month) and housing. Generated income and acquired assets, which exceed an
exemption limit, diminish payments.
10 This was in the year 2007 a monthly payment of 347 EUR. Until 2014 the amount
continuously increased to 391 EUR.
14
cipients, whose GZ application failed, could receive EXI. That is, due
to the obligatory service of GZ until the end of 2011, EXI was only
offered to those unemployed persons receiving payments of the SGBII
or without any public support (no beneficiaries - hereinafter NB) at
that time. Since then, it was also opened to UB (SGBIII) receivers.
Furthermore, simultaneously receiving EG and EXI was allowed.
Besides, EXI recipients could receive benefits for twelve months after
founding a business from a lump sum payment of 600 EUR per month,
without the possibility of extension. This measure was not changed
during program period. Like GZ, independent expert authorities had
to evaluate the submitted business plans and comment on the expected
sustainability before starting up. The measure was mainly financed
through the European Social Fund (ESF) with local authorities being
responsible for administration and control over the subsidies.
Neither GZ, EG nor EXI are subject to personal income tax, that is, all
increase earnings in gross and net terms. Statutory pension insurance
is not mandatory. For the EXI applicants, the state provides health
and nursing insurance. When receiving GZ, individuals, however, have
to insure privately.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of policy frameworks – start-up subsidies for the unemployed
Gründungszuschuss (GZ) Einstiegsgeld (EG) Existenzgründerrichtlinie (EXI)
Policy Level Federal Federal Regional
Regulation in force (time) 08/2006 – ongoing 01/2005 – ongoing 07/2007 – 12/2014
Necessity of registration Yes Yes Yes
for unemployment
Obligatory service Until 12/2011: yes No No
since 01/2012: no
Eligible beneficiary I. benefit recipients (SGBIII) I. benefit recipients (SGBII) I. benefit recipients (SGBII)
II. non-recipients of benefits
since 01/2012:
III. benefit recipients (SGBIII)
with denial on GZ
Period of eligibility Until 12/2011: 9 months Up to 24 months (variable) 12 months
(+extension period) (+6 months) no extension
since 01/2012: 6 months
(+9 months)
Financial support Unemployment benefit (SGBIII) Unemployment benefit (SGBII) 600 EUR per month + (unemployment benefit (SGBII))
+ 300 EUR per month + up to 100% (variable) of
basic benefit (2007: 347 EUR per month)
Approval of business plan by Yes Until 05/2008: no Yes
an independent source (extern) since 06/2008: yes
Social security No (private) Yes (health and long term care) Yes (health and long term care)
Subsidy is part of the assessment No No No
basis for personal income tax
Details Until 12/2011: § 57 SGBIII Until 12/2008: § 29 SGBII ThürStAnz Nr. 36/2007, p. 1717f.
since 01/2012: § 93 SGBIII since 01/2009: § 16b SGBII ThürStAnz Nr. 12/2009, p. 549f.
ThürStAnz Nr. 20/2011, p. 699f.
Notes: Explanation of abbreviations: SGBII – German Social Code 2, SGBIII – German Social Code 3, ThürStAnz – Thuringian
government gazette.
Source: Authors’ own illustrations.
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2.3 Descriptive statistics of EXI
2.3.1 Data and method
This paper is intended to introduce a new, unique data set of busi-
nesses and their owners based on the administrative data of a re-
gional Thuringian Agency for Employment and Economic Promotion
(Gesellschaft für Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsförderung Thüringen (here-
after: GFAW)). The data is unique since we observe the full popula-
tion (5,636) of formerly unemployed business owners receiving the EXI
start-up support who started their businesses between 2007 and 2014.
In the dataset, characteristics of business owners and their start-ups
are measured at the application date for the start-up support.
In the following sections descriptive statistics11, i.e. sample means, of
the variables in our dataset are shown.12 Due to the selection process
of GZ and EXI, presented in section 2.2.2, we split the descriptive
results into several classes. Specifically, we show the variables for a
group of unemployed persons receiving no benefits at all or receiving
social benefits / unemployment benefits II (SGBII) (hereafter: NB /
UB (SGBII)) as well as a group of unemployed receiving unemployment
benefits UB (SGBIII). The latter group corresponds to the beneficiary
presented by Caliendo et al. (2015) in a study about GZ while the
former is linked to the groups presented by Wolff and Nivorozhkin
11 The importance of descriptive statistics for a later evaluation process is empha-
sized by Caliendo et al. (2016). The authors show that typical control vari-
ables for general socio-demographic information (age, education, gender, ...) are
sufficient to adequately control for personality traits (conscientiousness, extro-
version, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness, locus of control, risk aversion),
which, in turn, can have an impact on the motives for setting up a business and
the effectiveness of a program.
12 Due to the missing ex-post evaluation of the measures, it was not possible to
form a sufficient reference group to calculate an average treatment effect by
means of a difference-in-difference approach.
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(2012) for EG.
In a second step, we follow the method of Caliendo and Kritikos (2010)
as differences are quantified using cross tabulations. By that, the two
groups of unemployed persons are separated by gender because of the
predominant finding in the economic literature, that the share of busi-
nesses run by women are significantly lower compared to men and are
characterized by different start-up patterns (e.g. Bates, 1995; Blanch-
flower, 2000; Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007; Koellinger et al., 2013).
A special feature of this paper is that it does not build upon a drawn
sample but on full data. As a result, it is not necessary to present t-
tests for mean differences to a statistical significance level as the actual
differences of means in the four distinct groups can be provided. Sig-
nificant differences in the results should therefore not be regarded as an
expression of a statistical significance, but rather as an economically
relevant difference. To show these significant differences, we present
differences of means in the variables between men and women being
NB / UB (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving UB (SGBIII) (𝑑2),
men in both unemployment groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both un-
employment groups (𝑑4).
Where it is appropriate, we compare results with the annual average of
the years 2007 to 2014 of all German start-ups13 and the corresponding
population of all unemployed persons.14
13 Data is received from the publications of the KFW-Gründungsmonitor (Kohn
and Spengler, 2008, 2009, Kohn et al., 2010, Hagen et al., 2011, 2012, Metzger
and Ullrich, 2014, Metzger, 2014, 2015).
14 The full data is received from official unemployment statistics by the FEA of
the federal state of Thuringia during that time.
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2.3.2 Characteristics of business owners
2.3.2.1 Socio-demographic background of business own-
ers
In Table 2.2 descriptive data about the socio-demographic background
of the participants is presented. At first, we observe an exception-
ally high share of female participation in EXI (56% male, 44% female)
compared to all full-time self-employed in Germany (66%male and 34%
female according to the KFW-Gründungsmonitor). On the one side,
one might attribute this to the higher labor market participation rate
of women in East Germany, as dual-earner couples are more common
(Hofäcker et al., 2013; Caliendo and Künn, 2015).15 In more com-
prehensive analyses Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) as well as Caliendo
and Künn (2015) outline for Germany that a more evenly distributed
population of supported male and female business owners may be a
result of different motives for start-up and the interrelationship with
regard to policy design. Women use self-employment more frequently
to generate additional household income, they are more often married,
have more children, and are more reluctant to work full-time (see e.g.
Leoni and Falk, 2010; Lechmann and Schnabel, 2012; Simoes et al.,
2016). This might also be important in the case of EXI, since busi-
ness start-ups only have to be the main occupation, not necessarily
a full-time job. Less restrictive eligibility criteria were also shown by
the authors to be supportive in reintegrating unemployed women into
the labor market. Interestingly, Wolff et al. (2016) show for the EG
and recipients of UB (SGBII) that only 22% of the participants were
female in all of Germany. In EXI, eligibility criteria are comparatively
15 Note, that also the male/ female ratio of unemployed is approximately one (see
Table 2.A1) between the years 2007 and 2014 in the observed federal state.
Compared to that, the business owners are slightly more unequally distributed.
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less restrictive for the NB / UB (SGBII) group, where both genders are
approximately evenly distributed (54% male, 46% female), while the
business owners receiving UB (SGBIII) are predominantly male (63%
and 37%, respectively). To be eligible for UB (SGBIII) an employment
of twelve months with some kind of income has to be proven. Thus,
reactivation is less important for that group, but restrictions by the
German Social Code may work as an entry barrier. Also, the necessary
denial on GZ requires tenacity in the start-up plans and contact to
several agencies.
EXI-subsidized business owners are about 36.0 years old. This is line
with the results found in the previous literature for Germany, as Hinz
and Jungbauer-Gans (1999) found an average age of 39.3 for unem-
ployed owners and Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) found an average of
37.7 to 39.4 (depending on gender and analyzed start-up subsidy). Ta-
ble 2.2 and Figure 2.3 highlight the age distribution. In contrast to the
average age, which is quite equal among the four groups, the density of
the five generated age classes differs to some extent. While the groups
of the mid-twenties to the mid-forties represent the most important
classes of business owners (in all groups above 60%), start-ups founded
by the youth (18 – 24 years) are significantly more relevant in the case
of UB (SGBIII) than in NB / UB (SGBII). The resulting reverse u-
shaped distribution of age on the x-axis and the relative density on the
y-axis has its peak at the age of 25 to 40, which has also been shown
by several empirical studies for Germany before (Pfeiffer and Reize,
2000; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Caliendo et al., 2015) and by the
KFW-Gründungsmonitor.
When concentrating on gender differences, the gender gap is the small-
est in the youngest and oldest age categories, while it is more pro-
nounced in the mid-age groups. However, overall the businesses founded
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by women are slightly more equably distributed among the age groups
indicating that age is of less importance. That the supported businesses
are on average younger than the rest of the unemployed, can be seen
in Table 2.A1. This and the u-shaped distribution of age and business
formation rate can be attributed to two effects. At first, the frequency
of business foundations are positively influenced by age. The older
an individual gets, the higher that individual’s endowment of social, fi-
nancial and human capital, which is supportive for the start-up process
(Simoes et al., 2016). However, at a certain threshold the propensity to
start-up diminishes as the excepted returns by self-employment com-
pared to paid employment are decreasing. Levesque and Minniti (2006)
refer to the differences between waged labor, from which an individ-
ual receives income immediately, and self-employment, which needs an
investment and from which future returns are expected. The shorter
this period, the relatively more attractive waged labor compared to
self-employment, causing the u-shaped distribution.
The above-average share of migrant self-employment compared to the
entire population is a common issue in the literature (Borjas, 1986;
Andersson et al., 2013; for Germany see Constant and Zimmermann,
2006), which can also be found in the EXI-dataset.16 About 15.8%
of the women and 18.8% of the men of NB / UB (SGBII) group are
migrants. Compared to the UB (SGBIII) group (6.4% men and 5.6%
women) this is a significant difference. Nevertheless, this is signifi-
cantly above the share of migrants compared to all unemployed per-
sons in Thuringia, as less than 3.6% have a migrant background (see
Table 2.A1). Yet compared to the German average of migrant own-
ership, about 22% (see KFW-Gründungsmonitor), it is significantly
16 In the present study, a person who is either Ethnic German (Spät-aussiedler),
Foreigner (No German Citizenship) or German citizens who were born abroad
are counted as migrants.
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less. As the gap between men and women of the EXI-owners is re-
markably smaller and only in the case of foreigners with no German
citizenship of NB / UB (SGBII) significant, the results indicate that
the start-up support is a much stronger incentive for unemployed per-
sons receiving NB / UB (SGBII). The comparatively high share of
migrant owners may be a result of several causes. An important aspect
is possibly the state’s provision of payment and the equal access for all
beneficiary groups. The distributed grant helps to overcome liquidity
constraints, as credit-markets typically tend to discriminate against mi-
grants (Blanchard et al., 2008; Blanchflower, 2009; Bruder et al., 2011).
Furthermore, migrants are also discriminated against in the dependent-
employment sector. Not only are the wages offered for the same job
lower than those to the natives (Clark and Drinkwater, 2000), which
lowers the opportunity costs of becoming self-employed. But they are
also discriminated as they are less likely to be hired simply because
of the fact that they are migrants (Lavergne and Mullainathan, 2004;
Weichselbaumer, 2017). Finally, in Germany, where self-employment is
relatively scarce compared to international standards,17 migrants “im-
port” the self-employment culture of their home-countries. If migrants
come from countries with comparatively high self-employment rates,
it is more likely for them to become self-employed in their destination
country (Hammarstedt and Shukur, 2009).
17 For example, in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor of the corresponding year
(Bosma et al., 2008, p. 5) it is stated: “Some European countries – most
notably Belgium, Germany and France – consistently have the lowest rates of
entrepreneurial activity levels. This possibly reflects the relative risk aversion
of European inhabitants and their declared relative preference for employment
over self-employment.”
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Table 2.2: Socio-demographic background of the business owners
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
Age (in years) 36.68 36.96 36.11 36.98 0.28 0.87 −0.57 0.02
18 - 24 years 0.078 0.089 0.132 0.121 0.011 −0.011 0.054** 0.032
25 - 34 years 0.414 0.365 0.382 0.351 −0.049** −0.032 −0.032 −0.015
35 - 44 years 0.272 0.301 0.250 0.253 0.029** 0.003 −0.022 −0.048**
45 - 54 years 0.174 0.189 0.184 0.227 0.016 0.044 0.010 0.038
55 - 66 years 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.048 −0.007 −0.004 −0.010 −0.007
Migrant 0.188 0.158 0.064 0.056 −0.030** −0.008 −0.124** −0.102**
Ethnic German (Spätaussiedler) 0.022 0.021 0.005 0.004 −0.001 −0.001 −0.017** −0.017**
Foreigner (No German Citizenship) 0.129 0.107 0.039 0.035 −0.022** −0.004 −0.090** −0.072**
German citizens who were born abroad 0.037 0.030 0.020 0.017 −0.007 −0.003 −0.017** −0.013
Disabled 0.029 0.023 0.024 0.019 −0.006 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004
Observations 2,351 2,028 795 462
Notes: Characteristics are measured at the application date for the start-up support, based on administrative records. Numbers are
shares unless otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.
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Another socio-demographic aspect concerns disability.18 Looking at
the percentage of owners with a disability (see Table 2.2), it becomes
clear, that in all groups about 2 to 3% are constrained in their life
activities. The equally distributed share of business owners is an inter-
esting finding, but the share is comparatively small and approximately
half of the share of disabled compared to all unemployed persons (see
Table 2.A1).
However, the small quantity, heterogeneity of definitions and data con-
straints due to the personal character of the disabilities linked with
medical data protection, leads to the fact, that the existing literature
on this topic is rather limited (Simoes et al., 2016). In one of the few
existing studies, Pagán (2009) finds that self-employment of disabled
as a percentage of the total employment is in Germany almost equally
distributed between males and females (around 10%). This share is
comparable with the non-disabled part of the population.
2.3.2.2 Qualifications and labor market history of busi-
ness owners
Consistent with previous analyses of the German Labor Market and
start-up support (Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Caliendo et al.,
2012; Wolff et al., 2016), the formerly unemployed owners of EXI have
a comparatively high degree of school education and job experience.
To be clear, this is compared to all unemployed persons, not to the
society as a whole (see Tables 2.3 and 2.A2).19
When looking at the school education level, only a minority of 1.0 to
2.5% have a ISCED-1 level (Primary / No Graduation) or another (not
18 All kinds of disabilities (cognitive, developmental, intellectual, mental, physical,
sensory, or some combination of these) are included.
19 The classes are standardized to the ISCED-levels by the OECD et al. (2015).
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classified) education among the fourth groups. The remaining partic-
ipants have an ISCED-2 (Lower-Secondary) or ISCED-3 (Upper Sec-
ondary) schooling degree. However, differences between the two bene-
ficiary groups of the unemployed are much more relevant than gender
differences. Interestingly, men (75.2%) and women (69.0%) receiving
UB (SGBIII) more often have an ISCED-2 degree in comparison to men
(63.0%) and women (64.0%) of NB / UB (SGBII). Correspondingly, it
is less common that UB (SGBIII) receivers have earned an ISCED-3
degree, which is why they are on average less educated than the NB /
UB (SGBII) group. This is somewhat surprising, as the general popu-
lation of unemployed persons in Thuringia shows a significant reverse
pattern. Among all unemployed persons the UB (SGBII) recipients
in Thuringia significantly less often receive the highest school educa-
tional level and have more often left school with no or only primary
graduation (Table 2.A2).
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Table 2.3: Qualification and labor market history of the business owners
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
General Education
ISCED 1 - Primary / No Graduation 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.000 −0.007** −0.005** −0.007** −0.005**
ISCED 2 - Lower Secondary 0.630 0.640 0.752 0.690 0.009 −0.062** 0.122** 0.051**
ISCED 3 - Upper Secondary 0.345 0.347 0.235 0.301 0.002 0.066** −0.110** −0.046
Other 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.009 −0.004 0.001 −0.005 0.000
Professional Education
No Apprenticeship 0.088 0.060 0.036 0.015 −0.028** −0.087** −0.052** −0.045**
ISCED 3 - Upper Secondary 0.027 0.033 0.010 0.041 0.006 0.007 −0.017** 0.009
ISCED 4 - Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary 0.526 0.498 0.639 0.552 −0.028 −0.021** 0.113** 0.054**
ISCED 5 - Short-Cycle Tertiary 0.094 0.115 0.166 0.184 0.021** 0.031** 0.072** 0.069**
ISCED 6 - Bachelor or equivalent 0.108 0.102 0.074 0.095 −0.006 0.021 −0.034** −0.007
ISCED 7 - Master or equivalent 0.124 0.160 0.062 0.093 0.036** 0.018 −0.063** −0.067**
Other 0.033 0.033 0.013 0.019 −0.001 0.031** −0.021** −0.013
Long-time unemployed
(12-months) 0.392 0.405 0.060 0.087 0.013 0.027 −0.332** −0.318**
Notes: Characteristics are measured at the beginning of the start-up, based on administrative records. Numbers are shares unless
otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.
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The educational differences indicate the importance of the underly-
ing selection processes into self-employment. At first, Caliendo et al.
(2012)20 and Caliendo et al. (2015) show in their studies that 46.5%
and 47.8% of the participants of GZ had a qualification similar to the
ISCED-3 degree. This is significantly higher than the UB (SGBIII)
owners in EXI. As the EXI-owners are former receivers of UB (SG-
BIII) who were denied GZ benefits, the administrative selection process
by the unemployment agency could already have identified the most
promising entrepreneurs (cherry picking) among the unemployed, pos-
sibly the ones with a higher educational degree. Or these unemployed
persons have been rejected because they had higher chances of finding
a dependent employment. This would be in line with the placement
priority idea, that is, the FEA should only use and permit ALMP if a
direct reintegration into dependent employment is unlikely (Bernhard
and Grüttner, 2015). As there is a lack of literature about the op-
eration and appropriateness of administrative selection processes, this
would be an interesting point of further research.21
However, this does not explain the on average higher educational level
of EXI-owners compared to all unemployed persons. Quite the reverse
would be expected, as Sluis et al. (2008) show in meta-analyses, that,
in Europe, returns to education are slightly lower for entrepreneurs
than for employees. Due to this result, it could be expected that those
unemployed persons with a high level of education are more likely to
self-select into employment than self-employment. They may also be
more likely to find dependent employment, since most firms rank the
unemployed, as they prefer c.p. jobless with a higher level of formal
20 PLease note, Caliendo et al. (2012) use data from businesses started in the first
quarter of 2009, which is three years before the EXI start-up support was opened
to unemployed receiving UB (SGBIII).
21 Most recently, Bellmann et al. (2017) address this topic in a working paper.
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(job) education (Deming et al., 2016) and a lower duration of immediate
unemployment (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Eriksson and Rooth,
2014). A promising approach to shed some light on this issue would be
a comparison with other formerly unemployed persons entering depen-
dent employment and comparing their respective educational levels.
Even if the selection process remains somewhat inconclusive, the high
educational level compared to all unemployed persons is from a policy
perspective promising since a higher endowment of human capital is
associated with a better firm performance (Gimeno et al., 1997; Rauch
and Rijsdijk, 2013).
In the case of job education, it holds true that there are different levels
of education among the unemployed of NB / UB (SGBII) compared to
the UB (SGBIII). All differences of education levels of men (𝑑3) and
most of the differences of women (𝑑4) are significant. However, there is
a changing picture about the average educational level: The group of
NB / UB (SGBII) significantly more often achieves the highest ISCED-
6 (Bachelor or equivalent) or ISCED-7 (Master or equivalent) degrees
(men 23.2% and women 26.2%) compared to those men and women re-
ceiving unemployment benefits (SGBIII) (13.6% vs. 18.8%). However,
they are also more often represented in the lowest educated groups
having no apprenticeship, i.e. an ISCED-3 degree or other (men 14.8%
and women 12.6% compared to men 5.9% and women 7.5%). So while
the first group more often achieves a qualification at the margins of the
educational distribution, the owners formerly receiving UB (SGBIII)
have significantly more often mid-level qualification degrees of ISCED-
4 (Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary) and ISCED-5 (Short-Cycle Tertiary)
(men 80.5% and women 73.6% compared to 62.0% and 61.3%).22 Due
22 Looking at the group of all unemployed persons, those receiving UB (SGBIII)
are, in terms of job-qualification, significantly better educated than the UB
(SGBIII) group (see Table 2.A2).
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to the German training system with its dual-system tracks of voca-
tional education as well universities, these results are consistent with
the school education levels presented before.
As nothing is known about the motives that drives the start-up process,
the heterogeneity among unemployed of NB / UB (SGBII) cannot be
fully elaborated yet. For example Bergmann and Sternberg (2007) show
for the German labor market between the years 2001 and 2004, that
start-ups out of necessity are launched by persons with a wide variety of
educational backgrounds. For those start-ups, educational levels have
no significant impact on the start-up decision, while it is however im-
portant for opportunity-driven start-ups.23 However, the results from
EXI significantly differ from the overall population of the respective
groups (Table 2.A2), since they have significantly more often a univer-
sity degree and are significantly less often suffering from a lack of formal
vocational qualification. According to the KFW-Gründungsmonitor,
17% of the business owners in Germany have no apprenticeship, while
55% have a mid-level job-qualification and 28% receive an ISCED-6 or
ISCED-7 degree.
Overall, the EXI owners compared with all business owners have a
medium level education, with an underrepresentation at the margins.
Compared to all unemployed persons, EXI-owners have a better edu-
cation. In Table 2.A2 it is further shown, that among the lower qual-
ified owners a remarkable share are migrants, which indicates that for
those – next to labor market discrimination – another entry barrier
into wage-employment exists. Again, the start-up subsidy may act as
a non-discriminatory incentive for this group. However, Kogan (2011)
shows that the educational gap for recent immigrants in Germany is
23 In contrast to this, Block and Wagner (2010) find, that both groups (necessity
and opportunity driven start-ups) have the same level of education.
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much smaller than for previous cohorts. In some circumstances the
educational degrees are even higher than those received by the native-
born.
When looking at the labor market history of the business owners in
Table 2.3, it is obvious that the NB / UB (SGBII) group is more often
suffering from long-term unemployment (about 40% of business owners
independent of sex) than the counterpart of the UB (SGBIII) receivers
(6.0% of male and 8.7% of female business owners). Consistent with
this finding, unemployed persons are only eligible for a period of twelve
months for the UB (SGBIII)24, which is coincident with the definition
of long-term unemployment. Typically, the longer the current unem-
ployment period, the less likely it is to find wage-employment. Not
only can an ongoing stint of unemployment depreciate human capi-
tal (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999),
but also potential employers put particular emphasis on the long-term
unemployment status (Eriksson and Rooth, 2014).
On the contrary, unemployment duration also has a financial dimen-
sion, since benefit entitlements are partially limited. Thus, the ques-
tion arises, how a remaining entitlement influences the start-up deci-
sion. For example, Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) find for the start-up
subsidy and bridging-allowance, that a remarkably low share of unem-
ployed persons starting a business have a remaining entitlement of lower
than one month. Even if no data for the EXI about a remaining entitle-
ment and the exact duration of the unemployment exists, the majority
of unemployed persons likely starts their businesses when approaching
24 For unemployed above the age of 55 years, the eligibility period is extended up
to two years.
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the end of the twelve months of the UB (SGBIII).25 This is reasonable
because, first there is a regulation that the unemployed persons shift
after twelve months to the NB / UB (SGBII) group. To prevent this,
becoming self-employed (with a fixed amount of monthly support pay-
ments by the EXI) is an advisable alternative in comparison to no or
less state payments (cf. Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007). Second, the
unemployment benefits as well as the GZ-support are typically linked
to higher payments than the EXI. From a profit maximizing aspect, it
would not be reasonable to forgo these safe payments.
2.3.3 Types of businesses started
In Table 2.4, we highlight the different sectors in which the four groups
are engaged.26 Arguments put forward by Johnson (2004) and Shane
(2009) state that start-ups by the unemployed are mainly created in
industries of high competition, comparatively low entry barriers and
with high risk of failures, where start-ups would not be most promising.
In the EXI-dataset most businesses started by men are in the indus-
tries of business activities, transport and logistics (23.8% NB / UB
(SGBII) and 26.3% UB (SGBIII)), construction (10.1% and 28.1%)
and retail (21.8% and 14.5%). For women other unspecified services
(34.2% NB / UB (SGBII) and 30.1% UB (SGBIII)) are the predom-
inant sector, which is mostly represented by hairdressing and beauty.
25 Interestingly, Caliendo et al. (2012) find, that this does only holds partially
true in the case of GZ. Businesses are started significantly earlier in the unem-
ployment period, than it was found in the case of the start-up subsidy and the
bridging-allowance.
26 It was only possible to opt for one business at the beginning of the start-up,
so diversified businesses which are active in more than one sector are not cap-
tured. However, in previous analyses (Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000) it was shown
that the majority (> 95%) of supported businesses are non-diversified, so that
no significant changes of the statics may result from that issue.
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Again, retail (17.9% and 14.9%) and business activities, transport and
logistics (17.8% and 16.7%) are further important industries. Personal
social services, health activities, education (12.5% and 17.1%) as well
as hotels and restaurants (10.1% and 8.4%) finish the enumeration for
women.
Consistent with the existing literature (Bates, 1995; Du Rietz and Hen-
rekson, 2000; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Koellinger et al., 2013) there
is a significant difference in the type of business activity between men
and women. Existing role models (Welter and Smallbone, 2010; Welter
et al., 2014) as well as the relevance of the fields of study (Leoni and
Falk, 2010), prior working experience and the related accumulation of
industry specific human capital (Kim et al., 2006) tend to be the main
determinants of the chosen sectors. For the case of EXI, differences
between NB / UB (SGBII) and UB (SGBIII) are of less relevance,
with the exception of the significant difference of men (18.0%) in the
construction industry (see Table 2.4). As this industry typically is not
characterized by the need for a high level of formal education (Grown
and Bates, 1992; Bates, 1995; Kim et al., 2006) this could be a fur-
ther hint for the mid-level qualification of the owners of UB (SGBIII)
compared to NB / UB (SGBII), which has been presented before.
The chosen industry is of high relevance for the future success of the
business. Comparing the chosen industries of the EXI-owners with
sector survival rates as presented by Fritsch et al. (2006), the critical
arguments mentioned earlier are not contradicted. Most of the favored
industries by EXI-owners, however, show a survival probability which
is below average (construction 57.3%, hotels and restaurants 53.1%) or
average (wholesale and retail trade (64.2% and 63.9%), other private
services 68.5%, traffic and freight 62.3%) compared to all private indus-
tries (64.1%) after two years. The sectors do not significantly change
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in the five-year and ten-year survival perspective. A positive exception
is the health care sector with a two-year survival rate of 85.1%. Only a
small minority of the EXI-owners is engaged in manufacturing, where
survivability is generally higher than in services.
The EXI-data neither provides information about the necessary start-
up capital for the venture, nor about the share of the capital brought
in by the owner. However, the start-up support after the period of eli-
gibility may provide some useful insights into the general distribution
of the necessary money. Aside from the owner’s living costs, all costs
of the business were eligible. A start-up subsidy lower than 7,200 EUR
indicates lower costs of the business during the first year. However, a
value of 7,200 EUR does not show how much higher the actual cap-
ital requirement in the first year was, as it represents an upper limit
on the financial resources. At first glance the average subsidy ranges
from 6,751 EUR (men of NB / UB (SGBII)) to 6,977 EUR (men of
UB (SGBIII)). The difference of 225 EUR is highly significant. Also
women of UB (SGBIII) received slightly, but still significantly, higher
subsidies than their NB / UB (SGBII) counterpart. The large majority
of the owners (around 80%) had higher costs than 7,200 EUR in their
first year, while less than 5% did not even need 3,600 EUR. Men and
women show no significant differences in capital requirement, which
in the context of reported differences in the selected industries is re-
markable and is not reflected by the literature (Caliendo and Kritikos,
2010). One hint may be the fact, that the state cuts off the distribu-
tion at the 7,200 EUR margin. Those businesses which were typicality
more capital intensive and started by men (e.g. construction, retail of
machinery and cars) may thus be of less importance as their higher
capital requirements are not adequately reflected in the data.
33
Table 2.4: Industry and start-up capital of businesses
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
Industry of start-up
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishery, environment 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.002 −0.007** −0.005 −0.001 0.000
Business activities, transport, logistics 0.238 0.178 0.263 0.167 −0.060** −0.096** 0.025 −0.011
Construction 0.101 0.005 0.281 0.015 −0.096** −0.265** 0.180** 0.010
Financial intermediation 0.045 0.031 0.040 0.065 −0.014** 0.025 −0.005 0.034**
Hotels and restaurants 0.086 0.101 0.050 0.084 0.015 0.034** −0.036** −0.016
Manufacturing 0.043 0.033 0.064 0.037 −0.010 −0.027** 0.021** 0.004
Mining, energy and water supply 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.000 −0.002 −0.003 −0.000 −0.001
Other unspecified services 0.211 0.342 0.103 0.301 0.132** 0.198** −0.107** −0.041
Personal social services, health activities, education 0.031 0.125 0.029 0.171 0.095** 0.142** −0.002 0.046**
Post, information technology, telecommunications 0.016 0.003 0.015 0.009 −0.013** −0.006 −0.001 0.005
Retail 0.218 0.179 0.145 0.149 −0.039** 0.005 −0.074** −0.030
Start-up support (in Euro) 6,751.00 6,767.00 6,977.00 6,890.00 16.00 -87.00 225.00** 123.00**
Up to 3,600.00 Euro 0.046 0.041 0.023 0.030 −0.005 0.007 −0.022** −0.011
3,600.01 EUR - 7,199.99 EUR 0.180 0.195 0.101 0.130 0.015 0.030 −0.079** −0.064**
7,200 EUR 0.775 0.765 0.876 0.840 −0.010 −0.036 0.101** 0.075**
Notes: Industries are measured at the beginning of the start-up, the start-up support after the period of eligibility (typically twelve
months) based on administrative records. Numbers are shares unless otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.
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2.3.4 Localization of business start-ups
Another important issue is the regional distribution of businesses foun-
ded. The data is reported on the level of official municipality codes
(Gebietskennzahlen), which is a unique identifier for every politically
independent municipality or unincorporated area in Germany. In this
paper, for analysis purposes, the data has been aggregated. To get
a first glance, in Figure 2.2, we present shares of subsidized start-ups
on all supported businesses of EXI at the NUTS-3 level (EUROSTAT,
2011b). Thuringia is divided into 23 administrative districts (Kreise
and Kreisfreie Städte). We can recognize, that Figures 2.2a and 2.2b
of Thuringia for men and women of NB / UB (SGBII) closely resemble
each other. The highest shares of start-ups can be found in the urban
districts of EF (Erfurt), WE (Weimar) and J (Jena), while more rural
districts in the northern and southern part of the federal state show a
lower share of supported firms.
Compared to the men and women of UB (SGBIII), illustrated in Fig-
ures 2.2c and 2.2d, there are significant differences. Rural districts in
the middle and south (as well as again the capital of the federal state
EF) show an above-average business formation rate. However, the ag-
gregation on a district level is to some extent generalized as in more
rural districts also larger agglomerations exist. A more detailed view
is, thus, also presented: Looking at Table 2.5, it is obvious that indeed
significant differences in the degree of urbanization between the four
groups prevail.27 While only 26.4% of NB / UB (SGBII) men started
up in rural areas, 40.2% did so in cities. For men of UB (SGBIII) the
reverse is true, as 44.4% (23.0%) founded their business in sparsely
27 The degree of urbanization is measured by the Eurostat “Degree of Urbanisa-
tion” (DEGURBA) classification for LAU2 (Local Administrative Units) areas,
which correspond to the municipal level (EUROSTAT, 2011a).
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(densely) populated regions. The same holds true for women, even if a
more equal distribution can be found in the data. Thus, the formerly
unemployed of UB (SGBIII) are significantly more likely to found their
businesses in rural areas than in cities. To some extent, this can be
attributed again to the share of migrants of the owners of NB / UB
(SGBII).
(a) Men – NB / UB II (SGBII) (b) Women – NB / UB II (SGBII)
(c) Men – UB (SGBIII) (d) Women – UB (SGBIII)
Figure 2.2: Regional distribution of subsidized businesses
Notes: In Figure 2.2, the shares of subsidized businesses on all businesses per class (men
(top left) and women (top right) of NB / UB (SGBII) and men (bottom left) and women
(bottom right) of UB (SGBIII)) in the 23 districts of Thuringia are illustrated.
Source: Statistics of the GFAW; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
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As can be seen in Table 2.A2 migrants predominantly favored found-
ing businesses in cities. Nevertheless, also for non-migrant owners the
trends exists in a moderate form. This may be due to a correlation of
the chosen industry and the localization of business. While for example
the construction sector is predominantly found in sparsely populated
areas by UB (SGBIII) (23.1% to 7.9% in densely populated areas),
other businesses, especially retail, are of more importance for the NB
/ UB (SGBII) and more often founded in cities (31.1%) than in rural
areas (24.2%) by this subgroup.
However, causality remains uncertain, as personal preferences or a
lack of dependent employment opportunities can drive the localiza-
tion choice. Likewise, opportunities in a given area can also drive the
industry choice. On this topic, Dahl and Sorenson (2009, 2012) state
that the former plays a major role, as entrepreneurs prefer proxim-
ity to family and friends, while regional characteristics and venture
opportunities are of less importance for start-up decisions. Interest-
ingly, in all groups of the EXI-dataset, approximately one third of the
owners started their business in intermediate density areas (towns and
suburbs), independent of gender, migration status or unemployment
group.
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Table 2.5: Business placement
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
Area of Business Domicile
Cities (densely populated areas) 0.402 0.354 0.230 0.266 −0.048** 0.036 −0.172** −0.088**
Towns and suburbs (intermediate density areas) 0.334 0.354 0.326 0.352 0.020 0.026 −0.008 −0.002
Rural areas (thinly populated areas) 0.264 0.292 0.444 0.382 0.028** −0.062** 0.180** 0.091**
Notes: Characteristics are measured at the beginning of the start-up, based on administrative records. Numbers are shares unless
otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.38
2.3.5 Outcomes
2.3.5.1 Business survival
Looking at business survival rates, the descriptive statistics are quite
puzzling. The regional administration of Thuringia reported two dif-
ferent measures, which should be interpreted as a lower and upper
bound of the business survival rate as no direct monitoring of business
performance after the funding period has been done.
The upper bound is the rate of discontinued operations during the
funding period. These businesses exited the market during the first
twelve months after their foundation, as the reported eligible period
was less than the maximum of twelve months. This is, however, rarely
happening, as above 95% of the owners of NB / UB (SGBII) and UB
(SGBIII) still continued their business after the first year. But likely
the beneficiaries want to receive the money until the end of the maxi-
mum funding period. It may be an expression of missing alternatives
or a profit-maximizing behavior in the course of the support. No sig-
nificant difference between the unemployment groups can be found.
Likewise, no significant gender-gap exists.
The lower bound refers to the administration process. Next to start-ups
not having completed the full twelve months, also completely revoked
subsidies may be counted as business exits. These are founded busi-
nesses whose application for the subsidy has been approved in the first
instance, but the grant has been reclaimed in the meantime. Neither a
reason of the repayment claim is reported, nor at which time the cause
of cancellation occurred. Typically, this is due to insolvency, as pre-
conditions for disbursement are not fulfilled. But also violating other
covenants during the eligible period may be a reason (e.g. start-up is
only a sideline business). Again, about 90% of the subsidized businesses
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survived in this sense, while men of NB / UB (SGBII) are significantly
more often affected by these problems.
Comparing the results with those reported by OECD and European
Commission (2014), Caliendo (2016) and Chapter 4 of this thesis, and
also taking into account the funding period, which is still ongoing, in
international comparison EXI ranks in the top range of the one-year
survival rates after start-up. Due to the missing post-evaluation, results
about survivability are very limited in their validity. For sure, a more
appropriate approach would measure the survival rate after the subsidy
faded out. One can expect that it is harder to stay in the market at
the end of the payment period and the years after that. Longer-term
analysis would therefore be preferable.28
2.3.5.2 Indirect employment effects
Nightingale and Coad (2013) state that the transition from an unem-
ployed person to an employer may be the best case from the policy
maker’s perspective, but it is just as rarely the case. Being aware
that the given categories are limited in their meaningfulness, the over-
whelming majority (> 98%) of the started businesses has less than five
employees.29 Almost no business was found with more than 20 employ-
ees. The only two exceptions were businesses in the retail industry. In
sum, it can also be derived from the data that at least four additional
jobs were created per 100 subsidized participants at the time of start-
up. Additionally, we found in the case of UB (SGBIII) men (1.7%) a
group of significant employment creation, which is mainly driven by
28 Due to reasons of data protection, a post-evaluation and a survey of a comparison
group was not possible. Further, the intended post-evaluation of the federal state
of Thuringia has not been conducted.
29 Also the owners of the business count as employees, that is, it can not be said,
how many businesses really had employees when starting up.
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the owners of the construction, retail and manufacturing sectors. This
concentration on a few sectors is not too surprising, since the above
mentioned are more labor intensive. However, it remains to further
research to find long-term indirect employment effects. In general,
the literature shows that unemployed individuals converting to self-
employed are predominantly solo-entrepreneurs (Caliendo et al., 2012)
and keep their prospects in a medium-term perspective (Caliendo and
Kritikos, 2010; Fritsch et al., 2012; Poschke, 2013).
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Table 2.6: Outcomes
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
Business Survival
Discontinued operations (during funding period) 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.050 −0.009 0.021 −0.009 0.021
Cessation of business𝑏 0.106 0.079 0.065 0.084 −0.028** 0.018 −0.041** 0.005
Corporation Size
1-4 employees 0.993 0.995 0.983 0.991 0.002 0.008 −0.009 −0.004
5 - 19 employees 0.007 0.005 0.017 0.009 −0.002 −0.008** 0.010** −0.001
20- 49 employees 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001
Notes: Characteristics are measured at the ending of the start-up support funding period or latest administrative action, based on
administrative records. Numbers are shares unless otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
𝑏 The variable also contain projects being completely revoked by the administration, which increases the numbers of observations by
337 (180 men and 109 women of NB / UB (SGBII) and 31 men and 17 women UB (SGBIII)).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.
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2.4 Conclusion
Data about start-up subsidy programs for the unemployed are rather
scarce and are particularly needed at the regional level. When eval-
uating such policies, the business founding aspects as well as the ALMP
perspective play an important role. This paper introduces a new dataset
that provides valuable information about the characteristics of formerly
unemployed owners, their start-ups along with reported outcomes. The
full data set contains all 5,636 business owners receiving the EXI start-
up subsidy between 2007 and 2014 in the German federal state of
Thuringia. With regard to the number of observations, this dataset
is, thus, one of the largest datasets analyzed in the existing literature
in that research field. Additionally, it covers a regional subsidy that
complements the GZ and EG, which in turn generated broad recogni-
tion by scholars (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2009; Caliendo et al., 2012,
2015; Wolff and Nivorozhkin, 2012; Wolff et al., 2016) and interna-
tional organizations (OECD and European Commission, 2014). Since
the introduction of the Hartz-reforms, EXI is the first start-up subsidy
program targeted towards all unemployed groups in a specific region of
Germany. Former studies only covered selective unemployment groups
due to program eligibility criteria and were performed on the federal
level.
In this paper, we provide detailed descriptive statistics about this
dataset. To shed some light on the ALMP and start-up perspective
of the EXI as well, the presented descriptive statistics were compared
with previous studies on start-up subsidies, with all unemployed in the
related region but also with all business owners of Germany for the
time EXI was in charge. Three main results were derived from this
study, even though they should always be seen and interpreted under
the aspect of a regional start-up subsidy program on the federal state
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of Thuringia and the corresponding limitations.
First, in some characteristics (gender of the participants or educa-
tion) the formerly unemployed owners receiving EXI significantly dif-
fer from relevant reference groups, while for other characteristics (age-
distribution, share of migrant business owners) EXI confirms the results
found in the literature so far. Comparing characteristics of the EXI-
owners with that of all business founders in Germany or other start-up
subsidies like GZ and EG. EXI is particularly attractive for women. Al-
most half of the businesses were set up by unemployed women, which
can be attributed to a generally higher female labor market participa-
tion rate in East Germany, but also to the fact, that the EXI support
scheme is relatively well suited to generate additional household income
and to combine work and family life through self-employment. Further,
the general and job specific human capital of the owners is compara-
tively high compared to all unemployed persons in the federal state of
Thuringia. Only a small proportion of the owners has not graduated
school or has no apprenticeship, while the share of participants that
obtained a general upper secondary or a university degree is surpris-
ingly high compared to all unemployed persons. This is to be assessed
positively with regard to the company’s future probabilities of success.
However, compared to all business owners in Germany or unemployed
receiving GZ, the EXI-receivers are on average less formally educated,
which points to interrelations with the selection process as the better
educated persons could already be in other support measures.
Second, confirming arguments put forward by Johnson (2004), Shane
(2009) and Niefert (2010) start-ups founded by the unemployed are
mainly created in less promising industries, characterized by compara-
tively low entry barriers, high competition and high failure rates. The
overwhelming majority of the EXI owners started their business in the
44
sectors of retail, construction, hotel and restaurants as well as other
services (most common is hairdressing and beauty) – all of which are
the sectors with the highest failure rates.
Third, only a minority of start-ups creates indirect employment effects
at the time of start-up (four additional jobs per 100 participants), while
the direct employment effect of the owners is comparatively high. The
one-year survivability of the firms is above 90%. However, as this
corresponds to the funding period, nothing is known about the medium-
term perspective of the business performance when support is no longer
available. Typically, this leads to a strong increase in exit-rates.
Only little is known about interdependencies of policy design, the en-
try decision and future business success with particular reference to
regional circumstances. In this paper it has been shown, that the lack
of a consistent scientific monitoring of ALMP and start-ups as well
hindrances to scholars in their research, preventing appropriate advice
for policy design. To address this problem, we provide an additional
source of data to the economic community, to partially fill these ex-
isting gaps and create a starting point for further holistic research ap-
proaches. However, the paper can unfortunately not fill the existing
lack of studies about program effectiveness in the long term.
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of unemployment rates
Notes: In Figure 2.3, the distribution of participant age of unemployed being no beneficiary
or receiving social benefit / unemployment benefit II (SGBII) and receiving unemployment
benefit (SGBIII) are illustraded. Separated for men and women.
Source: Statistics of the GFAW; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
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Table 2.A1: Socio-demographic background of unemployment in Thuringia
Social benefit / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Unemployment benefit II (SGBIII)
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
Age category
18 - 24 years 0.068 0.069 0.157 0.100 0.010 0.020** −0.025 0.022
25 - 34 years 0.259 0.238 0.173 0.148 0.155** 0.127** 0.210** 0.202**
35 - 44 years 0.224 0.233 0.148 0.171 0.048** 0.068** 0.102** 0.082**
45 - 54 years 0.295 0.303 0.230 0.292 −0.121** −0.113** −0.046** −0.065**
55 - 66 years 0.154 0.157 0.292 0.289 −0.092** −0.102** −0.241** −0.241**
Migrant 0.036 0.036 0.014 0.014 0.152** 0.123** 0.050** 0.043**
Disability 0.062 0.045 0.070 0.063 −0.033** −0.021** −0.046** −0.043**
Annual Average 2007 to 2014 38,751 35,903 21,141 21,204
Notes: Characteristics base on official administrative records. Numbers are shares unless stated otherwise. Reported values are annual
averages of the years 2007 to 2014.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences between the annual averages of unemployed (full-data of the years 2007 to 2014) and the
respective business owners receiving EXI. Presented results are grouped for men (𝑑1) and women (𝑑2) receiving social benefit /
unemployment benefit II (SGBII) and men (𝑑3) and women (𝑑4) receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII). Please note, that data is
not available for the no-beneficary group.
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data by the FEA.
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Table 2.A2: Qualification and labor market history of unemployment in Thuringia
Social benefit / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Unemployment benefit II (SGBIII)
(SGBII)
Men (I) Women (II) Men (III) Women (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV) 𝑑3 (I vs. III) 𝑑4 (II vs. IV)
School Education
ISCED 1 - Primary / No Graduation 0.125 0.084 0.029 0.015 −0.113** −0.079** −0.024** −0.015**
ISCED 2 - Lower Secondary 0.785 0.827 0.806 0.812 −0.154** −0.188** −0.053** −0.122**
ISCED 3 - Upper Secondary 0.068 0.065 0.154 0.165 0.277** 0.281** 0.081** 0.136**
Other 0.022 0.023 0.012 0.008 −0.010** −0.015** −0.004 0.001
Job Education𝑏
No Apprenticeship 0.259 0.237 0.101 0.062 −0.171** −0.177** −0.048** −0.047**
ISCED 3 / 4 / 5 - Upper Secondary to Short-Cycle Tertiary 0.669 0.691 0.808 0.822 −0.023 −0.046** 0.007 −0.045**
ISCED 6 / 7 - Bachelor / Master or equivalent 0.033 0.033 0.101 0.109 0.199** 0.229** 0.035** 0.079**
Other / No Information 0.038 0.040 0.006 0.007 −0.005 −0.007 0.006 0.012
Notes: Characteristics based on official administrative records. Numbers are shares unless otherwise stated. Reported values are annual
averages of the years 2007 - 2014.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences between the annual averages of unemployed (full-data of the years 2007 to 2014) and the
respective business owners receiving EXI. Presented results are grouped for men (𝑑1) and women (𝑑2) receiving social benefit /
unemployment benefit II (SGBII) and men (𝑑3) and women (𝑑4) receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII). Please note, that data is
not available for the no-beneficiary group.
𝑏 Annual means of the years 2009 to 2014, due to data availability.
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data from the GFAW.
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Table 2.A3: Qualification and labor market history of the business owners among non-migrants and
migrants
No beneficiary / Unemployment benefit Differences of means𝑎
Social benefit / (SGBIII)
Unemployment benefit II
(SGBII)
Non-Migrant (I) Migrant (II) Non-Migrant (III) Migrant (IV) 𝑑1 (I vs. II) 𝑑2 (III vs. IV)
School Education
ISCED 1 - Primary / No Graduation 0.005 0.028 0.001 0.039 0.022** 0.038
ISCED 2 - Lower Secondary 0.652 0.552 0.744 0.506 −0.100** −0.238**
ISCED 3 - Upper Secondary 0.340 0.371 0.253 0.364 0.030 0.111**
Other 0.002 0.050 0.003 0.091 0.048** 0.088**
Job Education
No Apprenticeship 0.048 0.203 0.019 0.169 0.155** 0.149**
ISCED 3 - Upper Secondary 0.021 0.069 0.019 0.065 0.048** 0.046
ISCED 4 - Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary 0.561 0.283 0.625 0.325 −0.278** −0.301**
ISCED 5 - Short-Cycle Tertiary 0.113 0.058 0.176 0.117 −0.055** −0.059
ISCED 6 - Bachelor or equivalent 0.104 0.113 0.081 0.104 0.009 0.023
ISCED 7 - Master or equivalent 0.137 0.160 0.069 0.130 0.023 0.060
Other 0.016 0.114 0.010 0.091 0.098** 0.081**
Area of Business Domicile
Cities (densely populated areas) 0.338 0.577 0.229 0.461 0.239** 0.231**
Towns and suburbs (intermediate density areas) 0.345 0.336 0.332 0.382 −0.009 0.049
Rural areas (thinly populated areas) 0.317 0.088 0.439 0.158 −0.229** −0.281**
Notes: Characteristics are measured at the beginning of the start-up, based on administrative records. Numbers are shares unless
otherwise stated.
𝑎 The ** indicate significant differences of means in the variables between men and women being no beneficiary or receiving social benefit
/ unemployment benefit II (SGBII) (𝑑1), men and women receiving unemployment benefit (SGBIII) (𝑑2), men in both unemployment
groups (𝑑3) as well as women in both unemployment groups (𝑑4).
Source: Authors’ own illustrations, based on administrative data by the the GFAW.
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Chapter 3
Start-Up Subsidies for the Unemployed – The
Effects on Regional Labor Markets
“SUN: Tell me about yourself.
SHEN TEH: What is there? I’ve got a small shop.
SUN, ironically: Oh, so you haven’t got a flat, you’ve got a shop!
SHEN TEH, firmly: I’ve got a shop, but before that I was on the streets.
SUN: And the shop, I take it, was a gift of the gods?
SHEN TEH: Yes.
SUN: One fine evening they stood before you and said: Here’s some money for you.
SHEN TEH, laughing quietly: One morning.”
— Brecht (2016, p. 110f.)
Abstract.30 Active Labor Market Policies, like the promotion of self-
employment among unemployed persons, are broadly discussed instru-
ments to improve the employment situation in Europe. Whether the
measures implemented work is, however, uncertain. We contribute to
already completed participant evaluations by conducting a macroeco-
nomic approach, investigating a unique data set of participants of two
distinctive start-up subsidies in Thuringia, a federal state of Germany.
When implementing a stock-flow matching function, we find only lim-
ited evidence that start-up subsidies help to reduce unemployment at
the regional level. We demonstrate that direct employment effects
largely depend on the supported target groups and their prior endow-
30 I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Heike Grimm, Dr. Johannes Jaenicke, Dr. Tina
Haussen and Lee Drewitz as well as the participants of the 2016 International
Council for Small Businesess (ICSB) World Conference, New York/ New Jersey,
and the 2017 RENT Conference, Lund (i.e. Prof. Dr. Hiroyuki Okamuro and
two anonymous referees) for many helpful discussions and suggestions. The
presentation of the paper in Lund, Sweden has been financially supported by
the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD).
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ment of human and financial capital. In particular for the long-term
unemployed with a lower endowment of human and financial capital
these results give new indications about counteracting market distor-
tion. Conclusions for reasonable policy implications are discussed.31
3.1 Introduction
As a result of the financial and economic crisis, Europe’s labor markets
are still in a tense situation. The unemployment rate within the Euro-
pean Union (EU) has increased from 7.2% in 2007 to its high of 10.9% in
2013 but has begun slowly recovering since then (International Labour
Organization, 2011, 2015, 2017). Appropriate policies may help to im-
prove the employment situation. For this purpose, policymakers iden-
tified active labor market policies (ALMP) as a possible instrument of
recourse and implemented them in several countries (Kluve, 2010; Card
et al., 2015). Between 2007 and 2013, public expenditures on ALMP
relative to GDP increased by a third, from 1.43% to 1.90%, in the EU.
One of these ALMP, the promotion of self-employment among the un-
employed, became one of the most broadly discussed measures (OECD
and European Commission, 2014; Eurofound, 2016). While evaluation
studies identify positive employment effects for the supported partic-
ipants and show high survival rates (e.g. Andersson and Wadensjö,
2007; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Wolff et al., 2016; Caliendo, 2016;
Dvoulety` and Lukeš, 2016), as of yet there is no evidence whether they
further help to reduce unemployment in a region.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the specifications of ALMP through
31 JEL-Classification: J64; P48; J08; M13; L53; O11. Keywords: Regional Policy;
Start-Up Subsidy; Unemployment; Entrepreneurship
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start-up subsidies for the unemployed with respect to its employment
effects at the regional level. Existing empirical studies have to be com-
plemented by macroeconomic approaches as ALMP measures not only
cause direct positive effects for the individuals involved, but may also
create externalities on non-participants (Calmfors, 1995; Calmfors and
Skedinger, 1995; Fehr et al., 2002; Abbring and Heckman, 2007; Brown
and Koettl, 2015). On the one hand, starting up a business ends unem-
ployment for individuals, directly reducing the regional unemployment
rates. Further, younger firms contribute to job creation and growth
more than well-established companies (Hart and Oulton, 1999; Law-
less, 2014) and the formation of new and growing firms by formerly
unemployed persons may lead to more people getting hired, having an
indirect effect on the regional unemployment situation. On the other
hand, subsidization of self-employment can cause market distortions.
New businesses supported by ALMP programs can crowd-out other es-
tablished companies as well as their employees due to cost advantages
created by the rewarded grants. Moreover, given that some of the un-
employed would have established a business without start-up subsidies,
dead-weight effects of the programs may emerge. As the public covers
the rising expenditures for the programs, it is of great public interest to
evaluate whether the implemented measures are effective with respect
to their net employment effects.
Compared across nations, start-up subsidies traditionally represent a
minor role in the wider range of ALMP measures (Martin and Grubb,
2001). Germany, however, is unique in this respect. Labor market re-
forms and the initiation of federal start-up support programs led to a
remarkable increase in business formation rates from unemployed per-
sons in the last decade (Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007; Caliendo and
Kritikos, 2010; Bellmann et al., 2017). While in 2001 only 46,000 par-
ticipants received start-up incentives, the number of beneficiaries had
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more than tripled by the year 2010. Due to a policy shift, public expen-
ditures for these kinds of ALMP programs were cut at the federal level
and a sharp and intensifying decline has marked start-up rates since
December 2011. The government supported only 28,000 participants
in 2013. Additionally, not just the federal government offered start-up
support in Germany. Regional start-up subsidy programs also comple-
mented the federal policies in some areas. The region of observation,
Thuringia – a federal state located in Eastern Germany with a popu-
lation of 2.2 million people and until 2014 an EU-convergence region32
– was characterized by an exceptionally high share of participants in
these programs.33 During the years from 2007 to 2014 (the observa-
tion period of this paper), unemployment rates decreased substantially
from 13.1% to 7.8%.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. Direct
and indirect employment effects by start-up subsidies are analyzed in
the region of Thuringia. The existing variation among the region, as
start-up subsidies for the unemployed were used in a large scale and fol-
lowed by a deep cut and the unemployment rate strongly declined, will
help to reflect on the results in different economic situations. To learn
more about the interdependencies of ALMP measures in kind of start-
32 A region is defined as an EU-convergence region if the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita is less than 75% of the average GDP of the EU-25. Since
2014, Thuringia is a transition region with a GDP per capita of between 75%
and 90% of the EU average.
33 The median and average of the regional participant stock as a percentage of
the labor force was 0.44% between 2007 and 2011 in Thuringia. Compared
with the OECD average of 0.23% (median 0.065%) in the same period, this
is a remarkably high value. In the years 2012 and 2013 the average of about
0.23% (median 0.23%, too) in Thuringia hardly differed from the OECD average
of 0.19% (median unchanged). Furthermore, Germany spent more (0.057%)
than OECD average (0.016%) of its public expenditures on ALMP for start-up
support relative to the GDP between 2007 and 2013. This is the third-highest
value after Spain (0.105%) and Poland (0.062%) in the OECD.
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up subsidies and regional unemployment, the underlying matching pro-
ceedings on the labor market are estimated by a stock-flow approach
(Coles and Smith, 1998; Pissarides, 2000). We test whether and how
support of business formation out of unemployment contributes to the
reduction of unemployment. For this purpose, full data about the job-
less figures and the vacant positions in Thuringia is used on a monthly
basis. The number of supported participants is obtained from unique
data sets from the federal employment agency and regional adminis-
trations, that is, comprehensive information about the implemented
start-up programs exist. Further, as promotional conditions are also
known and different eligible groups subsist, this is used to discuss the
importance of participant’s human and financial capital endowment
when starting up. To deal with causality issues, the before-mentioned
policy shift in December 2011 is utilized. Before the shift, federal and
regional start up-support was mutually exclusive and targeted to dif-
ferent eligible groups of unemployed. Since then, this separation has
been reduced and the instruments are more interrelated.
This paper is structured as follows: A general literature review of entry
and success determinants of formerly unemployed entrepreneurs and
description of other influencing factors of the shift from unemployment
to self-employment is given in Section 3.2. The paper continues with
a literature review of evaluation studies about start-up support and
active labor market policies (Section 3.3). In Section 3.4, a theoret-
ical framework for the impacts of ALMP start-up programs on labor
markets and the regression design is developed. This results in the
implementation of a stock-flow matching function environment. The
used data set and some descriptive statistics can also be found in this
Section. The empirical results are presented in Section 3.5. The pa-
per concludes with Section 3.6 and a statement about relevant policy
implications.
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3.2 Determinants of self-employment out of unemploy-
ment
To better understand the macroeconomic interdependencies of start-up
support and unemployment, it is crucial to consider the general con-
text of self-employment and its factors of success. Following the labor
market approach, people have to choose between three relevant oppor-
tunities: unemployment, dependent employment and self-employment
(Knight, 1921; Oxenfeldt, 1943). A decision for self-employment is re-
alized if the expected utility from being self-employed (as a function
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits) exceeds utility from depen-
dent employment or unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998;
Hamilton, 2000; Reize, 2012). Based on this, a considerable part of
the entrepreneurship literature analyzes the determinants of starting-
up businesses, the characteristics of business owners and aspects of
entrepreneurs’ success. Or, in a nutshell: determinants of the market
entry, performance and exit decision, respectively.
3.2.1 Personal determinants of formerly unemployed busi-
ness owners
Personal characteristics affect the probability of becoming self-employed
as they influence the expected returns of starting up.34 In the case of
business formation by formerly unemployed persons, one has to take
into account the advantageousness of a higher endowment of financial
34 In the literature, other general findings exist, which will not be pursued any
further due to data limitations. Next to the importance of the endowment of
financial and human capital (see Section 3.2.1.1 and Section 3.2.1.2), men are
more likely to become self-employed than women (e.g. Cowling and Taylor,
2001; Berglann et al., 2011; Koellinger et al., 2013; Caliendo and Künn, 2015)
and younger and older people are more unlikely to start a business than medium
aged people (e.g. Bates, 1995; Simoes et al., 2016.
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and human capital.
3.2.1.1 Endowment of financial capital
Capital and liquidity constraints especially are a general hindrance for
entrepreneurship and market entry (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans
and Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Johansson, 2000;
Berge et al., 2014). Capital investments work as an entrance barrier
to industries (Lofstrom et al., 2014). Further, the endowment of finan-
cial capital determines the level of competition in that market and a
firm’s later survivability and development (Johnson, 2004; Fritsch et
al., 2006).
An insufficient capital endowment of potential business owners may
result in a sub-optimally low level of market-entering firms and, thus,
market failure. Unemployed persons intending to found a company
could be particularly affected. At first, a common argument points to-
wards imperfections in the credit market, which may tend to discrim-
inate against socio-economic groups in general and the unemployed in
particular (Meager, 1996, for a broader discussion on this topic see also
Section 4.4.1.2). But next to access to the credit markets, the special
livelihood of the unemployed also plays a role here. In that special
case, individuals typically depend on unemployment benefits, savings
or intra-household payments to cover their costs of living. But starting-
up requires additional investments in various equipment and business
owners have to make a living in spite of expected initial losses. If not
available, a substantial financial endowment to start a business is hard
to acquire, in particular against the backdrop of a continued stint of
unemployment. For this reason, policy measures that deal with the
market failure of credit constraints and inadequate provision of capi-
tal can help support the unemployed persons in their start-up project
56
(Craig et al., 2007; Berge et al., 2014).
3.2.1.2 Endowment of human capital
A further issue in this context of market entry is the endowment of
human capital. Acquired education and skills in the form of human
capital foster the foundation of new businesses (Robinson and Sexton,
1994; Wagner, 2003; Wagner, 2006).
Following Lazear (2004), business owners should be distinguished from
paid employees in terms of the necessary human capital. Particu-
larly a jacks-of-all-trade type endowment is favorable for becoming
self-employed, as running a business needs a variety of skills and di-
verse roles have to be fulfilled. That is, entrepreneurs require more
general knowledge than formal and specific education to start a suc-
cessful business. In turn, employees should be specialists in their tasks
to gain comparative cost advantages for their employer. Where gen-
eral knowledge is needed, human and financial capital are substitutable
to some extent and simultaneously supportive (Chandler and Hanks,
1998; Parker and Van Praag, 2006). Substitutability is important as
entrepreneurs with a high level of human capital may equalize their
lack of financial endowment through better investment decisions, and
business owners with a lower level of human capital can compensate
this through higher financial ventures. However, if both are available
to a considerable extent, firms generally perform better (Brüderl et al.,
1992; Berge et al., 2014).
As a firm’s success is positively influenced by skills and knowledge
of the owner (Gimeno et al., 1997; Rauch and Rijsdijk, 2013), this
in turn may interrelate with the status of unemployment. As these
individuals generally experience a comparatively lower endowment of
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human capital (Van Stel and Storey, 2004), a higher risk of failure and
lower performance may result (Baptista et al., 2014). Besides, both
general and specific human capital tend to depreciate with an increasing
duration of unemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Hinz and
Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Weber, 2014; Card et al., 2015). The longer
the period of unemployment the less, c.p., the endowment of needed
human capital, which is why a focus on the duration of unemployment
can matter.
3.2.2 Contextual factors of starting-up
Moreover, the formation of businesses out of unemployment results
from contextual factors. Wagner and Sternberg (2004) and Fritsch
and Wyrwich (2014), among others, point to the relevance of a spa-
tial context of business formations. As general feedback processes and
long-term path dependencies exist in a regional perspective, further
important circumstances of start-ups exist that are not influenced by
individual characteristics of the business owners.
3.2.2.1 Relationship between unemployment and self--
employment
The relationship between (regional) self-employment formation and
economic conditions is not clear; in particular the interrelationship with
unemployment-rates. In the literature, different lines of arguments ex-
ist and findings support the existence of two effects which relate to
unemployment-rates and the formation of businesses (e.g. Gilad and
Levine, 1986; Hamilton, 1989; Reynolds et al., 1994; Thurik et al.,
2008; Parker, 2009; Congregado et al., 2012a,b).
The first, the so-called Prosperity-Pull Hypothesis assumes that indi-
58
viduals tend to start a business, when economic conditions are favor-
able and unemployment-rates are low. In this context entrepreneur-
ship is to be assumed as pro-cyclical. Not only profit opportunities are
strong due to a higher demand when incomes and wealth are grow-
ing (Dawson et al., 2009), but also the higher income and financial
endowment are favorable for start-up activities itself as it counteracts
the aforementioned financial constraints (Johansson, 2000). Moreover,
consequences of business failure are reduced if other job opportunities
exist in a prosperous economy (Carrasco, 1999; Parker, 2009). In turn,
starting-up does not only end the unemployment of the business owner,
but also formation of new and growing firms may lead to more peo-
ple getting hired, which can reduce the regional unemployment rate
indirectly. Hart and Oulton (1999) and Lawless (2014) find that in
particular younger firms contribute to job creation and growth more
than well-established companies, which may create a positive side effect
of reverse causality.
The second, the so-called Recession-Push Hypothesis, assumes a counter-
cyclical relationship between formation-rates and economic circum-
stances. At these times unemployed persons are more likely to at-
tempt to become self-employed, as opportunities for a dependency
based opportunity are missing (Oxenfeldt, 1943; Dawson et al., 2009;
Parker, 2009; Congregado et al., 2012b). Unemployment works then
as push factor for self-employment, as unemployed persons are often
“entrepreneurs out of necessity” (Reynolds et al., 2005; Von Greiff,
2009; Dawson and Henley, 2012; Poschke, 2013). A substantial share
(a fifth to a third) of the entrepreneurs in the developed countries
(Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2014) are represented by formerly
unemployed persons. The line of reasoning behind this empirical ob-
servation is that in cases of unemployment, this disadvantaged sta-
tus is accompanied by a loss of firm-specific human capital and, thus,
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lower expected wages in the future (Hamermesh, 1987; Poschke, 2013).
Likewise, lower reservation wages increase the probability of becoming
self-employed as starting up a business becomes relatively more attrac-
tive. However, businesses founded by formerly unemployed persons
have a higher probability of failure (see e.g. Carrasco, 1999; Pfeiffer
and Reize, 2000; Andersson and Wadensjö, 2007). In such circum-
stances, self-employment may again turn into unemployment. These
tendencies all point to the interdependent character of unemployment
and self-employment.
3.2.2.2 Institutional settings
Finally, institutional settings are likely relevant for becoming self-emp-
loyed. As empirical evidence points to imperfections in the credit mar-
ket, which tend to discriminate against socio-economic groups (Meager,
1996; Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower et al., 2003; Blanchard et
al., 2008; Blanchflower, 2009), political interventions counter the lack
of financial resources at the point of starting up. To provide these re-
sources to the unemployed, start-up subsidies are usually introduced
(Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007).35 These “Welfare Bridges” commonly
grant a predefined payment after starting up, endowing business owners
with financial capital for a fixed period. The provision of start-up sub-
sidies acts as an important financial incentive, making self-employment
attractive in pecuniary terms, and ends unemployment.
35 Indirectly, these policies counteract the depreciation of the human capital, too,
as they act as an easy access to get people back to work, whereby new skills can
be acquired. Often start-up subsidies are complemented by training measures
and consulting services for entrepreneurial skills. By that, policy makers try to
correct the lack of entrepreneurial human capital (Brüderl et al., 1992; Berge
et al., 2014). Since no data on these measures are available, this issue is not
pursued any further. Anyhow, the collaboration of consulting services, start-
up subsidies and unemployment rates would be an interesting field of further
research.
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3.3 Evaluation Studies
It seems highly doubtful whether start-up aid will only work in such
a way as to put an end to unemployment and, at best, create indirect
employment effects. Accompanied by the increased interest in ALMP
in general (Brown and Koettl, 2015; Saint-Paul, 2015), the evaluation
of such entrepreneurial programs and its economic effects has grown.
ALMP programs differ significantly in their employment success and
results about their impact are often not encouraging.36 However, Mar-
tin and Grubb (2001) state that private sector employment subsidies,
like self-employment subsidies or wage subsidies, are most likely to be
effective. To pursue the target of success, business start-up subsidies
should be targeted towards “the minority among the unemployed who
have entrepreneurial skills and the motivation to survive in a compet-
itive environment” (Martin and Grubb, 2001, p. 23).
3.3.1 Studies on the participant level
A large body of the literature (see Chapter 4 for a literature review) ad-
dresses the outcomes of supported businesses on the participant level.
For the participants of ALMP it is explained whether or not, and how,
their participation in the program has a positive influence on an individ-
ual output variable of the formerly unemployed persons or the business.
In general, results are quite promising and optimistic (Caliendo, 2016;
Dvoulety` and Lukeš, 2016) and the subsidy is identified as a positive
influencing factor on the start-up success for participants. For exam-
ple, Andersson and Wadensjö (2007) find in a sample of Swedish en-
trepreneurs positive effects (relatively lower exit rates, more income) of
36 For a comprehensive meta-study for European ALMP see Kluve (2010) and for
the US see Greenberg et al. (2003). A recent study is also presented by Card
et al. (2015).
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start-up assistance. Formerly unemployed owners who benefited from
subsidies perform significantly better than those unemployed, who did
not receive public support. However, the authors state that the rela-
tionship between correlation and causality is not totally clear. On the
one hand, it could be a direct impact of the subsidy; on the other hand,
it may be a result of a positive selection bias by the promotional institu-
tion. For the German Labor Market, Caliendo and Kritikos (2010) find
substantial individual employment effects not only for successful start-
ups, but also for formerly subsidized entrepreneurs who found a depen-
dent employment in the case of termination of the business. This might
be attributed to the acquired skills during the self-employment phase.
For Germany, Wolff et al. (2016) show that the subsidy is a strong
incentive for unemployed persons to start their own businesses. It is a
preferable alternative compared to an ongoing job-search, as the proba-
bility of being a receiver of welfare benefits is lowered in the short- and
mid-term. Comparing subsidized businesses founded by formerly un-
employed persons with regular business owners, Caliendo (2016) found
that comparatively higher survival rates are found for the supported
business owners, but firm key performance indicators (income, growth,
innovation) are lower. However, Meager et al. (2003a) found in the UK
no statistical evidence about the subsequent employability or income
effects of supported individuals, who leave these measures and become
employees again.
3.3.2 Macroeconomic evaluation studies
As participation effects of start-up subsidies for the individual indicate
positive results but are not unambiguous, macroeconomic evaluations
of ALMP are highly relevant. Although, an ineffective ALMP for the
employability of a participant group hardly ever will be successful on
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the macroeconomic level (Kluve et al., 2002), success of an instrument
on the individual level rarely gives an indication about particular im-
pacts in a broader context. Economic literature about employment ef-
fects of ALMP programs through start-up subsidies on the aggregated
macroeconomic level is rather rare. This is quite surprising, since these
instruments do not only affect the status of unemployment; they simi-
larly cause spillover effects on non-participants. Moreover, by focusing
only on the direct effects of ALMP, one can create misleading results
and, thus, inappropriate political implications (Crépon et al., 2013).
For the purpose of a comprehensive overview of start-up subsidies, it is
important to know, that macroeconomic evaluations can only comple-
ment microeconomic studies. Where evaluation studies of participants
give an indication of the extent of singular effects, macroeconomic ap-
proaches aggregate them all and yield a net effect, in the sense of
analyzing both direct and indirect effects of ALMP (see e.g. Dauth
et al., 2016 on this topic). This is of general public interest as net ef-
fects condense the complex structure of the start-up subsidies, making
evaluation of their overall economic effectiveness possible.
However, as said before, it is not clear whether start-up incentives
lead to positive employment effects. Following the pioneering remarks
of Calmfors (1995) as well as Calmfors and Skedinger (1995), Meager
(1996), Fehr et al. (2002) and Abbring and Heckman (2007), negative
effects of ALMP also have to be taken into account to estimate net
effects of ALMP. Self-employment created by the ALMP programs can
crowd-out other self-employed, established companies, as well as their
employees or be ineffective in promoting the formation of additional
businesses, respectively. This may happen through three channels.
First, dead-weight effects may be highly important as a push effect (see
Section 3.2.2.1) from unemployment to self-employment exists. Dead-
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weight losses would occur, if the unemployed person would have set up
the company anyways, without ALMP funding. It is difficult to detect
these effects on an individual level. Nevertheless, Caliendo et al. (2012)
propose a distinction between dead-weight losses in the broader and in
the narrower sense in a survey for the German “Gründungszuschuss”,
which is one of the investigated objects in the present study. The
definition in the widest sense of the word, the unemployed would have
started-up without the subsidization, is observed by the authors in 47%
of the supported businesses. The latter and sensu stricto characteriza-
tion assumes that a dead-weight loss only occurs if the subsidization
has not affected the success of the business at all (in the first six months
after start-up). This was confirmed by 19% of the sample of the sur-
vey. In other studies (Wilson and Adams, 1994; Meager, 1996; Meager
et al., 2003a; Caliendo, 2016; Section 4 of this thesis) the range of
dead-weight losses varies between 15% up to 60%.
Second, the existence of such start-up incentives and grants increase
the opportunity costs of being an employee or staying an unsubsi-
dized self-employed worker. As a result of the earlier mentioned la-
bor market approach, a shift from potential dependent employment
or an exit of unsubsidized self-employment to supported business for-
mation is imaginable (Meager, 1996; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007).
The subsidy would not create additional employment then, but substi-
tute dependent employment with self-employment or enhance job-to-
unemployment-to-job mobility. An individual evaluation study would
indicate the existence of an effective ALMP program, since the data
would register a transition from unemployment to employment (Calm-
fors and Skedinger, 1995; Fehr et al., 2002). As substitution effects
cannot be ruled out completely, this is why macroeconomic studies are
expedient.
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Third, as stressed in Section 3.2.1.1, policymakers usually justify start-
up subsidies as an answer to capital market’s failing to providing suit-
able loans or other financial services to the unemployed (Meager, 1996;
for a broader discussion on this topic see also Section 4.4.1.2). This
hinders the unemployed in founding a business and competing in a
market environment. However, in contrast to loans, the grants given
are not refundable by definition. That is, the bequeathed capital is
permanently available for the purposes of the start-up and investments
are not linked to expected payback annuities. Unlike micro-financing
instruments (Leone and Porretta, 2014; Minnetti et al., 2016), the
promotion of grants does not target the capital market, on which the
market failure is detected. In fact, the market for goods and services
is influenced by start-up subsidies for the unemployed negatively in
the form of displacement effects. Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) dis-
cuss, that due to higher capital endowment, supported self-employed
persons can supply at relatively lower prices and - in the mid-term -
can displace established firms, which do not participate in the measure
and do not experience this cost advantage. The displacement effect
can lead to a circular process: when the appropriation period ends, the
former subsidized firm loses its cost advantage and starts to compete
with the currently subsidized firms. This can be called as a “revolving
door” mechanism, which is characterized by recurring firm entries and
exits as well as temporary job creation.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Theoretical framework
To follow the approach of Pissarides (2000) a matching function in or-
der to analyze the employment effects of start-up subsidies on regional
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labor markets is used. Matching models abstract from the complex fit-
ting procedures of job-seekers and vacancies and the various concerned
parties (unemployed, firms, the employment agency, policy makers, ...),
respectively. However, they provide a useful instrument to demonstrate
interrelationships on labor markets. The approach of this paper is that
the benchmark model of the matching of unemployed and vacancies in
a stock-flow environment is augmented with the introduction of start-
up policies. In the following, considerations about the use of such a
stock-flow model are presented.
The basic assumption of the ALMP programs37 is that more unem-
ployed people will be able to end their unemployment as a result of
the provision of support. Thus, the approach of this paper is that the
benchmark model of the matching of unemployed persons and vacan-
cies in a stock-flow environment is augmented with the introduction of
start-up policies. In the following sections, considerations about the
use of such a stock-flow model are presented.
Given the stated purpose of these ALMP programs, matches (𝑚) on the
labor market are used as the dependent variable. These matches are
registered outflows from the stock of the unemployed into the regular
37 To give an impression of the regulative and normative motivations, the official
bulletin about the observed measures state the following: The Federal Gov-
ernment emphasizes the “very favorable effects” of the start-up subsidization
for the employability of the participants (Bundesregierung der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland, 2006, p. 167; Deutscher Bundestag, 2006, p. 30) as well as
the general employment creation. In turn, the Operational Program for the
European Social Fund in Thuringia for the Period 2007 to 2013 (Thüringer
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Technologie, 2007, p. 98f., p. 103) ex-
plains that “growth-oriented start-ups” by the unemployed should be supported
by grants and an integration in the labor market through transition benefits
for self-employed ought to happen. The measures also aim to increase the re-
gional self-employment rate. In both cases, the consideration of quality, the aim
to contribute to a drop in unemployment and the stimulation of the economy,
respectively, are highlighted.
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labor market, that is, any kind of income generating employment.
To estimate these outflows one has to consider the behavior of the
unemployed and firms on the labor market simultaneously. The model
generally bases itself on the assumptions, that either matches
1. of a recently unemployed (𝑢) and an existing vacancy from the
stock (𝑉 ),
2. or of an continuing unemployed in the stock (𝑈) and a new offered
vacancy (𝑣)
take place. They are expected to be more likely than matches between
the stocks of unemployed and vacancies. Coles and Smith (1998) state
that an individual who just became unemployed will be registered as
an inflow (𝑢) into the existing stock of the unemployed (𝑈). On the
supply side of the labor market, this unemployed person is most likely
looking for a new job from the existing stock of vacancies 𝑉 . On the
demand side, firms with a new vacancy, which will be denoted as in-
flows 𝑣 into the stock of open vacancies, are probably screening for a
suitable applicant within the stock of unemployed 𝑈 . Only if no mar-
ket transaction takes place, further searching proceedings have to be
made by both parties. Therefore, the same rationale applies one period
later. With the remaining formerly newly unemployed now counting
to the stock of all unemployed, then it is even more likely that they
will concentrate on the newly incoming vacancies (inflow). The unem-
ployed, in turn, developed a sufficient market overview about existing
vacancies, without being recruited or having successfully applied. This
makes a future stock-stock match unlikely. Also firms have screened
the stock of the unemployed, so they will focus on the new incoming
jobless.
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Formalized, this leads us to equation (3.1), showing the relationship of
matches, unemployed and vacancies:
𝑚 = 𝐴 · 𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑈, 𝑣, 𝑉 ) (3.1)
where 𝐴 denotes a factor of the efficiency of these matching processes
on the market as such. Coles and Smith (1998) suggest that matches
benefit from increasing inflows of new vacancies (𝑚′𝑣 > 0) as matches
with the stock of the unemployed become more likely. However, it is
not clear how the matching process depends on the stock and newly
incoming unemployed. On the one side, high inflows and high stocks
of unemployment indicate unfavorable economic conditions. In these
circumstances matches are unlikely, as vacancies are non-existing or
highly competitive. On the other side, in a flexible labor market, those
unemployed act as the source of matching if reintegration takes place
rather quickly. As a consequence of the Hartz-Reforms in Germany, it is
assumed that the latter assumption holds true and a positive influence
for the stock and inflows of unemployment on the matching process
exists, respectively (𝑚′𝑈 > 0 and 𝑚′𝑢 > 0). For the stock of vacancies,
no significant impact on the explanatory variable is expected (𝑚′𝑉 = 0)
(cf. Fahr and Sunde, 2009; Klinger and Rothe, 2012).
By considering the inflows 𝑝 and stocks 𝑃 of the start-up subsidies
in equation 3.1, the question of whether ALMP in kind of grants to
start-ups for unemployed help to reduce unemployment in a regional
perspective should be answered, leading to equation (3.2).
𝑚 = 𝐴 · 𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑈, 𝑣, 𝑉, 𝑝, 𝑃 ) (3.2)
To follow the policy hypothesis that the more start-ups are supported,
the higher the outflows from unemployment ought to be, it is assumed
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that 𝑚′𝑝 > 0 holds true. The provision of the start-up program should
act as additional (inflowing) and direct job opportunities to the un-
employed. As the vast majority of the supported start-ups are solo-
entrepreneurs (Caliendo et al., 2012) an indirect job creation would
be expected to come mostly from the stock of the supported start-ups
(𝑚′𝑃 > 0).38
3.4.2 Data
The data is received from two distinct German authorities. First, the
stocks as well as inflows and outflows of unemployment and vacancies
are taken from official full data by the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA). Also the data about the federal start-up support GZ (see e.g.
Caliendo and Kritikos, 2009; Caliendo et al., 2012; Caliendo et al.,
2015) is provided by the FEA. Second, the full data set about the re-
gional start-up subsidy Existenzgründerrichtlinie (EXI) is reported by
the Gesellschaft für Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsförderung des Freistaats
Thüringen mbH (GFAW). All information is reported on a monthly
and regional basis.39 The regions are administrative districts (Kreise)
and correspond to the European NUTS-3 (Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics) in the federal state of Thuringia. The 23 admin-
istration units of Thuringia separate in 17 rural districts (Landkreise)
and six urban districts (Kreisfreie Städte). The focus is set on the time
38 However, by focusing on net effects in this study, insignificant or negative coef-
ficients of the respected variables would indicate to the existence of equalizing
dead-weight, substitution or displacement effects by the start-up subsidies.
39 Due to privacy protection, however, inflows and stocks into the GZ measure are
not reported for a month and region if only one or two unemployed persons had
founded a supported business in this particular region. Data is controlled for
those missing values. The stocks and flows for the EXI are full data and a result
of compulsory subsidy controlling system by the European Union.
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between January 2007 and December 2014.40
In order to understand the interactions of the labor market with the
start-up subsidies offered, it is important to know that the unemployed
are segmented into individual groups. At first, unemployed persons
are allowed to receive unemployment benefits from the German So-
cial Code III (Sozialgesetzbuch III – hereinafter SGBIII ), if they paid
unemployment insurance contributions. The unemployment benefits
depend on previous working income, that is, it is only paid if the ben-
efits are higher than the calculated basic security benefit. Typically,
financial support from SGBIII lasts for a maximum of twelve months.
Thus, SGBIII unemployed persons are characterized by recent job ex-
periences and – compared to other unemployed groups in Germany
– on average better educated.41 In contrast to that, for the second
unemployment group of the German Social Code 2 (Sozialgesetzbuch
II – hereinafter SGBII ) payments act as a basic security benefit for
job seekers and are means-tested. Additionally, it supports recently
unemployed whose former labor income was comparatively low. They
are characterized by a lower level of human capital, too. Addition-
ally, after the eligibility period of twelve months of SGBIII, long-term
40 The period is chosen for the following reasons. In Germany the Hartz reforms,
introduced between the years 2003 and 2005, caused the most influential changes
in the social security system in recent decades. The reforms encompassed a
structural break in the supply of public welfare services and ALMPs – such as
the GZ – as well. As they were well implemented in 2007, no further structural
shifts have to be expected and have to be controlled for. For a broad overview
and impact analysis of the Hartz Reforms see e.g. Jacobi and Kluve (2006),
Fahr and Sunde (2009) or Klinger and Rothe (2012). Further, the remarkable
decrease of unemployment since the introduction of the Hartz-Reforms and the
financial and economic crisis of 2008 to 2010 provide an interesting setting,
whereby both variation and a check of robustness for the model is received.
Lastly, the reviewed period strongly interrelates to the funding period of the
EXI, which was in force from July 2007 to December 2014.
41 A broad overview about different characteristics of the unemployed and start-up
measures can be found in Section 2.2.2.
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unemployed shift to the SGBII.
The FEA administers the start-up support GZ and they only allow un-
employed persons receiving SGBIII-payments to apply for the measure.
Interestingly, until December 2011, unemployed persons were able to
make a claim on the subsidization. Since then, the start-up subsidy
has shifted to a nonobligatory service and administrators of the FEA
are responsible for making a decision on applications (Bernhard and
Grüttner, 2015; Bellmann et al., 2017). Further, unemployed in the
federal state of Thuringia were allowed to apply for the regional start-
up support EXI, administrated by the regional authority GFAW. Due
to the obligatory service of GZ until the end of 2011, EXI was only
offered to those unemployed persons receiving payments of the SGBII
or without any public support at that time. Since the policy shift, it
was also opened to SGBIII receivers who the FEA denied GZ.
For a first glance the number of the participants in total and over time
of the two policies is shown to Figure 3.1. A steady inflow into the
measures can be seen for the 23 administrative districts of Thuringia.
Due to the above-mentioned policy shift, denied applicants of GZ who
still benefit from the unemployment allowance of the SGBIII were able
to apply for EXI since December 2011. This caused a remarkable
change in the distribution and significance of the measures, which is
illustrated by a vertical line. The largest variation can be seen in the
state capital (EF) and the, in terms of surface area, largest districts
(SLF, SOK and SM), whereas it is lowest in minor urban districts
(EA and SHL) as well the district of SON. After the shift and due to
the conversion of the GZ from an obligatory service to a discretionary
benefit, a structural change can be found. Before the policy shift, GZ
dominated EXI in terms of the number of participants; the reverse
pictures emerge on a lower level after the policy shift. This holds true
71
until EXI expired in December 2014.42
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Figure 3.1: Inflows into start-up subsidy measures
Notes: In Figure 3.1, the monthly inflows into the measures Gründungszuschuss (GZ) and
Existenzgründerrichtlinie (EXI) in the years 2007 to 2014 in the 23 districts of Thuringia
are illustrated. The vertical line in December 2011 represents the policy shift when the GZ
was turned from a obligatory to a non-obligatory service.
Source: Statistics of the FEA and GFAW; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
To get an overview about the size and distribution of the main vari-
42 A third measure for start-up subsidies for the unemployed existed in Germany
and Thuringia as well during that time, namely the Einstiegsgeld (EG) (Wolff
and Nivorozhkin, 2012; Pongratz et al., 2013; Wolff et al., 2016). In terms
of entry, EG, however, does not amount to more than 6% of all unemployed,
who received a start-up subsidy during the observation period. Due to data
restrictions, not all information needed are provided by administrative records,
which is why EG has not been analyzed. Given the minor importance of the
instrument in terms of the number of participants, the impact on the results is
assumed to be negligible.
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ables, Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics of the years from 2007
to 2014. The median monthly outflows from unemployment into em-
ployment are mainly driven by the employment of SGBIII-unemployed
(236 to 167), while the median stocks of unemployed are much lower
(1,699 to 2,968). This indicates the comparatively higher probability
of SGBIII-unemployed to join the workforce again. The inflows into
unemployment are relatively evenly distributed (524 to 503).
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of main variables
Mean SD Min Max P50
Outflow from Unempl. 464.94 234.06 89.00 1, 555.00 413.00
Outflow from Unempl. (SGBII) 201.71 127.44 19.00 826.00 167.00
Outflow from Unempl. (SGBIII) 263.74 135.14 40.00 975.00 236.00
Stock of Unempl. 5, 092.53 2, 389.82 1, 127.00 16, 776.00 4, 769.00
Stock of Unempl. (SGBII) 3, 247.81 1, 713.32 425.00 11, 664.00 2, 968.00
Stock of Unempl. (SGBIII) 1844.72 835.52 368.00 5, 132.00 1, 699.00
Stock of Vacancies 615.83 357.33 115.00 2, 705.00 525.50
Inflow into Unempl. 1, 150.32 531.35 331.00 3, 761.00 1, 052.00
Inflow into Unempl. (SGBII) 577.28 332.95 155.00 2, 405.00 503.00
Inflow into Unempl. (SGBIII) 573.12 271.73 112.00 1, 988.00 524.50
Increase in Vacancies 267.99 175.75 52.00 1, 252.00 220.00
Stock of EXI 28.86 27.36 0.00 196.00 25.00
Stock of GZ 126.79 87.00 0.00 462.00 125.00
Inflow into EXI 2.55 3.02 0.00 23.00 2.00
Inflow into GZ 8.59 8.80 0.00 61.00 7.00
Source: Statistics of the FEA and GFAW; authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 3.2: Development of the stocks of unemployed persons and
vacancies in Thuringia
Notes: In Figure 3.2, the monthly stocks of the unemployed (as total and divided into
SGBII and SGBIII as well) and vacancies are shown for the years 2007 to 2014.
Source: Statistics of the FEA; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
During that period of 8 years, the total number of unemployed in
Thuringia nearly halved from about 180,000 to 80,000 unemployed (un-
employment rate dropped from 13.8% to 7.8%, respectively) as can be
seen in Figure 3.2. It is equally important to recognize the seasonal
employment effects on the labor market. The economic crisis in the
years of 2008 to 2010 had no major impact on the stocks of the un-
employed. The positive development only slightly slowed down. The
demand of labor, represented by the stocks of vacancies, shows a sig-
nificant downturn in that time, which recovered to the pre-crisis level
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before the observation period ends.
From the regional perspective, we see a remarkable divergence in the
unemployment rate (Figure 3.3a) and participation rate (Figure 3.3b)
for the examined period (2008 to 2013).43 Whereas the participation
rate of the unemployed is comparatively high in the middle and south of
Thuringia, unemployment is a larger problem in the northern and east-
ern parts of this federal state. The figures indicate a spatial negative
correlation between the unemployment rate and the self-employment
rate that would be in line with the recession-push theory.
(a) Average unemployment rates (b) Average participation rates
Figure 3.3: Regional distribution of unemployed persons and start-up
subsidy participants
Notes: In Figure 3.3a, the average unemployment rates (Social Code II and III) in the years
2008 to 2013 in the 23 districts of Thuringia is illustrated. In Figure 3.3b, the stocks of
start-up subsidy participants divided by the stock of all current unemployed for the same
period are outlined.
Source: Statistics of the FEA and GFAW; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
43 Due to implementation and phasing out of the EXI in 2007 and 2014, respec-
tively, these years are excluded.
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3.4.3 Econometric specification
Basically, it is subsidiary if a federal (GZ) or regional (EXI) author-
ity initiated an entrepreneurship policy. The relevant realization and
thus the main effects always occur (first) on the participant level (see
Section 3.3.1). Thus, the lowest form of spatial aggregation of those
participants is represented by regional labor markets (Audretsch et al.,
2007). Since regional settings and policies are meaningful for the influ-
ence of entrepreneurship policies (Altavilla and Caroleo, 2013; Caliendo
and Künn, 2014), the work of Dauth et al. (2016) for the Austrian, Al-
tavilla and Caroleo (2006) for the Italian and the remarks of Hujer
et al. (2006), Hujer et al. (2009), Fahr and Sunde (2009) and Klinger
and Rothe (2012) for the German labor market are followed and an
explanatory matching-model on a regional level (districts) will be im-
plemented.
3.4.3.1 Hypotheses–related variables
The stock-flow model is estimated for the observed matches 𝑚𝑟𝑡 in
region 𝑟 (𝑟 = 1, ..., 𝑅) at time 𝑡 (𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇 ). Closely following the lit-
erature, equation (3.2) is rewritten as a general Cobb-Douglas-function
in a log-linear version and equation (3.3) is received:
ln𝑚𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎+ 𝛼1 ln 𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ln𝑈𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑣𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln𝑉𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑘 ln 𝑝𝑘𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑘 ln𝑃𝑘𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡.
(3.3)
The dependent variable (matches 𝑚) represents outflows from unem-
ployment into gainful occupation. Unemployed who enter a wage-
subsidized employment in the regular labor market or job creation
schemes are included in the outflows. The lagged independent vari-
ables 𝑈𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑉𝑟𝑡−1 and 𝑃𝑘𝑟𝑡−1 indicate the respective stock of unem-
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ployed persons, vacancies and supported start-ups, which are reported
at the end of the previous period.44 Hereby, it is allowed for possible
delays by one period in registration. Also by using this time lag the
general matching process out of stocks, as was mentioned in Section
3.4.1 before, is considered. To test for differences between the distinc-
tive start-up measures the index 𝑘 is introduced.
3.4.3.2 Control variables
When implementing such a stock-flow matching model, it is necessary
to control for a number of factors. First, periodical features are cor-
rected by using time fixed effects 𝑑𝑡.45 The time dummies for the month
and years are used to account for seasonal effects in the stock and flow
of unemployed as well as the vacancies. By that, the typical spring
upturn in the labor market and business cycle downturns in the years
2008 to 2010 as well as the following v-shaped recovery in Germany is
44 Unregistered unemployed are not captured in the estimation. Regardless, only
slight biases are expected by that, as they are not allowed to apply for the
observed start-up subsidies. Even though they might compete for the same
vacancies. The vacancies reported are full-time or part-time offers and subject
to social insurance contributions. Although, the data exists on the same levels as
it does for the unemployed, the announcement is not mandatory to businesses,
which are willing to fill a vacancy. However, no information about the number
of unreported vacancies and the account of job-to-job matches are known, so
the data is not corrected for these issues. Franz (2013) suggests to use of some
kind of market share of the unemployment agency. This could be reached by
using the reported vacancies relative to all fresh engagements, but this data is
not available on the regional and monthly level.
45 Applying the Hausman-test, which states that the null hypothesis (the differ-
ences in coefficients are not systematic) has to be rejected, a fixed effects re-
gression in comparison to both the pooled OLS as well as the random effects
regression has to be preferred. After performing a Wald test (Ho: dummies for
all time variables are jointly equal to 0), it is also shown, that time fixed effects
are needed.
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covered.
ln𝑚𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎+ 𝛼1 ln 𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ln𝑈𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑣𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln𝑉𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑘 ln 𝑝𝑘𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑘 ln𝑃𝑘𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑟 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡.
(3.4)
The federal state of Thuringia is regionally heterogeneous as rural and
urban areas exist. Therefore, regional fixed effects 𝑑𝑟 are used in equa-
tion (3.4) in order to capture structural differences in characteristics of
the administrative districts. The model, thus, focuses on within vari-
ation by controlling out the between regional variation. Nevertheless,
the regional administration units in Thuringia, like in the rest of Ger-
many (cf. Hujer et al., 2009), do not necessarily fit to the relevant labor
market, that is, the administrative regions are not spatially indepen-
dent. Additionally, there are good reasons to believe that employers
do not restrict their search activities to the regional (administrative)
labor market to fill their vacancies. Furthermore, changes in economic
circumstances hardly ever affect only single regions.
With regional dependency likely to be present, the estimation model
is thus augmented by the sum ∑︀𝑠̸=𝑟 𝑤𝑟𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑡 with a spatially lagged
variable (cf. Anselin, 2002). By definition this mathematical term
is endogenous but controls for the expected spatial dependencies and
interrelations. Therefore, 𝑚𝑠𝑡 represents matches in a region 𝑠 being
distinctive of region 𝑟 at the same period 𝑡. To capture the variation
and importance from matches in a region 𝑠 for an observed region 𝑟,
those matches 𝑚𝑠𝑡 are weighted by 𝑤𝑟𝑠. Following Dauth et al. (2016)
the raw weights equal 1 if the driving time between regions 𝑟 and 𝑠
is not more than one hour, and otherwise 0. Formally, this binary
spatial weight matrix is a 𝑅 × 𝑅 positive matrix 𝑊 with zeros on the
main diagonal (𝑤𝑟𝑟 = 0). As spatial weight matrices are typically row
standardized, the raw weight matrix is transformed to a normalized
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matrix for which counts ∑︀𝑆𝑠=1𝑤𝑟𝑠 = 1 for each region 𝑟. The related
regression coefficient is 𝜌. This leads to equation (3.5).46
ln𝑚𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎+ 𝛼1 ln 𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2 ln𝑈𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑣𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln𝑉𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑘 ln 𝑝𝑘𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑘 ln𝑃𝑘𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ln(
∑︁
𝑠̸=𝑟
𝑤𝑟𝑠𝑚𝑠𝑡)
+ 𝑑𝑟 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡.
(3.5)
Another specification refers to the investigation of matching processes
by differences in occupations (Fahr and Sunde, 2009) or by sectors
(Broersma and Van Ours, 1999). The underlying assumption, that
differences in the matching process are driven by financial and hu-
man capital, is captured in this paper by the differentiation of the
German Social Codes (see Section 3.4.2). To check whether the pol-
icy measures show different impacts on the beneficiaries with their on
average different characteristics, equation (3.5) is augmented by the
index 𝑐 (see equation (3.6)). It can either have the value 𝐼𝐼 (SGBII-
unemployed characterized by a lower endowment of human and fi-
nancial capital, higher probability of long-term unemployed) or 𝐼𝐼𝐼
(SGBIII-unemployed characterized by a comparatively higher endow-
ment of human and financial capital, predominantly short-term unem-
ployed), where 𝑚 = 𝑚𝐼𝐼 +𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑈 = 𝑈𝐼𝐼 +𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝑢 = 𝑢𝐼𝐼 +𝑢𝐼𝐼𝐼 and in
the case of EXI (𝑘 = 2) 𝑝2 = 𝑝𝐼𝐼2 + 𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼2 as well as 𝑃2 = 𝑃𝐼𝐼2 + 𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼2
holds true. To control for the frequently made assumption that a higher
share of long-term unemployment 𝑈𝐿 in relation to short-term unem-
ployment 𝑈𝑆 leads to a lower effectiveness of the matching process (cf.
46 A simple contiguity matrix, like those presented in Anselin (2002), would not be
appropriate to capture the topographical and infrastructural profile of Thuringia.
This is even truer as an east-west highway in the middle of Thuringia connects
a number of cities in the six biggest municipal units. South of that high way
a central German upland is situated, which separates the federal state in a
northern and southern part.
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Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Pissarides, 2000), it is also controlled
for the share of the long-term unemployed in relation to all unemployed
𝑈 = 𝑈𝐿 + 𝑈𝑆 , which leads to the term (𝑈𝐿𝑐𝑟𝑡−1) · (𝑈𝐿𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡−1)−1
and, thus, equation (3.6).
ln𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎𝑐 + 𝛼1𝑐 ln 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑐 ln𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑐 ln 𝑣𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑐 ln𝑉𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝛾1𝑐𝑘 ln 𝑝𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑐𝑘 ln𝑃𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝑐 ln(
∑︁
𝑠̸=𝑟
𝑤𝑟𝑠𝑚𝑐𝑠𝑡)
+ 𝑑𝑟 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑐(𝑈𝐿𝑐𝑟𝑡−1) · (𝑈𝐿𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑡−1)−1 + 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡.
(3.6)
3.4.3.3 Regression design
A frequently quoted concern about the usage of stock-flow estimations
certainly appears at this point. To get consistent results, the inherent
relationship between inflows, outflows and stocks have to be taken into
account. The connection is represented as an example in equation
(3.7), wherein it is shown that 𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 is even an implicit part of the
right hand side of equation (3.6) as it highly correlates and corresponds
widely to the sum of all outflows.47
𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑡 = 𝑈𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 −𝑚𝑐𝑟𝑡−1 (3.7)
In any case, the model variables would correlate to the error term,
that is, autocorrelation appears for the error term 𝜀𝑐𝑟𝑡. Indeed, the
Wooldridge (2010) test for autocorrelation in panel data indicates,
that the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation has to be
rejected. Additionally, as time periods 𝑇 largely exceed the number of
47 For the concrete composition of the outflows in the model, see the data descrip-
tion in Section 3.4.2. The same relation holds true for the stocks of the vacancies
and start-up support.
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regions 𝑅, heteroscedasticity may be expected in the model environ-
ment. Following Greene (2003, p. 324) one has to test for group-wise
heteroscedasticity in the residuals of a fixed effect regression model.
This is the case in the data structure used. Finally, time-series cross-
sectional (TSCS) macro panels with a comparatively large number of
time periods 𝑇 may also cause cross-sectional dependence, which is why
Pesaran’s cross-sectional dependence test is applied. It shows whether
residuals across entities correlate or not. The former is found in the
data structure, which is a common issue in TCSC settings. For the pur-
pose of statistical inference and to address the above-mentioned issues,
a Prais–Winsten regression (Plümper et al., 2005) with panel-corrected
standard errors is implemented (Beck and Katz, 1995; Hoechle, 2007;
Beck and Katz, 2011).
3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 General stock-flow-matching-model
In this subsection the implementation of the general stock-flow envi-
ronment is tested, before in subsection 3.5.2 the augmentation of the
model by implementing start-up subsidies take place and further ro-
bustness checks examined. All results are presented in Tables 3.2, 3.3
and 3.4.
Model (1) in Table 3.2 shows a baseline model of the matching func-
tion of the regional labor markets in Thuringia. The coefficients of the
log-linear model can be interpreted as elasticities. According to the
assumptions of the stock-flow environment presented in section 3.4.1,
matching-elasticities for the stock of unemployed as well as inflows
into it and the new vacancies are positive and highly significant. The
highest elasticity for the number of matches occurs from the stock of
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unemployed (elasticity of 0.701), which is consistent with respect to the
scales presented by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 393). Imple-
menting the spatially lagged outflows (Table 3.2, model (2)) to control
for interregional matching relations, and additionally for the share of
long-term unemployed in a region (Table 3.2, model (3)) only slightly
change the magnitude of the elasticities, while keeping the significance
level constant. However, the explanatory power of the model slightly
increases and the elasticity of the stock of vacancies is now positive
and significant. Also the spatial lagged matches show a significant and
positive impact on the outflows from unemployment in a region, con-
firming the spatial dependency of the matching processes. A higher
share of long-term unemployed significantly hinders job-matches. This
is consistent with the literature, as long-term unemployment lowers the
effectiveness of the matching process (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994;
Pissarides, 2000).
Estimations for the disadvantaged unemployed with a lower endowment
of financial and human capital (SGBII) compared to the unemployed
who are better-off (SGBIII) can be found in Table 3.3, model (7) and
model (11). Obviously, on the demand side of the labor market, new
incoming vacancies significantly (at the p < 0.01 level) increase the
probability of matches on the labor market in all models by a scale of
0.101 and 0.079, respectively. That is, a 1% increase of the number
of new incoming vacancies increases the number of outflows from un-
employment by 0.101% and 0.079%, respectively. Thus, additional job
opportunities cause matches for all unemployment groups. However,
evidence for the matches by the stock of vacancies is mixed. While
they are a positive and highly significant source of matches for the
SGBII unemployed (model (7)) no significant impact can be found for
the higher endowed unemployed of the SGBIII (model (11)). This is
also in line with the existing literature, as other stock-flow studies for
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Germany (see e.g. Fahr and Sunde, 2009; Klinger and Rothe, 2012)
show mostly insignificant effects. However, the availability of data may
drive this effect, since the models consider only reported vacancies. It
is possible that there is some kind of bias, so that reported vacancies
are more targeted to unemployed related to the SGBII or reported jobs
are more visible for this group.
Table 3.2: Matching proceeding on the labor market – baseline model
Dependent Variable ln Outflow from Unempl.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln Stock of Unempl. (t-1) 0.701*** 0.527*** 0.577*** 0.585*** 0.687*** 1.143***
(0.073) (0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.086) (0.161)
ln Stock of Vacancies (t-1) 0.031 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.091*** 0.042
(0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.037)
ln Inflow into Unempl. 0.321*** 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.093
(0.046) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.064)
ln Inflow into Vacancies 0.088*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.078***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023)
ln Spatial lagged Outflow 0.679*** 0.648*** 0.645*** 0.558*** 0.614***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.059) (0.075)
ln Share of long-term Unempl. (t-1) −0.775*** −0.753*** −0.307* −0.800***
(0.140) (0.138) (0.186) (0.309)
ln Stock of EXI(t-1) 0.001 −0.005* −0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ln Stock of GZ (SGBIII, t-1) −0.002 0.006 0.001
(0.014) (0.032) (0.015)
ln Inflow into EXI 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Inflow into GZ (SGBIII) 0.001 0.026*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
Constant −3.377*** −4.976*** −4.909*** −4.919*** −5.801*** −8.814***
(0.779) (0.646) (0.643) (0.641) (0.887) (1.520)
Observations 2,164 2,164 2,094 2,094 1,224 870
LR chi2 16,408.1 18,597.9 19,836.2 20,451.2 17,313.9 24,061.1
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.978 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.992
Notes: Prais–Winsten Regression with panel corrected standard errors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Time (month and year) and regional fixed effects included. * 𝑝 < 0.10,
** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
In all models a highly significant and positive effect of the stock of the
unemployed indicates to the existing dynamics on the labor market in
Germany. Also, the inflow-effect is positive and significant with a coef-
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ficient of 0.360 for the SGBII-unemployed (model (7)) and insignificant
for the unemployed related to the SGBIII (model (11)). In particular,
by model design, this significance of the variable points to the occur-
rence of reintegration of new unemployed within a month. This may be
a possible effect of the Hartz-Reforms and the overall favorable trend
of the job market in Germany. Financial constraints may cause the
different inflow-effects for the two groups of unemployed. That is, a
fast reintegration into the labor market is more relevant for the former
group, as unemployment benefits for the SGBIII are comparatively
high, while SGBII unemployed only receive basic security benefits. In
the sense of the labor market approach, the opportunity costs of unem-
ployment in SGBII are lower than in SGBIII. Also the transition from
SGBIII to SGBII, after a period of twelve months of unemployment,
act as a strong incentive to find a job as a result of that increasing
opportunity costs.
The highly significant negative effect of -0.855 of the share of long-
term unemployed for the jobless related to the SGBII (model (7)) is
unsurprising. For those long-term unemployed the situation has hard-
ened into some kind of structural unemployment due to a mismatch
of supplied skills and labor market demand. During the continuing
unemployment, the depreciation of human capital increased this disad-
vantage and reduced the chances to obtain a job (Hinz and Jungbauer-
Gans, 1999; Weber, 2014; Card et al., 2015). In line with that, the
corresponding coefficient is lower (-0.697) in the SGBIII model (model
(11)) as these unemployed hardly suffer from this stigma. In turn the
smaller effect of the spatial lagged outflows (0.222 and 0.699 respec-
tively) of SGBII to SGBIII unemployed may indicate a lower spatial
mobility of unemployed with a comparatively lower human capital en-
dowment, as a negative relationship between the level of educated skill
and spatial mobility exists (for evidence for Germany see e.g. Arntz,
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2010; Granato et al., 2015).
3.5.2 Augmented stock-flow-matching-model with start-
up subsidies
This study investigates the hypothesis that start-up subsidies for the
unemployed contribute to the reduction of unemployment from a re-
gional perspective. At first sight the results in Table 3.2, model (4)
seems not to be in concordance with that hypothesis. After imple-
menting the stocks and flows of the start-up subsidies GZ and EXI,
the above discussed (see Section 3.5.1) magnitude and significance of
the variables compared to the baseline regressions remain almost un-
changed. But neither the stock (indirect employment effects), nor the
inflow (direct employment effect) into the start-up subsidy measures
GZ and EXI have a statistically and economically significant impact
on the number of matches in a region. This points to the existence
of counteracting effects as discussed in Section 3.3.2 and the general
unlikely transition from unemployment to the status of an employer
(Nightingale and Coad, 2013).
However, a differentiated understanding is gained concerning the sub-
groups of the lesser-endowed unemployed (SGBII) in Table 3.3, model
(8) and the higher endowed unemployed (SGBIII) in Table 3.3, model
(12), respectively. In the case of EXI (SGBII) no significant effect can
be found on the number of matches for the more disadvantaged un-
employed group. In this case, the above-mentioned hypothesis must
be rejected. In contrast, the support of higher endowed unemployed
related to SGBIII show increased and significant direct employment
effects in both cases, for the GZ as well as for the EXI. The elasticity
of the direct effect of the GZ as well the EXI is, however, rather small
in terms of the economical impact as it amounts to 0.003 in model (12),
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that is, a 1% increase of the number of participants in the measures in-
creases the number of outflows from unemployment by 0.003%.48 Also
a slight positive indirect employment effect of the supported EXI start-
ups can be found.
The question arises, if this kind of ALMP program is a useful and ap-
propriate instrument to reduce unemployment of the target group of
SGBII-unemployed persons. Even though the financial support is of
comparatively greater need, strong negative employment effects seem
to counteract positive participant effects. The presented results also
throw doubt on the policy idea, that if program features attract more
disadvantaged unemployed persons, higher net employment effects are
caused. To shed some more light on that question, in Table 3.2, the re-
gression is divided in the situation before (model (5)) and after (model
(6)) the policy shift in December 2011. Again, the sign and significance
of the main variables of the stock-flow environment are comparable to
the presented baseline model. Before the policy shift, both EXI and
GZ were mostly mutually exclusive instruments in regard to their ben-
48 To give an impression of the effect size: The values presented here are the average
elasticity for the values presented in Table 3.1, and thus the average over all
regions, years, months, etc. A 1% increase in Inflow into GZ would therefore
mean an increase in the average of 8.59 by 0.0859 (= 8.59 · 1%) to 8.6759. At
the same time, the outflow from unemployment (SGBIII) would increase from
263.74 by 0.0079122 (= 263.74 · 0.003%) to 263.7479122. The effect in absolute
values is therefore not that one participant in the measure directly causes one
additional observable outflow out of unemployment, but the effect is on average
about one tenth of that (0.0921 = 0.0079122 / 0.0859). However, since this
type of calculation assumes a constantly linear relation between the quantities,
a conceivable model extension within the framework of further research would
therefore be the implementation of a margins plot, so that the effect size could
be estimated for a (non-linear) increasing number of participants. However, in
the following it will be discussed only the sign and significance of the coefficients,
because Dauth et al. (2016) notes: “Yet, from the perspective of policy-makers,
the important implication is that there is a positive net effect, that is, increasing
ALMP does increase the number of matches rather than simply redistributing
the propensity of getting a job among job seekers.”
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eficiary groups. The differentiated impact of the start-up support on
the number of matches by the higher and lower endowed subgroups
are again supported by the results. Time independent, the start-up
subsidy EXI does not seem to have a significant direct impact on the
occurrence of matches on the labor market. As EXI-participants of SG-
BII are on average significantly better educated than the group of all
unemployed persons in relation to SGBII (see Section 2.3), it is likely
that they would have also found a dependent job, giving an indication
to the existence of dead-weight effects.
It is also important to note that the estimated coefficient of the inflows
into GZ is positively significant in Table 3.2, model (5). Elasticities are
remarkably higher and positive before the policy shift (0.026), than
after it (0.003 and insignificant). Interestingly, even though EXI is
more important in terms of participant numbers after the policy shift
than GZ, no significant influence on the number of matches has been
found. This indicates that a quantity-based promotion of participant
numbers not necessarily leads to more matches.
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Table 3.3: Matching proceeding on the labor market – augmented
model with separation for groups of unemployed persons
SGBII-Model SGBIII-Model
Lower endowment Higher endowment
Dependent Variable ln Outflow from Unempl. (SGBII) ln Outflow from Unempl. (SGBIII)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
ln Stock of Unempl. (SGBII) (t-1) 0.604*** 0.606*** 0.681*** 0.883***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.099) (0.196)
ln Stock of Unempl. (SGBIII) (t-1) 0.714*** 0.712*** 0.721*** 0.927***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.058) (0.104)
ln Stock of Vacancies (t-1) 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.119** 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.045
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.060) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.039)
ln Inflow into Unempl. (SGBII) 0.360*** 0.359*** 0.349*** 0.377***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.059)
ln Inflow into Unempl. (SGBIII) 0.035 0.035 −0.044 0.045
(0.037) (0.036) (0.041) (0.070)
ln Inflow into Vacancies 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.098*** 0.079** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.112***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.039) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025)
ln Spatial lagged Outflow (SGBII) 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.169*** 0.025
(0.041) (0.041) (0.054) (0.072)
ln Spatial lagged Outflow (SGBIII) 0.669*** 0.656*** 0.566*** 0.644***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.087)
Share of long-term Unempl. (SGBII, t-1) −0.855*** −0.853*** −0.352 −0.725**
(0.151) (0.151) (0.218) (0.337)
Share of long-term Unempl. (SGBIII, t-1) −0.697*** −0.678*** −0.373** −1.946***
(0.167) (0.164) (0.190) (0.401)
ln Stock of EXI(SGBII, t-1) 0.001 −0.006 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
ln Stock of EXI(SGBIII, t-1) 0.002** 0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Stock of GZ (SGBIII, t-1) 0.009 0.020 0.020
(0.015) (0.032) (0.017)
ln Inflow into EXI (SGBII) 0.000 −0.001 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
ln Inflow into EXI (SGBIII) 0.003*** 0.002** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln Inflow into GZ (SGBIII) 0.003* 0.039*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.008) (0.002)
Constant −4.112*** −4.115*** −5.029*** −5.579*** −4.835*** −4.770*** −3.994*** −6.052***
(0.743) (0.744) (0.997) (1.764) (0.558) (0.553) (0.668) (1.089)
Observations 2,094 2,094 1,224 870 2,190 2,190 1,316 874
LR chi2 13758.5 13,845.6 9,993.4 23,312.1 19,351.5 21,188.8 17,197.7 23,911.6
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.947 0.947 0.958 0.978 0.985 0.986 0.982 0.991
Notes: Prais–Winsten Regression with panel corrected standard errors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Time (month and year) and regional fixed effects included. * 𝑝 < 0.10,
** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
Matches do not seem to be significantly and positively affected by the
stocks of supported start-ups. In contrast, the significant negative ef-
fect of the EXI (-0.005) in Table 3.2, model (5) points towards existing
negative externalities rather than indirect employment impacts before
the policy shift. It is more likely, that the support causes displace-
ment and substitution effects. The regression results before December
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2011, separated for the groups of SGBII with the more disadvantaged
unemployed (model (9)) and the SGBIII for the unemployed being
better off (model (13)) are shown in the Table 3.3, respectively. The
complementary regressions after the policy shift are presented in the
remaining models 10 and 14. The results are generally supported by
this robustness check. While no impact of the EXI start-up support
on the SGBII-unemployed is found, positive direct employment effects
are only shown for the SGBIII-unemployed and only before the pol-
icy shift. The GZ has a significant elasticity of 0.039 in that period,
while the EXI has a small but also significant impact of 0.002. The
higher impact within the same beneficiary group may be due to the
fact, that at this time the GZ was quantitatively more important for
the SGBIII-unemployed than the EXI. That is, the start-up subsidy
only has a significant impact for a certain target group and a certain
period. That also means: The FEA was, after the policy shift, in charge
of selecting which unemployed should be eligible for their own future,
this has not lead to a higher program effectiveness. As especially before
the year 2012 unemployment rates were remarkably higher (see Figure
3.2), this leads inevitably to the question about interdependencies of
start-up subsidies and the regional unemployment rates.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of unemployment rates
Notes: In Figure 3.4a, the distribution of the monthly aggregated unemployment rates
(unemployment rate of Social Code 2 (SGBII) and unemployment rate of Social Code 3
(SGBIII) in the years 2007 to 2014 in the 23 districts of Thuringia are illustrated. The
distribution is divided by quartiles in different unemployment situation (low, middle, high).
In Figure 3.4b, the scattered SGBII-unemployment rates and related SGBIII-unemployment
rates are shown for the same unemployment situations.
Source: Statistics of the FEA; authors’ own calculations and illustrations.
For this purpose, in Table 3.4 the stock-flow matching model regression
is performed for three different unemployment situations. In model (15)
and (18), the regression results are shown for the lower quartile (Q1),
represented by a region 𝑟 at time 𝑡 with an unemployment rate lower
than 8%. The following regressions (model (16) and (19)) show the
interquartile range (Q1 - Q3) of regional unemployment rates ranging
from 8% and above to 12.3%. The remaining columns present the high
unemployment situation, with a rate of 12.3% and above (Q3). An
illustration of the distribution of the regional unemployment rates can
be found in Figure 3.4a. The share of the unemployment rate, which
is attributed to the different target groups, can be found in Figure
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3.4b.49 For all models the main explanatory variables of the stocks
and inflows into unemployment as well as vacancies are comparable
to the results presented before. Again, it can be seen that in the
SGBII-models (15), (16) and (17) no significant effect on the matching
proceedings are caused by the start-up subsidy EXI, independent of
the respective unemployment situation. Neither the recession-push nor
the prosperity-pull hypothesis can be confirmed.
To sum up, in neither presented models for the SGBII-unemployed the
effects of the start-up subsidy measures on the outflows from unem-
ployment are significant. For the case of these unemployed persons,
with a comparatively lower endowment of financial and human capi-
tal, this measure is not an appropriate policy to cause subsequent em-
ployment effects. So, program features attracting more disadvantaged
unemployed (in terms of a lower endowment of human and financial
capital) seem not to cause higher net effects and, thus, have no higher
program effectiveness. Intense counteracting dead-weight, substitution
as well as displacement effects seem to exist and hinder that overall net
effectiveness.
In the case of SGBIII-unemployed, the models (18), (19) and (20) of
Table 3.4 illustrate that comparatively low (GZ) and middle (EXI) un-
employment rates drive the positive and significant direct employment
effects. For the high unemployment situation, no significant and direct
employment effect can be found. It is likely, anyways that the existing
push effect into self-employment out of unemployment causes strong
dead-weight effects that counteract the positive employment effects by
the start-up subsidy. Anyhow, the start-up subsidy is not appropriate
to cause additional outflows from unemployment in unfavorable eco-
49 The regression is not implemented with quartiles depending on the separately
SGBII-unemployment and SGBIII-unemployment situation within a region as a
significant loss of heterogeneity go along with this approach.
91
nomic conditions, regardless of the individual characteristics (human
and financial endowment) of the owner. All in all, also the evidence
for prosperity-pull hypothesis of an (indirect) employment boost from
start-up support in better economic situations is mixed. The signifi-
cance and direction of the elasticity is to some extent ambiguous, which
is why no significant employment effects by the supported start-ups
should be expected, at least in the short-term.
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Table 3.4: Matching proceeding on the labor market – augmented
model with separation for groups of unemployed persons and unem-
ployment rates
SGBII-Model SGBIII-Model
Lower endowment Higher endowment
Dependent Variable ln Outflow from Unempl. (SGBII) ln Outflow from Unempl. (SGBIII)
Unemployment Rate Low Middle High (Low) Middle High
(< 𝑄1) (≥ 𝑄1∩ < 𝑄3) (≥ 𝑄3) (< 𝑄1) (≥ 𝑄1∩ < 𝑄3) (≥ 𝑄3)
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
ln Stock of Unempl. (SGBII) (t-1) 0.505*** 0.825*** 0.761***
(0.179) (0.116) (0.181)
ln Stock of Unempl. (SGBIII) (t-1) 0.940*** 0.734*** 0.628***
(0.122) (0.062) (0.086)
ln Stock of Vacancies (t-1) −0.102 0.100*** 0.194*** 0.030 0.015 0.020
(0.097) (0.036) (0.045) (0.059) (0.021) (0.027)
ln Inflow into Unempl. (SGBII) 0.525*** 0.251*** 0.331***
(0.074) (0.048) (0.062)
ln Inflow into Unempl. (SGBIII) 0.101 −0.026 −0.075
(0.087) (0.042) (0.057)
ln Inflow into Vacancies 0.109* 0.085*** 0.096*** 0.123*** 0.087*** 0.046**
(0.056) (0.028) (0.034) (0.036) (0.017) (0.021)
ln Spatial lagged Outflow (SGBII) 0.108 0.340*** −0.036
(0.093) (0.050) (0.091)
ln Spatial lagged Outflow (SGBIII) 0.623*** 0.707*** 0.680***
(0.111) (0.063) (0.073)
Share of long-term Unempl. (SGBII, t-1) −0.941** −0.647*** −0.370
(0.423) (0.206) (0.295)
Share of long-term Unempl. (SGBIII, t-1) −0.955** −0.571*** −0.643***
(0.453) (0.215) (0.231)
ln Stock of EXI(SGBII, t-1) 0.005 0.002 −0.005
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
ln Inflow into EXI (SGBII) −0.001 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
ln Stock of EXI(SGBIII, t-1) 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Stock of GZ (SGBIII, t-1) −0.010 0.032* 0.008
(0.019) (0.019) (0.030)
ln Inflow into EXI (SGBIII) 0.003 0.003*** −0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
ln Inflow into GZ (SGBIII) 0.005* 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant −2.380 −5.776*** −4.902*** −6.823*** −5.065*** −3.305***
(1.999) (1.128) (1.829) (1.336) (0.671) (0.973)
Observations 512 1031 551 534 1100 556
LR chi2 44,168.2 8,823.4 347,317.3 132,082.7 11,348.7 6,798.0
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.966 0.979 0.977 0.993 0.988 0.993
Notes: Prais–Winsten Regression with panel corrected standard errors. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Time (month and year) and regional fixed effects included. * 𝑝 < 0.10,
** 𝑝 < 0.05, *** 𝑝 < 0.01.
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3.6 Conclusion and implications for public policy
In this paper we analyze the question of whether ALMP in kind of
grants to start-ups by the unemployed help to reduce unemployment
from a regional perspective. For this purpose, we make extensive use
of comprehensive data sets on the stock and flows of unemployed, va-
cancies and participants of two distinctive start-up subsidies. An un-
derstanding of macroeconomic effects of these ALMP is important, as
these measures not only cause direct employment effects, but also can
cause positive as well negative externalities on non-participants. The
largely positive results of the individual participant studies are gen-
erally not confirmed by this study in the broader context and in the
short-term.
The results particularly indicate that policy makers face a delicate bal-
ancing act: From a regional labor market perspective, ALMP through
start-up subsidies are very limited in terms of job creation effects, es-
pecially for the group of unemployed with a lower endowment of fi-
nancial and human capital. However, ALMP programs are typically
implemented specifically for this group. Further, in the context of the
Recession-Push Hypothesis, it is found that in times of comparatively
high unemployment rates, the provision of start-up subsidies does not
cause additional outflows from the stock of unemployed persons into
employment. Independent of the unemployment situation, indirect em-
ployment effects on the labor market by start-up subsidies are ambigu-
ous and should not be expected. It remains the task of other studies
to review these results for other regions and different economic situ-
ations. This is especially true against the background of the special
case of the German and Thuringian labor markets and their unique,
positive development. The external validity of the results is therefore
restricted.
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Based on the results of this study, the financial support of start-ups by
unemployed persons appears questionable. For the purpose of higher
net effects, it is reasonable to recommend that these kind of ALMP
measures should be more targeted and focus more on the concrete cir-
cumstances of founders, business’ industries and the labor market. To
avoid dead-weight losses, the focus should be put more on the sup-
ported individual with its specific characteristics. Even if there are
social reasons for supporting the unemployed, there should be evidence
of real financial disadvantage in order to protect state budgets.
It is also important to ask whether setting up a company is indeed the
most efficient way of ending unemployment. A large proportion of the
unemployed receiving support had a high level of education compared
to the total number of unemployed persons. This human capital en-
dowment may be positive for the company’s prospects of success, but
given the current economic situation and the existing jobs in the area
of study, an unsupported dependent employment could have been a
realistic possibility. Further, to avoid displacement effects, a special
focus could be given to the supported business’ industries. As noticed
by Shane (2009), founders are typically starting-up in sectors where
entry is comparatively easy but not where success rates are high. It
would therefore be advisable to look at the specific cutthroat compet-
itive situation in the market. Whether or not the additional supply
by the start-ups finds additional demand is of great interest to avoid
a “revolving door” mechanism (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007) and to
increase net employment effects.
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Chapter 4
What Do We Really Know about Start-Up In-
centives for Unemployed Persons? A Critical
Discussion
“A player appears before the curtain and addresses the audience apologetically in an
epilogue:
THE PLAYER:
Ladies and gentlemen, don’t feel let down:
We know this ending makes some people frown.
We had in mind a sort of golden myth
Then found the finish had been tampered with.
Indeed it is a curios way of coping:
To close the play, leaving the issue open.”
— Brecht (2016, p. 185)
Abstract. This survey article critically reviews the recent evaluation
literature on start-up incentives for the unemployed. The main con-
clusion is that the existing literature has not yet been able to link the
outcomes studied with the institutional framework conditions of the re-
spective policies. In particular, too little attention has been paid to the
description of the different institutional frameworks (policy objectives,
beneficiaries, eligibility criteria, type and amount of support) and the
economic circumstances including market failures. Yet, this focus is of
crucial importance in the context of measuring success, comparing the
results and giving appropriate policy advice. An analytical framework
is being developed that makes the different instruments more compa-
rable. As a result, a series of open research questions is identified that
need to be clarified in order to adequately assess and justify the use of
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start-up incentives for the unemployed.50
4.1 Introduction
One of the currently most discussed and implemented instruments
to reduce unemployment are start-up subsidies for the unemployed
(OECD and European Commission, 2014; Eurofound, 2016). In OECD,
2017 countries, between the years 2006 and 2015, more than 45 billion
EUR were spent on this policy. However, start-up incentives for the
unemployed can be both, an active labor market policy (ALMP) and an
entrepreneurship policy. Given that one of the most basic issues for pol-
icymakers are jobs (Dennis Jr., 2011), these policies are very attractive
as they directly end the period of unemployment through the founda-
tion of their own company by that unemployed person (Román et al.,
2013; Caliendo, 2016). In addition to that, possible indirect employ-
ment creation through the growth of the newly founded business may
emerge (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010). Although the existing literature
predominantly shows positive results with regard to the effectiveness
of start-up incentives for unemployed persons (see e.g. Caliendo, 2016,
Dvoulety` and Lukeš, 2016), there are also studies that do not clearly
confirm the effectiveness of these measures (see e.g. O’Leary, 1999;
Meager et al., 2003a,b; Cueto et al., 2017).
Given the limited public finances, such policies should, thus, be regu-
larly examined empirically for their effectiveness as political decision-
makers are increasingly demanding an evidence-based policy advice to
50 JEL-Classification: J64; P48; J08, M13; L53; D78. Keywords: Regional Policy;
Start-Up Subsidy; Unemployment; Entrepreneurship.
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support and inform their actions (Sanderson, 2002). It is then the re-
sponsibility of researchers to formulate clear policy recommendations
as a result of the policy evaluation process. However, up to now, most
of the existing literature on start-up incentives for unemployed persons
has investigated the question of how the funding instrument affects out-
comes of the participants or established companies, while policy advice
to improve the effectiveness is scarce.
In this paper, we argue that the evaluation of specific instruments with-
out reference to external validity is too general to adequately assess and
justify the use of start-up incentives for the unemployed. Rather, it is
important to describe both the support measures as well as the context
in which they have been implemented as the effectiveness of a measure
depends to a large extent on these factors (see e.g. Wilson and Adams,
1994; Meager, 1996; Cueto et al., 2017). Since differently structured
start-up incentives for unemployed persons in various regions or coun-
tries exist, only in this way the different studies on these measures can
be compared in terms of the external validity of their results. For this
purpose, we introduce a uniform institutional and contextual frame-
work that makes the different instruments analyzed in the literature so
far more comparable. With this, the framework can serve as a basis for
more evidence-based policy advice. We do so based on 19 instruments
from 13 different countries, bringing together a total of 27 studies on
start-up incentives for unemployed persons.
The framework developed here addresses four main issues: First, evalu-
ation studies of start-up incentives for unemployed persons are focused
on supposedly “positive” outcomes such as survival rate, employability,
job creation or business growth among others. Important negative ef-
fects, i.e. displacement effects and dead-weight losses have so far been
insufficiently investigated. Second, as the fact that start-up incen-
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tives are both an ALMP and entrepreneurship policies creates conflicts
between the two policy areas, a clearer focus of political objectives
by policy makers is often required. Moreover, the present literature
does not sufficiently consider how the measures perform in respect of
the stated objectives nor consequently discusses the economic circum-
stances at the time of the introduction of the policy, even though this
is a prerequisite for effective, evidence-based policy making. Third,
start-up incentives for unemployed persons require more verifiable eco-
nomic justification by identifying market failures. Credit constraints
for unemployed persons in the context of capital market imperfections
are not be proven yet. Fourth, due to the lack of clarification of these
fundamental issues, it is not yet possible to identify best practices with
regard to the institutional framework and, most important, link the
outcomes studied with the institutional framework conditions of the
respective policies. The analysis of different policy frameworks and
the critical discussion of the literature gives rise to a number of open
research questions that need to be clarified to broaden and solidify
evidence-based policy advice on the topic of start-up incentives for un-
employed persons.
This article is organized as follows. The upcoming Section 4.2 provides
a descriptive overview of start-up incentives for unemployed persons
in the international context. This quantitative analysis is followed by
a qualitative assessment of the measures. Section 4.3 then gives a
brief overview of the existing literature on this topic and the selection
of the examined studies in this paper. The subsequent discussion of
these empirical studies in Section 4.4 is divided into five subsections,
i.e. policy perspective, eligibility criteria, type and level of financial
support and supplementary services, which together form the analytical
framework developed. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Descriptive data
Within the OECD, start-up incentives for the unemployed are a politi-
cal instrument whose application is concentrated within the European
countries. According to data reported by OECD (2017), one can see in
Figure 4.1a that since 1985 the average of public expenditure on these
measures as a percentage of GDP were in the European Countries at all
times higher than outside Europe. This applies equally to participant
stocks as a percentage of the labor force (Figure 4.1b).
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Figure 4.1: Public expenditures and participant stocks of start-up
incentives for unemployed persons
Notes: In Figure 4.1a, the average public expenditure on start-up incentives for unemployed
persons as a percentage of GDP in the years 1985 to 2015 are illustrated. In Figure 4.1b,
the average participant stocks as a percentage of the labor force in the years 2000 to 2015
are illustrated.
Source: OECD (2017).
It can be seen that after the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the
subsequent transformation processes in Eastern Europe there has been
a first substantial increase in expenditures relative to GDP. After a
phase of expenditure consolidation between the mid-1990s and mid-
2000s in all countries, interest in these measures has picked up again
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at the latest since the economic and financial crisis in the year 2007.
Since then, both expenditure as a share of GDP (only in Europe) and
the number of participants (in Europe and Non-Europe) have risen
significantly.
However, these general trends do not explain the observable differences
between countries, nor the fluctuations in expenditure and numbers
of participants within individual countries, which can be seen in Fig-
ure 4.2. For example, countries like Spain, Poland, Slovakia, France
and Germany are particularly committed to providing these measures.
This leads to the fact, that the number of participants are of particular
importance for the general entrepreneurial process as, for example, the
share of business owners who had no employment prior to start-up and
received a start-up subsidy was in France (1998) 52% (Duhautois et
al., 2015) or in Germany (2006 to 2011) 40% to 60% (Caliendo et al.,
2015). Even if basic explanatory models to explain the fluctuations
within countries and in international comparison are missing, we know
from Germany, for example, that in the course of the labor market
reforms at the beginning of the 2000s this occurred as a reaction to
the increased unemployment rate and this led to a strong increase in
the number of participants (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010). When the
unemployment rates then fell again, various reforms of the instruments
(see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2015; Bellmann et al., 2017) took place, re-
sulting in a disproportionate decline in the number of participants and
expenditure. Other countries such as France and the UK have also car-
ried out various revisions of their funding instruments in recent years
(Haas and Vogel, 2016). This implies that either there is no general
best-practice approach for such funding instruments or that the mea-
sures has to be constantly adapted to changing economic conditions.
However, what can be deduced from Figure 4.3 is that there is a gen-
eral positive link between the unemployment rate in a country and the
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expenditures relative to GDP on start-up incentives for unemployed
persons.
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Figure 4.2: Public expenditures on start-up incentives for unemployed
persons by country
Notes: In Figure 4.2, the public expenditure on start-up incentives for unemployed persons
as a percentage of GDP in the years 2000 to 2015 are illustrated for several countries.
Source: OECD (2017).
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Figure 4.3: Correlation between unemployment rates and public ex-
penditure on start-up incentives for unemployed persons
Notes: In Figure 4.3, the correlation between unemployment rates and public expenditure
on start-up incentives for unemployed persons as a percentage of GDP are illustrated.
Source: OECD (2017).
4.3 Literature review and selection of studies
In correspondence to the number of participants and expenditures on
start-up incentives for the unemployed, the research on this issue also
focuses on Europe, especially Germany. In a recent review of Dvoulety`
and Lukeš (2016), which evaluates 18 empirical studies about self-
employment out of unemployment of the last ten years and focuses
on the research designs and empirical results used, it is shown that in
almost all studies European countries are treated. Of these, ten stud-
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ies alone deal exclusively with different German measures to support
start-ups out of unemployment. Only one study in the review – a work
by Zouhar and Lukes (2015) using data on cross sectional cohorts –
covers states outside the European Union. Caliendo (2016) presents a
further overview that the latest studies of start-up subsidy programs,
which provide descriptive evidence or causal effects and originate from
non-European countries, are from Wilson and Adams (1994) for Aus-
tralia and the USA, Ross et al. (2002) for Australia and Perry (2006)
for New Zealand.
In Table 4.1, the studies used for the literature review in this paper are
presented. The literature review, focusing on the policies’ institutional
and contextual framework, is also dominated by European studies. For
example, of the 19 examined instruments, a total of 16 are from Europe,
which is equivalent to 24 out of 27 in total studies. The selection of
articles, and thus the various funding instruments, is essentially based
on the result-orientated literature that is also used in Caliendo (2016).
In order to ensure that those studies those studies that have been per-
formed since that time are also included, the keyword search approach
described in detail by Dvoulety` and Lukeš (2016) was followed. As
a result, four new studies (Bellmann et al., 2017; Cueto et al., 2017
and Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis) have been identified that have not
been included in the previous review articles. The information in the
overview of Table 4.1 to 4.7 have been taken with the greatest care
from the respective papers and therefore represent the description of
the institutional and contextual framework as well as the performance
indicators for the specific measures.
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Table 4.1: Policy measures by country and related literature
Country Nr. Name Literature Policy Level
Australia [1a] New Enterprise Incentive Scheme (1990) Wilson and Adams (1994) Federal
[1b] New Enterprise Incentive Scheme (2000–2002) Ross et al. (2002)
Denmark [2] Ivaeksaenterydelsen (1992) Meager (1996) Federal
Finland [3] Start-Up (1988–2002) Tokila (2009) Federal
France
[4a] ACCRE (1986) Wilson and Adams (1994) Federal
[4b] ACCRE (1988) Meager (1996)
[4c] ACCRE plus (1998–2006) Duhautois et al. (2015)
Germany
[5a] Bridging Allowance (1991) Meager (1996)
Federal[5b] Bridging Allowance (1993–1996) Pfeiffer and Reize (2000)
[5c] Bridging Allowance (2003–2008) Baumgartner and Caliendo (2008)
Caliendo (2009)
Caliendo and Kritikos (2010)
Caliendo and Künn (2014)
[5d] Start-Up Subsidy (2003–2008) Caliendo (2009)
Caliendo and Kritikos (2010)
Caliendo and Künn (2014)
Federal
[5e] New Start-Up Subsidy (2009–2011) Caliendo et al. (2015)
Caliendo et al. (2016)
Federal
[5f] New Start-Up Subsidy (2011–2014) Bellmann et al. (2017) Federal
[5g] Einstiegsgeld (2005–2007) Wolff et al. (2016) Federal
[5h] Existenzgründerrichtlinie (2007-2014) Section 2, Section 3 in this thesis Regional
Hungary [6] Self-Employment Assistance (1995–1997) O’Leary (1999) Federal
New Zealand [7] Enterprise Allowance (1988–1997) Perry (2006) Federal
Poland [8] Self-Employment Assistance (1993–1997) O’Leary (1999) Federal
Romania [9] Self-Employment Assistance (1999–2002) Rodríguez-Planas (2010)
Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob (2010)
Federal
Spain [10a] Self-Employment, pp. 1996-2000 Cueto and Mato (2006) Regional
[10b] Flat rate for young self-employed workers (2013) Cueto et al. (2017) Federal
Sweden [11a] Self-Employment, 1998–2002 Andersson and Wadensjö (2007) Federal
[11b] Self-Employment, 2003–2007 Månsson and Delander (2011)
Behrenz et al. (2012)
UK
[12a] The Business Start-Up Scheme (1991) Wilson and Adams (1994) Federal
[12b] The Business Start-Up Scheme (1992-1994) Meager (1996)
[12c] Prince’s Trust (1998–2001) Meager et al. (2003a)
Meager et al. (2003b)
Federal
US [13] Self-Employment Assistance (1990) Wilson and Adams (1994) Regional
Source: Author’s own illustration based on referenced articles.
4.4 Institutional and contextual framework
Literature reviews of entry into self-employment are of great impor-
tance. They help to provide a solid background for the definition of
more focused and efficient policy measures (Simoes et al., 2016, p. 799).
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The development of a comparative analytical and institutional frame-
work for start-up incentives for unemployed persons is, thus, of critical
importance, since the outcomes of the policies in various countries dif-
fer (Caliendo, 2016; Dvoulety` and Lukeš, 2016) and are determined to
a large extent by how the measure is designed in concrete terms, for
example with regard to different target groups, funding amounts, types
of funding or funding conditions (see e.g. Meager, 1996, Cueto et al.,
2017).
The provision of an analytical framework on this topic is a continuation
of the early survey work of Wilson and Adams (1994) but also Meager
(1996). The above mentioned authors’ comparative studies of selected
OECD countries and transitional economies, which corresponds with
the first increase in expenditures and numbers of participants at the be-
ginning of the 1990s (see Section 4.2), consist of two parts: First, a de-
scription of different policy designs in the respective countries and, sec-
ond, a presentation of outcome-variables (survival rates, dead-weight
effects, job creation). While the latter has been recently analyzed and
extended through literature reviews by Caliendo (2016) and Dvoulety`
and Lukeš (2016), the former has been given less attention. Since that
early work, only Haas and Vogel (2016) published a comparative in-
stitutional analysis of recent policy designs based on interviews with
selected administrators from different European countries.
This paper tries to fill the existing gap, namely a literature review with
a focus on the institutional and contextual framework level. This not
only provides information on the various funding instruments and their
policy design, but also on the state of the research in the field. In the
following, it will be shown that there is a significant heterogeneity of
the measures with regard to their policy design, that is, there is no best
practice approach to date. Interestingly, the main part of the current
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studies refer to measures taken before the financial and economic crisis
of 2007 and subsequent years. However, it is precisely during this
period that a significant increase in unemployment has been observed,
which is why the call for adequate policy measures has been intensified
and start-up measures became the subject of this discussion (OECD
and European Commission, 2014; Eurofound, 2016, see also Section
4.2). Due to considerable time delays, research has so far insufficiently
described current problems and challenges.
4.4.1 Policy perspective
In order to ensure adequate policy-making and evaluation, it is at first
of crucial importance to define the objectives of a specific measure.
Obviously, from a purely economic point of view, this would imply
particularly the identification and removal of market failure. How-
ever, we know from policy research (Battilana et al., 2009; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2013; Arshed et al., 2014) that policy measures do not
necessarily pursue economic efficiency, but may also be influenced by
elected politicians, civil servants and especially external stakeholders,
which pursue their own agendas and try to satisfy the needs of partic-
ular interest groups. The formulated policy objective is thus a result of
a negotiation process and therefore represents a political equilibrium,
which can be used as an object of investigation.
In the case of start-up incentives for unemployed persons, the formu-
lation and analysis of policy objectives can be challenging as different
policy areas are affected. Román et al. (2013, p. 171)therefore provoca-
tively asks the question: “Are start-up incentives an entrepreneurship
policy or an instrument within ALMP?”. It depends on the answer to
that question which indicators should be used to assess the effectiveness
of the policy measure from a political and economic perspective.
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4.4.1.1 Policy objectives and justification of market in-
terventions
If the design of start-ups incentives for unemployed persons is intended
to be an entrepreneurship policy, this is linked to a focus on growth ori-
entation, i.e. regional development and the creation of additional jobs.
Typical policy objectives (see Table 4.2) and the resulting measures
of success (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4) would be the survival rate of the
supported business owners (for example defined in the Swedish (Måns-
son and Delander, 2011; Behrenz et al., 2012) or Spanish (Cueto and
Mato, 2006) Self-Employment Grants) or the number of their newly
created jobs (for example defined as the goal of the German Bridging
Allowance (see e.g. Baumgartner and Caliendo, 2008, Caliendo and
Kritikos, 2010). But also an increase in the self-employment rate of
the region is a conceivable goal, for example as aimed as by the Span-
ish flat rate for young self-employed workers (Cueto et al., 2017).51
51 In this context, it is stated by Meager (1996) that broader objectives exist,
which are essentially ideological, for example the extension of an “enterprise
culture”. The increase in the self-employment rate may, thus, target towards
experiences in self-employment to encourage a more positive attitude towards
entrepreneurship. This may be particularly important for groups that typically
experience only wage employment.
108
Table 4.2: Policy objectives by country and measure
Country Nr. Policy Perspective
Policy Objective Economic Context
Australia [1a] Help participants become self supporting[*];independence from social security payments[ ][1b]
Denmark [2]
Finland [3] General statements on lack of finance[ ] and in-
crease in entrepreneurship[*]
Average annual unemployment rate between
12% and 16%, regions are more urban (75%)
than rural (25%)
France
[4a]
[4b]
[4c] Secure income [*]; provide social security[ ]; ad-
vantageous for participants[ ]
Germany
[5a] Integrate participants into labor market
(ideally long term)[*]; create additional jobs[*];
spur growth[*]; cover basic costs of living and
social security contributions[ ]
[5b] General information on numbers of unemployed
and self-employed persons
[5c] Comprehensive information and international
context; in Germany comparatively low
self-employment rate (10 to 11%); medium
unemployment rates (7.3%)
[5d] Integrate participants into labor market[*]; se-
cure early self-employment[*]; provide social se-
curity[ ]
[5e]
[5f] Reintegrate participants into labor market[*];
maintaining livelihood[*]
Unemployment rate (6.4%-6.8%) and GDP
growth (0.3%-1.5%) reported
[5g] End the participants’ welfare receipt[*] Decrease in unemployment rates since labor
market reforms of the years 2003-2005
[5h] Support growth-oriented start-ups[ ]; reduce re-
gional unemployment rate[*]; integrate unem-
ployed into the labor market[ ]; increase regional
self-employment rate
Favorable development in unemployment rates
(drop from 13.1% to 7.8%) decline in self-
employment rates
Hungary [6] General statements on reemployment[ ] Increase in GDP and unemployment rates (up
to 13%) in last 7 years
New Zealand [7]
Poland [8] General statements on reemployment[ ] increase in GDP and unemployment rates (up
to 16%) in last 7 years
Romania [9] Reintegration of displaced workers[*] underdeveloped SME sector, high share of agri-
culture businesses, high unemployment rate
(more than 10%), low share of self-employment
Spain [10a] Reduce unemployment[ ]; inequality[ ]; businessfailures[ ]
[10b] Foster self-employment[ ]; facilitate survival of
young self-employed workers[*]
Unemployment rate and (youth) self-
employment rate high (compared to EU
average)
Sweden [11a]
[11b] Decrease unemployment[*]; stimulate employ-
ment in small businesses[ ]
UK
[12a]
[12b]
[12c] Help participants to get work[ ]; support to
start-ups[ ]
US [13]
Notes: Author’s own illustration based on referenced articles (Table 4.1). Policy objectives
of a measure that have actually been evaluated are marked with an [*].
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Table 4.3: Descriptive policy outcomes by country and measure
Country Nr. Performance – descriptive results
Survival (% in self-employment) Employment (%
self-employed or
employed)
Job creation (% of start-
ups with employees and no.
of jobs created
Dead weight
losses
Displace-
ment
Australia [1a] 54% (1 year after T) 63% (1 year afterT)
22% (1 year after T); 0.36
FTE jobs per survivor
39%
[1b] 56% (2 years after T) 84% (2 years af-
ter T)
0.45 FTE jobs per survivor
(2 years after T)
Denmark [2] 74% (2 years after S); 55% (3.5 years
after S);
36 extra jobs per 100 par-
ticipants (2 years after S)
41% Likely high
Finland [3] 79% (1 year after S); 52% (4 years af-
ter S); 36% (8 year after S)
France
[4a] 51% (4.5 years after T) 29% (4.5 years after T);
0.45 jobs per survivor
60%
[4b] 53% (3 years after S) 97 extra jobs per 100 par-
ticipants (5 years after S)
35% Likely low
[4c] 56.9% (5 years after S); 45.3% (8 years
after S)
Germany [5a] 20% Likely low
[5b] 90% (West) and 94% (East) (1 year
after S)
14%–19% mean annual
employment growth rate
(1 year after S)
[5c] 72% (2 years after S); 68% (4.5 years
after S)
86% (2 years af-
ter S); 89% (4.5
years after S)
[5d] 68% (2 years after S); 60% (4.5 years
after S)
80% (2 years af-
ter S); 81% (4.5
years after S)
[5e]
[5f] 87% (female 18 months after S) 94%
(male 18 months after S)
[5g]
[5h] 96%–97% (male 1 year after S) 95%-
97% (female 1 year after S)
4 extra jobs per 100 partic-
ipants (at time of S)
Likely high
Hungary [6] 81% (1.5 years after T) 17% (2 years after T); 0.3
jobs per survivor
New Zealand [7]
Poland [8] 62% (4 years after S) 27% (3.5 years after S);
0.84 jobs per survivor
Romania [9] 60% employed
(for at least 1 out
of 2 years after
S)
Spain [10a] 93% (2 years after S); 76% (6 yearsafter S)
[10b] 50% (1 year after S) 40% (2 years after
S)
Sweden [11a]
[11b] 30–45% insignificant
UK
[12a] 71% (0.5 years after T) 81% (0.5 years
after T)
18% (1.5 years after S);
0.28 FTE jobs per survivor
(0.5 years after T)
42%
[12b] 87% (1 year after S); 59% (3 years af-
ter S); 40% (5 years after S)
35 extra jobs per 100 par-
ticipants (5 years after S)
50–70% High >50%
[12c] 75% (1.5 years after S); 50% (4 years
after S)
US [13] 77% (1 year after T) 80% (1 year after
T)
Source: Author’s own illustration based on the results presented in Caliendo (2016), sup-
plemented by referenced articles (Table 4.1). After T is the time passed since the end of
period of support (treatment). After S is the time passed since start-up. FTE are full time
equivalent jobs.
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Table 4.4: Policy outcomes and causal effects by country and measure
Country Nr. Policy Outcomes (percentage point change)
Self-employment Self-employment and employment Income growth Business growth
Australia [1a]
[1b]
Denmark [2]
Finland [3] +4pp (4 years after S)
France
[4a]
[4b]
[4c] 0pp (2 years after S);
+3.5/4.5/4.7pp (4/6/8
years after S)
0pp, effect on turnover/
employment growth
rate
Germany
[5a]
[5b] East: -6.4pp (1 year af-
ter S); West: 0pp
0pp, effect on employ-
ment growth rate
[5c] +14.5pp (4.5 years after S) +618 EUR per month
(4.5 years after S)
[5d] +22pp (4.5 years after S) +435 EUR per month
(4.5 years after S)
[5e]
[5f] +30pp (female 18 months after S) +26pp (male 18 months
after S)
+530 EUR (female 18
months after S) 950
EUR (male 18 months
after S)
[5g] -26–31pp less likely to be unemployed; 13–17pp less likely to
receive welfare (2 years after S)
[5h] 0.003pp more employed per 1pp increased participant num-
ber for benefit recipients Social Code III (at time of S) +/-
0pp for benefit recipients Social Code II or non-recipients
(at time of S)
Hungary [6] 0 (2 years after T) -$26 per month (2 years
after T)
New Zealand [7] -100/-32 days in unemployment (6 months after T)
Poland [8] +27pp (after 5 years after S)
Romania [9] +8pp (for at least 0.5 years out of 1 after S)
Spain [10a]
[10b] +/- 0 (2 years after S) +/- 0 (2 years after S)
Sweden [11a] +8pp (3 years after S) +27%/19% (1/3 yearafter S)
[11b] 17pp/10pp less likely to be UE (2/5 years after S)
UK
[12a]
[12b]
[12c] +/- 0pp (4 years after S) +/- 0pp (4 years after
S)
US [13]
Source: Author’s own illustration based on the results presented in Caliendo (2016), sup-
plemented by referenced articles (Table 4.1). After T is the time passed since the end of
period of support (treatment). After S is the time passed since start-up. FTE are full time
equivalent jobs.
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On the other hand, there is the ALMP perspective for these mea-
sures, which aims at reducing unemployment. These policies target
the individual and its further prospects and development on the labor
market, i.e. its employability and income prospects (see e.g. Caliendo
and Künn, 2011). In concrete terms, an ALMP can be considered
as successful if the supported individual’s probability of being unem-
ployed in the future is reduced. Be it directly by maintaining their self-
employment status, or indirectly by gaining work experience through
the establishment and closure of the company. The latter can be in
conflict with the entrepreneurial perspective, since low survival rates
are not necessarily associated with a lack of program efficiency as expe-
riences gained may increase the individual’s human capital and, thus,
the chance to return to regular employment (Månsson and Delander,
2011). This means that a focus is set on the employment chances af-
ter a certain period. In addition, the individuals’ dependence on state
transfer payments can be an important policy dimension. As an ex-
ample, both, the “Start-Up Subsidy” (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010,
Caliendo and Künn, 2014) in Germany and the French “L’aide aux
chômeurs créateurs ou repreneurs d’entreprise” (ACCRE) system (see
e.g. Duhautois et al., 2015), aimed at providing income and social se-
curity to formerly unemployed persons while starting up. An effective
instrument would therefore encompass the maintenance of the standard
of living for an individual or the provision of a certain degree of social
security, i.e. the maintenance of entitlements to health, pension or un-
employment insurance. However, this conflicts with the entrepreneur-
ship approach, which is focused on the growth of the company. This
means that people should be supported in taking entrepreneurial risks
in order to generate profits and not to provide social security. In many
countries, self-employed persons are excluded from state social benefits
and must fall back on private insurance or do not have any entitlement,
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e.g. unemployment insurance (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010; Haas and
Vogel, 2016).
Even if all mentioned outcomes (survival rate, employability, job cre-
ation, change in self-employment rates, business growth, income changes,
social security or other) of start-up incentives can be evaluated inde-
pendently of the original policy objectives, there is a crucial value in
analyzing it:52 Because, adequate evidence-based policy advice, given
by researchers, is able to link political objectives by policy makers with
expected outcomes. To say whether the measure was effective from
the intended political will is, thus, an interesting and demanded con-
clusion for politicians in particular, as political decision-makers are
increasingly demanding this evidence-based policy advice to support
and inform their actions (Sanderson, 2002). The necessary consider-
ation of intended objectives would also be in line with the argument
put forward by Dixit (1997) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) that
economic analysis and policy advice should not just focus on the eco-
nomic costs and benefits or the removal of market failures (see Section
4.4.1.2). Moreover, it should consider the policy making process. The
funding instrument and its objective are now the very outcome of this
policy making process. That is, if possible, scholars may take more into
account the originally intended objective of the start-up incentives for
the purpose of comprehensive evaluation.
Until now (see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4), the measures of success in in-
ternational comparative studies have been used without placing them
consequently in this context, as the outcomes evaluated and the in-
tended political aims often differ or are not reported in the literature.
However, this also places demands on policy makers, as Meager (1996,
52 For sure, in the case of an unclear definition of the objectives or a unquantifiable
target this broad evaluation is a standalone, reasonable approach by researchers
(Eurofound, 2016).
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p. 495) noticed: “a clear articulation of objectives is a prerequisite of
the evaluation process, particularly when such schemes may have mul-
tiple (and occasionally conflicting) objectives, which need to be taken
into account in assessing impact”.
4.4.1.2 Economic context
An increased focus on political objectives, however, does not render the
“pure” economic analysis obsolete. On the contrary, it is still of great
importance if it is done appropriately. At first, it is therefore surprising
that a large number of studies (see Table 4.2) do not explain the eco-
nomic circumstances that exist in the relevant geographical unit at the
time of the analysis of the respective measure. In the case of start-up
incentives for unemployed persons, this particularly would mean that
the unemployment rate is of crucial importance (Cueto and Mato, 2006;
Tokila, 2009), but also the development of the GDP in recent years,
self-employment rates or local sector analysis on competition. Since an
effective policy design should take regional circumstances into account
(Szerb et al., 2013; Stam and Bosma, 2015), this information would be
of great value for comparative research.
In addition, Ehrenberg and Smith (2016) remind us of the need to
justify state interventions in the labor market, as in the case of the
existence of market failures. Even if a focus on a pure economic per-
spective has been described as maybe too one-dimensional from a policy
perspective, economists are, however, responsible for identifying mar-
ket failures and incorporating them in their policy advice as well as in
the evaluation of policy measures. In this paper it is not so much the
justification of state intervention in the labor market as such that is to
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be discussed,53 but rather the concrete justification for the application
of start-up incentives for unemployed persons. From an economic point
of view, subsidies should be dependent on an obvious and unambiguous
market failure, because otherwise negative distortion effects are to be
expected on efficient, existing firms and, thus, on other self-employed
and dependent employed persons (see e.g. Santarelli and Vivarelli,
2007). This, in turn, can have repercussions on the overall economic
context.
(i) Lack of Financial Resources: The most important and frequently
cited justification for the instrument of self-employment incentives (see
e.g. Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Tokila, 2009; Román et al., 2013;
Caliendo et al., 2015; Wolff et al., 2016; Cueto et al., 2017 and others)
relates to a lack of financial endowment of the unemployed in addition
to a discrimination by the credit market.54 It is assumed that signifi-
cant credit constraints exist for unemployed persons, as it is found in
the literature that credit markets tend to discriminate against socio-
economic groups (for example women or migrants see e.g. Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1998; Blanchflower, 2009; Bruder et al., 2011). This state-
ment is based on two assumptions and relates to policy objectives re-
garding the financial help to participants to become self-employed (see
Table 4.2) .
53 Examples are the fail of markets to provide insurance against unemployment
(Boeri and Van Ours, 2013), imperfect information on job opportunities or self-
employment prospects (“lack-of-awareness”) which leads to suboptimal job de-
cisions (Storey, 2003) or the existing externalities on schooling (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 2016).
54 Other reasons of minor interest, which are a disadvantage of unemployed persons
compared to normal business founders, but which do not necessarily constitute
a market failure, are that unemployed people may lack in terms of their endow-
ment of human capital, as this continuously decreases with an ongoing period
of unemployment and the, thus, missing working experience and their underde-
veloped social business networks (e.g. Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Pfeiffer
and Reize, 2000; Caliendo et al., 2015).
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Firstly, the provision of financial resources is essential for the estab-
lishment of a company as decisions for or against certain investments
depend on it and an individual’s livelihoods must be guaranteed. Over-
coming liquidity problems and providing a certain degree of neces-
sary capital, thus, positively influences the survival of the company, as
more opportunities are offered and financial security during the start-
up phase is provided (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1998; Berge et al., 2014). Secondly, due to their status as
unemployed persons compared to non-unemployed, they are expected
to have less financial resources at their disposal, which is why external
sources are needed. That is, their personal income and wealth situation
is comparatively lower than that of the average founder, as unemployed
persons depend on savings or limited state transfers, which are by de-
sign lower than achievable work income. In addition, family members
are more often not available as a source of finance as they more fre-
quently face the same capital constraints or are financially dependent
on the unemployment benefit recipient (Caliendo et al., 2015). As a
result, more often external capital has to be acquired. The state is
then responding to the lack of access to capital by providing start-up
support.
The unfortunate problem is that to date there is not enough empiri-
cal evidence that the lack of external financial capital actually hinders,
in particular, the prospects for an unemployed person to start their
own business. The most recent study discussing this topic relates to
Caliendo et al. (2015), who found only “suggestive evidence” [p. 176]
that unemployed persons were unable to receive credits by banks, as
16% of the subsidized and formerly unemployed business founders re-
ported that they wanted but had no loan contract with a bank, while
this was only true for 10% of the regular business start-ups in their
questionnaire. However, it has not been asked if they really applied for
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a loan contract. As a result, comprehensive studies with comparative
groups and a calculation of the loans offered or denied are still lacking.
In the meantime, there are good reasons to believe that there is not an
(extensive) discrimination by the capital market, but rather that the
supposed market failure is just a reaction of banks to the lack of col-
lateral and characteristics offered by the unemployed persons and their
poorer prospects of success. Also self-selection mechanisms, justified or
not, or general risk attitudes are conceivable to prevent an unemployed
person from taking out loans (for a general discussion without explicit
reference to unemployment see e.g. Cressy, 2000; Sena et al., 2012).
This means that the causal relationships are sufficiently indeterminate
and, thus, the economic justification of the incentives, which is why
further research is needed to provide reasons for the wide-ranging use
of these measures.
Another aspect regarding the topic of financial resources is that un-
employment is discussed as a push factor into self-employment (see
Chapter 5). A lack of alternatives in the paid employment sector may
make them self-employed out of necessity (Moore and Mueller, 2002;
Thurik et al., 2008). The extent to which additional incentives are ac-
tually needed for this transition of employment status has not yet been
clarified. A relevant question to get closer to this topic is which per-
sons are insensitive to these incentives; or in other words: What is the
proportion of unemployed people who would have founded a company
without the start-up incentive in order to end their unemployment? As
shown in the previous literature on this topic, these dead-weight losses
are by no means negligible (see Table 4.3). In earlier studies, the dead-
weight effects ranged between 30% to 60% in selected OECD countries
(Wilson and Adams, 1994) and between 20% to 70% for Germany,
Denmark, UK and France (Meager, 1996), respectively. More recent
values reported for the German “Bridging Allowance” (Caliendo and
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Kritikos, 2010) and the “New Start-Up Subsidy” (Caliendo et al., 2015)
account to about 50%. Further, the former “Start-Up Subsidy” in Ger-
many showed dead-weight losses of about 35% (Caliendo and Kritikos,
2010). This means that in a bandwidth of one-third to two-thirds of
all unemployed persons receiving support, the intended incentive effect
could not be proven. This also casts additional doubt on the lack of
access to external capital assumed and capital market discrimination.
However, for reasons of economic justification and efficiency, it should
be a target to keep dead-weight losses as low as possible (Santarelli and
Vivarelli, 2007).
The interactions with the policy design are puzzling. Particularly re-
strictive eligibility criteria or the exclusion of target groups to reduce
dead-weight losses are often characterized by higher social costs. For
example, in the form of higher administrative efforts through examin-
ing these criteria or at the cost of higher failure rates and, thus, more
unprofitable investments if particularly disadvantaged unemployed are
targeted by the measures (Behrenz et al., 2012; see also Section 4.4.2
for a more detailed discussion). Again, it is increasingly important to
devote more attention to this topic with more comprehensive research
designs than the surveys of participants initiated so far to determine
whether the foundation had taken place in any case or not.55
(ii) Externalities: A second important aspect of the justification of
start-incentives for unemployed persons concerns expected externali-
ties as the new entrants into markets may create additional jobs, fos-
55 The proposed introduction of dead-weight losses in a narrower sense by Caliendo
et al. (2012) (the subsidization has not affected the success of the business at
all in the first six months after start-up) may not be useful and particularly
misleading in this context as new businesses act in a utility and profit maxi-
mizing environment. Thus, a subsidy, typically in form of a grant without any
repayment requirements (see Section 4.4.3), ought to affect business success per
se.
118
ter innovation or enhance regional development (Fritsch and Mueller,
2004; Mueller et al., 2008; Fritsch and Storey, 2014; Caliendo, 2016;
Storey, 2016). Since, in addition to ending the unemployment of the
supported individual further positive effects are expected from the busi-
ness founded, this “double dividend” (Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010) is
closely linked to the aforementioned political objectives with a focus
on entrepreneurship policies (see Table 4.2).
Reasons for the external effects are based to a considerable extent on
the observation mentioned above that entrepreneurship is associated
with desirable economic outcomes, i.e. job creation. However, this
is mainly a result of the selective and heterogeneous groups of high-
growth firms (HGF) (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2009; Nightingale and
Coad, 2013; Coad et al., 2014; Daunfeldt et al., 2015; Nightingale and
Coad, 2016; Bravo-Biosca et al., 2016; Storey, 2016). Although one
cannot completely rule out the possibility that start-ups supported by
formerly unemployed people will make a contribution to this, but it
is at least doubtful and unlikely due to the numerous disadvantages
experienced by this group (Shane, 2009; Nightingale and Coad, 2013).
Generally, these start-ups are lacking generous financial resources (see
Section 4.4.1.2), experience a depreciation of their human capital due to
the unemployment situation (Hinz and Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Pfeiffer
and Reize, 2000) and have underdeveloped social and business net-
works (Niefert, 2010), which are generally prerequisites for particularly
successful start-ups (Davidsson and Honig, 2003; Millán et al., 2012).
For example; Niefert (2010) finds that formerly unemployed business
owners, supported or not, are predominantly single self-employed and,
thus, not an employer.
In addition, the increased market entry as an intended result of the
support may lead to distortion effects as competition arises between
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the new entrants and the current market participants. And because the
survival probability of the supported start-ups is increased (Caliendo et
al., 2015), unsupported competitors face cost disadvantages and have
to possibly withdraw from the market in the midterm (O’Leary, 1999;
Meager et al., 2003a). In this case, the start-up incentive would lead
to a displacement effect and the intended reduction of unemployment
would be jeopardized. This mechanism depends in general on three
relevant factors (Mueller et al., 2008; Fritsch and Storey, 2014): (i)
the competitive pressure by the new entrants on their competitors,
(ii) the reaction of the incumbent firms; and (iii) the general market
characteristics as the competitive process may differ between sectors
due to the existing demand, legal entry barriers, or the number of
competitors.
However, research has actually failed to identify the scope of these
effects, partly due to the fact, that not always a description of the
economic circumstances at the time of foundation is given (see Table
4.2). In addition, most of the studies deal with federal programs, since
only three cases of regional programs have been investigated so far
(see Table 4.1). This also provides a basis for further research, as
the effectiveness of policies often benefits from considering economic
circumstances at the regional level (Szerb et al., 2013; Stam and Bosma,
2015). As a result, “hard empirical evidence is lacking, displacement
effects cannot be ruled out” (Caliendo, 2016, p. 9). Comprehensive
local labor market studies with sector-specific distinctions are, thus,
needed as they seem to be the most likely method to address this
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issue.56
4.4.2 Eligibility criteria
Given the importance of objective achievement for policy makers and
the intended target group, it also has to be defined who is allowed to
apply for the support and what other conditions of support must be
met by the potential beneficiaries. In connection with the ALMP and
entrepreneurship perspective on start-up incentives for the unemployed,
it can be seen in Table 4.5 that there are funding conditions which are
directed on the one hand at the individual and on the other hand at the
new business. In principle, these eligibility conditions can be wide and
restrictive, which, in turn, not only influences the number of supported
participants but also the scheme performance and thus the effectiveness
(Meager, 1996; Haas and Vogel, 2016).
At first, the start-up incentive can be limited to a specific group of
(unemployed) persons by defining certain characteristics that have to
be fulfilled by the applicants. This reflects the extent to which the
guideline provider desires selective access to the program. While most
of the countries grant general access to the programs for registered
unemployed people or welfare benefit recipients, age particularly is a
selection criterion in Sweden (Self-Employment Grants, Månsson and
Delander, 2011; Behrenz et al., 2012) and Denmark (Ivaeksaentery-
delsen, Meager, 1996) with a minimum of 25 years. On the contrary
56 To our knowledge, the only evidence-based statements are made by Meager
(1996) and Behrenz et al. (2012). The former reports for example on an early UK
scheme, that the displacement effect in the sector of “hairdressing and beauty”
with a competitive market and low profit margins was about 100 per cent, while
it was for the “business services” sector, due to more capital- and skill intensive
conditions and higher entry barriers “only” about 50 per cent. However, for
other countries the authors and the study by Behrenz et al. (2012) show low or
insignificant effects.
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in the UK Prince’s Trust (Meager et al., 2003a,b) and in Spain (flat
rate for young self-employed workers, Cueto et al., 2017) the maximum
age is 30 and 35 years, respectively.57. Another important criteria that
may influence the allocation or the amount of the subsidy is the dura-
tion of unemployment (for example a focus on long-term unemployed
by the grant programs in Spain (Cueto and Mato, 2006) and in Den-
mark (Meager, 1996)) or a remaining unemployment entitlements in
the German “New Start-Up Subsidy” (Caliendo et al., 2015; Caliendo
et al., 2016). This concept may be of particular interest, to hinder the
emergence of job-to-unemployment-to-job mobility. This means that
a job is actively abandoned in order to qualify as eligible for funding.
Insofar as the intention to set up a company existed in any case, this
represents a considerable dead-weight loss, as unemployment was ini-
tially created by the start-up incentive and no new employment was
achieved in total (this possibility is particularly discussed by Tokila,
2009 for the Finnish Start-Up Grant).
Furthermore, the eligibility of the company can be restricted, which,
in turn, can reduce the number of people receiving funding. For this
kind of selection process, the review of business plans is a kind of
well-established approach and has been introduced in the majority of
countries in recent years. The examination is usually not carried out
by the employment agency itself, but by a competent external agency
such as chambers of commerce and industry, a trade or professional
organization, banks, tax consultants or others (an exception is the Ger-
man “Einstiegsgeld” until the year 2008 where the federal employment
agency was responsible for the examination; see e.g. Wolff et al., 2016).
At the same time, this selection process is an important instrument of
57 In particular with regard to the age criterion, there is a need for comprehensive
studies on ways of reducing youth unemployment by promoting self-employment
(Eurofound, 2016)
122
screening for the funding provider, which may help to reduce dead-
weight losses. The additional effort involved means that the applicant
has to show his or her actual interest in the start-up project and, in
addition, a certain level of quality of the business plans and thus that
the founding ideas can be carried out (Caliendo, 2016). Another way
of selection on the business level is to exclude certain sectors (Haas
and Vogel, 2016), which has not been part in any of the measures
examined so far. This is based on the idea that different industries
are characterized by different competitive situations and therefore also
have different survival probabilities in these industries (see Fritsch et
al., 2006 for the different survival rates in Germany). For the purpose
of reducing displacement effects, it may therefore be useful to limit
support to businesses which aim to enter sectors where comparatively
low levels of entries and exits are observed in the past (Johnson, 2004).
That is, there are still adequate profits in these markets and the entry of
subsidized companies can therefore be accompanied by fewer distortion
effects. At the same time, these profit opportunities are also a strong
incentive to enter the market, which is why it is at least questionable
to strengthen this with additional start-up incentives, as this will once
again create dead-weight losses (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007).
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Table 4.5: Eligibility criteria by country and measure
Country Nr. Eligibility Criteria
Person Business
Australia [1a] Eligible unemployed people Establishment of business plan mandatory,administrative selection based on likelihood of
success
[1b]
Denmark [2] Long-term unemployed and over 25
years
Finland [3] Registered job-seeker grant neces-
sary to start-up
External evaluation of founder and business con-
cept; no competition distortion in local market
France
[4a] Recipient of unemployment insur-
ance, or means tested benefit
[4b] Any unemployed Business plan must be vetted
[4c] Unemployed and minimum social
income recipients
Approval of business plan by labor administra-
tion required
Germany
[5a] Unemployed with benefit
entitlement
Competent external expert must assess
sustainability of self-employment, work must
comprise at least 18 hours/week
[5b]
[5c]
[5d] Unemployment benefit recipient Competent external expert has to assess the sus-
tainability of the self-employment since 2004
[5e] Registered unemployed with mini-
mum entitlement to unemployment
benefit I of at least 90 days
Competent external expert has to assess the sus-
tainability of the self-employment
[5f] Registered unemployed with mini-
mum entitlement to unemployment
benefit I of at least 150 days
[5g] Welfare recipients Until 2008: submission of documents describing
start-up, including a business plan since 2008:
external approval of business plan
[5h] Benefit recipients (Social Code II)
non-recipients of benefits; since
01/2012: benefit recipients (Social
Code III) with a denial on [5e; 5f]
Approval of business plan by external authority
Hungary [6] Recipient of unemployment com-
pensation
New Zealand [7]
Poland [8] Registered unemployment
Romania [9] Registered unemployed, income less
than half of national minimum wage
and (i) worked as an employee for
at least 6 months in the last year or
(ii) recent graduate from school or
university
Spain [10a] Registered unemployed
[10b] Young men (under 30 years), young
women (under 35 years)
Sweden [11a]
[11b] Unemployed or at risk of becoming
unemployed (over 25 years) knowl-
edge in starting and running a busi-
ness
Review of business idea and business plan by an
external expert
UK
[12a] Unemployed for 6 weeks Business Plan compulsory 1.000 GBP (1.120EUR) own capital[12b]
[12c] Youth unemployed (18-30 years) re-
fused funding from other sources
US [13] Newly unemployed eligible for un-
employment insurance only
Source: Author’s own illustration based on referenced articles (Table 4.1).
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In a larger context, the functionality of the selection process as a whole
must also be discussed and analyzed when the question of eligibility
criteria is raised. In fact, research has not yet investigated whether
these selection criteria and processes actually contribute to higher pro-
gram effectiveness. In addition to the above-mentioned restrictions also
interdependencies with other programs as well as job opportunities are
important. Germany, in particular, shows a complex system of fund-
ing instruments for various groups of unemployed people (see Section
2.3.2.2), so that regional and federal programs concurrently exist, each
with its own administrative or external audits and funding conditions.
In some cases rejections of one program by one authority is required in
order to be eligible for other programs by another authority.
Next to the problem of administrative costs, conflicts can also arise
between the entrepreneurship and ALMP objectives. The promotion
in kind of “picking-the-winner”-approaches by authorities may, at best,
identify the most promising founders and companies, which are often
not the most disadvantaged unemployed people for which these sub-
sidies have actually been introduced. However, these most promising
beneficiaries are frequently not the ones who need start-up support
most urgently, too. On the other hand, any attempt to take fairness of
distribution into account in the selection procedure would jeopardize
the quality of the selection (Eickelpasch and Fritsch, 2005).
Further, from research on selection processes of high growth firms (see
e.g. Brown et al., 2017), we already know that such policy frameworks
often tend to use easily identifiable factors (like age, sector, source of
finance and prior employment status) as selection criteria to support
the decision-makers with hard parameters in their choice. But due
to the complexity and heterogeneity of business foundation and other
characteristics of the founders, these criteria are often unsuitable for
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identifying the most promising businesses ex ante. To what extent
this is the case in the rather broader promotion of start-up incentives
for unemployed persons with their completely different prerequisites is,
therefore, a task of further research.
4.4.3 Type of support
Assuming that there is real discrimination against the unemployed on
the credit market (see Section 4.4.1.2), policy makers are faced with the
question of the type of support. As displayed in Table 4.6, typically, it
is a decision between grants and loans. However, also other instruments
like guarantees, warranties, credit insurance or tax reductions exist, but
are of minor importance.58
The main advantage of grants from the administration’s point of view
is that they are easier to manage, as there is extensive experience in
the application and payment procedure and these are also known from
funding areas other than economic promotion. From the beneficiaries
perspective, grants are of particular interest as they are easier to access
and are often paid directly at the time of foundation. Also they have a
high transparency due to the “gift” character as no payback is needed
(Bulow and Rogoff, 2005; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007; De Klerk,
2008). The advantage of loans or microcredit instruments are, in turn,
their repayment of means including interests, which make them avail-
able for a later reuse by the public lender. The borrower, in turn, has
to pay them which makes them, compared to grants, less attractive.
58 In fact, the only other types of support analyzed so far are the Spanish flat rate
for young self-employed workers (Cueto et al., 2017) and the Hungarian self-
employment assistance (O’Leary, 1999). While the former reduces minimum
contributions to the social security system for a period of 30 months, the latter
covers up to 50 per cent of the premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed
to start the enterprise for a one-year period.
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Table 4.6: Type and level of support by country and measure
Country Nr. Type of support Level of financial support
Amount of benefit Appropriation period
Australia [1a] Grant Means tested unemployment benefit up to 9.594 USD(7.850 EUR) in 2001 12 months[1b]
Denmark [2] Grant Up to 5.400 DRK (725 EUR) p.a. Up to 3.5 years
Finland [3] Grant Tied to size of unemployment benefit, average 500–650 EUR per month 10 to 15 months
France [4a] Grant
Lump-sum dependent on unemployment benefit category
[4b] Lump sum up to 43.000 FF (6.500 EUR)
[4c] Eligible for unemployment benefits: (i) receive unemployment benefits
or (ii) exemption from social contributions (depends on compensation
payment by their start-up)
(i) up to 15 months (ii–
v) one year
Not eligible for unemployment benefits: (iii) exemption from social con-
tributions
Recipients of minimum income: (iv) receive minimum income or (v)
exemption from social contributions (depends on compensation payment
by their start-up)
Germany
[5a]
Grant Participant receives UB and additional lump sum ofapprox. 70% (for social security liabilities) 6 months[5b][5c]
[5d] Grant 600 EUR (360 EUR; 240 EUR) per month in the 1st (2nd; 3rd) year,
only granted if income does not exceed 25,000 EUR per year
3 years
[5e] Grant Unemployment benefit + monthly lump sum of 300 EUR to cover social
security costs
9 months + 6 month
extension (only lump
sum)
[5f] Grant Unemployment benefit + monthly lump sum of 300 EUR to cover social
security costs
6 months + 9 month
extension (only lump
sum)
[5g] Grant Percentage (typically 50% + 10% for additional household members)
of the basic cash benefit (333 EUR in Est Germany, 345 EUR in West
Germany) to cover welfare recipients’ regular expenses
Up to 2 years
[5h] Grant Lump sum playment of 600 EUR per month + additional unemployment
benefit II if eligible
1 year
Hungary [6] Grant Equal regular unemployment compensation (monthly) coverage up to 50
per cent of premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed to start-up
12 months (+ 6 months
extension)
New Zealand [7] Grant
Poland [8] Loan Loan limited to 20 times national average wage (4.800 EUR); market
rates of interest; 50% principal reduction to businesses which survive at
least two years
Romania [9] Loan 25.000 USD (20.000 EUR)
Spain [10a] Grant / loan Up to 3.600 EUR (if registration as self-employment is maintained forat least two years, no payback is needed)
[10b] Reduction of social se-
curity contributions
Self-employed in the last 5 years: 30% discount on minimum social se-
curity contribution (230 EUR)
30 months
Not self-employed in the last 5 years: 80% discount for 6 months, 50%
for 6 months, 30% for 18 months
Sweden [11a]
[11b] Grant Member of unemployment insurance fund: (i) equivalent to unemploy-
ment benefit (ranges from 42 USD (34 EUR) per day to 90 USD (73
EUR) per day, reduced if benefit period of 300 days expired
6 months
No member of unemployment insurance fund: (ii) 70% of basic insurance
benefit
UK
[12a] Grant Differential payment schemes based on enterprise proposal 6–15 months
[12b] Grant 40 GBP (45 EUR) per week Up to 1 year
[12c] Grant / loan Low interest loans of up to 5,000 GBP (5.600 EUR) and grants of up to
2,500 GBP (2.800 EUR) in special circumstances
First 3 years of trading
US [13] Grant Periodic allowances equal to unemployment insurance payment 6 months
Source: Author’s own illustration based on referenced articles (Table 4.1). The conversion
of the various currencies into EUR represents the actual exchange rates as of 21 January
2018.
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However, the advantage for the beneficiaries is, next to the investable
money, the opportunity to gain access to the (subsidized) capital mar-
ket in order to collect experiences with credit financing and the chance
to build up a credit history. This can help borrowers apply for loans
from formal financial and banking institutions at a later date (Leone
and Porretta, 2014; Minnetti et al., 2016).
Even if it would be reasonable to provide loans for reasons of economic
justification as the discrimination was identified in the credit markets,
grants are usually chosen as start-up incentives in the various countries.
Only four of the analyzed measures are start-up incentives in the form
of loans; therefore they are strongly underrepresented in the scientific
literature. This is also in line with Haas and Vogel’s (2016) findings,
whose survey article on current funding policies in twelve European
countries shows that there is a general trend towards providing grants
rather than loans. An interesting hybrid model is the start-up incentive
program in Spain (Self-employment grants; Cueto and Mato, 2006),
where the support is provided as a grant, in so far as the start-up is
maintained for a period of two years, otherwise the support has to be
repaid.
However, it is not yet comprehensively known whether and how the
different forms of incentives actually affect the discussed outcomes (see
Section 4.4.1). In particular, it would be interesting if the various
policy objectives could be achieved more effectively in one form or an-
other. For example, it is conceivable that subsidies should be preferred
if the aim is to promote the short-term survival of the subsidized firms
or the employability of the founder. Loans, on the contrary, may be
more appropriate in the case of an intended growth-oriented policy as
the enterprises would be exposed to correspondingly stronger incentive
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structures from the outset.59 It would also be reasonable to discuss this
against the background of limited government budgets and the large fi-
nancial expenses incurred for start-up incentives (see Section 4.2). An
interesting research design might be a comparison of grant and loan
instruments with otherwise identical funding conditions for beneficia-
ries and subsidized companies as well as an unsubsidized comparison
group. Also insights of self-selection processes could be derived from
this.
The fact that the clarification of these issues is accompanied by con-
siderable political interest can be seen, for example, in the fact that
the European Commission (2016) encourages the European member
states to develop and use innovative financial instruments in addition
to grants. In this context, the European Commission highlights the fo-
cus of these instruments on self-employed and/or disadvantaged people
as part of their cohesion policy.60
4.4.4 Level of financial support
As shown in Table 4.6, the level of financial support as another impor-
tant institutional determinant consists of two factors. On the one hand
side, there is the financial amount an unemployed person can receive
in the case of an approval of his application for funding. On the other
hand, there is the time over which the founder receives this funding
amount. In the literature significant differences between the funding
instruments analyzed are found.
59 This argument is based on the assumption, that a start-up grant might also
induce moral hazard as the founder is not entirely responsible for the risks, i.e.
no or low income, he has taken on (Caliendo et al., 2015).
60 However, there are significant problems in the implementation of these measures,
as a lack of experience (need of capacity building) on the part of the adminis-
trative authorities often seems to hinder the efficient use of these instruments
(European Commission, 2016; Minnetti et al., 2016).
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Loans, which are usually paid out immediately, range from 5,000 GBP
(5,600 EUR) in the UK (Meager et al., 2003a,b) to 25,000 USD (20.000
EUR) in Romania (Rodríguez-Planas and Jacob, 2010; Rodríguez-
Planas, 2010) or are limited to a factor of the national average wage in
Poland (O’Leary, 1999). On the other hand side, grants are paid either
as a continuation of unemployment benefits (typically on a monthly ba-
sis for a certain appropriation period) or as a one-off payment directly
at the outset of self-employment.
The grant programs in Germany, France and Finland are financially
more extensive, whereas the policies in Sweden and Spain are more
modest. In Germany, for example, the “Start-Up Subsidy” (see e.g.
Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010) amounted to a monthly lump sum pay-
ment of about 25,000 EUR in total in the first three years. That the
start-up funding is typically provided directly at the time of founda-
tion as an entry subsidy (for a discussion see Santarelli and Vivarelli,
2007) expresses, in particular, the incentive to take up work (ALMP).
Only in the UK support scheme one can apply for support within the
first three years after start-up, which is closer to the idea of corporate
subsidies as part of entrepreneurship policies.
In this context, Millán et al. (2012) point to an interesting finding
in their study on determinants on firm survival for the EU-15: Even
though entering self-employment from unemployment has a strong neg-
ative effect on the survival probability within self-employment, com-
pared to self-employed with other starting status than unemployment
the survival rates are comparatively higher the higher the total amount
of the received start-up subsidies expenditures are. This means that
the level of funding can be a decisive and supporting factor not only
as an incentive to take up self-employment, but also as a means of
maintaining it. However, while a positive correlation between higher
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promotion and higher survival rates is not surprising, there is unfor-
tunately a lack of empirical evidence of the interrelation of the level
of support and other program outcomes. For the purpose of effective
policy design, it would not only be necessary to know whether there
are interrelationships, but also whether they are linear in their course
or whether certain thresholds exist with regard to the level of funding.
In concrete terms, it would be interesting to see to what extent lim-
its exist, up to which, for example, there is no damage to the market
mechanism61 or from which a disproportionate employment effect can
be achieved through the creation of new companies.62
An interesting starting point for further research is the concept of Haas
and Vogel (2016), which would also act as a connective link to the eligi-
bility criteria discussion of Section 4.4.2. Haas and Vogel (2016) classify
existing funding instruments according to the two criteria (i) level of
financial support and (ii) strictness of eligibility. This enables them to
identify three different groups of funding approaches. Firstly, a group
of low strictness of eligibility and medium to high levels of financial
support exists (for example specifically the current policies in France,
but also Sweden and others), which brings together generous funding
programs. Although they are particularly interesting from the partici-
pant’s perspective due to their financial scope and low administrative
effort, they may also create false incentives, which may lead to firms
with little economic growth and job impact as well as high failure rates
61 For example, the European Union assumes that an amount of 200,000 EUR
can be paid to a company over a period of three years without creating market
distortions (European Union, 2013b).
62 However, Millán et al. (2014) once again point out that, compared to other
founders, starting a business out of unemployment is in itself associated with
an increasing likelihood of becoming unemployed again. This applies both to
former unemployed founders with and without employees. For other groups of
founders, however, the chances of survival for employers are significantly higher
than for own-account workers.
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after the funding period.
Secondly, a group of high strictness of eligibility and medium to high
level of financial support exists, which is characterized in particular by
Germany and Greece, but also Austria, Switzerland and Spain. After a
competitive selection process by the administration, generous resources
are made available to the unemployed persons. Especially Germany is
interesting here, as it changes between the different eligible groups on
a recurring basis (see Table 4.1).
Thirdly, a group of low level financial support exists. As the financial
impact of the funding on the participant and the company is very small,
only minor negative effects of the funding, but also only minor positive
externalities such as job creation should be expected by policy makers.
This classification could be used in a meta-analysis of impact estimates
(see Kluve, 2010 and Card et al., 2015 for comprehensive studies on
all other ALMP other than start-up incentives) in ALMP evaluation
setting that accounts for differences between a participant group and
a comparison group.63
4.4.5 Supplementary services
In addition to the lack of financial resources (see Section 4.4.1), the un-
employed may lack the general knowledge necessary for self-employment.
This includes experience with the general founding process as well as
industry-specific knowledge and management experiences (Hinz and
Jungbauer-Gans, 1999; Caliendo et al., 2015). In order to counteract
63 In addition to the class assignment, information on the estimated impact of the
program on the outcome of the participants as well as their standard deviation
and the sample sizes are needed for this kind of studies. Typically, simple OLS
estimations or, in the case of 3-way classification of sign and significance (positive
significant, insignificant, negative significant), ordered probit regressions could
therefore be implemented.
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this potential shortage, there are complementary funding opportunities
for training and technical support, which can be found in Table 4.7.
These are not so much intended to serve as an incentive for starting
a business, but rather to increase the probability of survival. That is,
some of these measures before start-up or in an early phase of the self-
employment period are voluntary; in some cases the subsidized formerly
unemployed business owners have to take part in the training schemes
(Meager, 1996). There is also large variation in terms of provided ser-
vices and content. This ranges from general education, which deals
with the foundation process and financial management, to personal-
ized consulting and coaching aimed at the formulation of individual
business strategies. Although there is no study to date that explic-
itly deals with the connection between training measures for former
unemployed founders and the later development of the company, the
most common problem with such measures is generally seen from the
ALMP perspective in lock-in effects (Dauth et al., 2016; Osikominu,
2016). This means that, during the training phase, the unemployed
person’s search activities for a job are limited, which leads to strong
negative employment effects in the short term, but in the long run to
better employment opportunities due to the investment in human cap-
ital. Given the fact that unemployment is likely to be ended by the
creation of the business, the lock-in effects found so far are likely to
be of less importance here. From an entrepreneurial perspective, par-
ticipation in such measures can also be viewed as positive, since the
human capital obtained makes a significant contribution to the com-
pany’s success in financial terms. Also, the duration of maintaining a
business or personal income are significantly and positively linked to
its resources (Martin et al., 2013).
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Table 4.7: Supplementary services and special program features by
country and measure
Country Nr. Supplementary services and special program features
Australia [1a] Pre entry-business training, voluntary post-entry training and business counseling[1b]
Denmark [2]
Finland [3] Training courses
France [4a] Vouchers with a shelf life of 18 months post entry business counseling[4b]
[4c]
Germany
[5a] Unemployed person does not lose claims to unemployment payments by transition
into self-employment for 4 years, social security during program phase left to the
individuals
[5b]
[5c]
[5d] Requirement to join the legal pension insurance and reduced rate on health insurance
[5e] Claims on subsidy for the first program phase; second period dependent on admin-
istrative decision
[5f]
[5g]
[5h] Additional training courses are supported with lump sum payments
Hungary [6] Professional entrepreneurship counselling and training courses (costs are covered up
to 50 per cent)
New Zealand [7]
Poland [8]
Romania [9] Personalized assessment, consulting and training
Spain [10a] Training and advisory
[10b]
Sweden [11a]
[11b] Mandatory participating in training course if lacking experience
UK
[12a] Pre-entry training with basic skills[12b]
[12c] Volunteer business mentor
US [13] Pre-entry counseling by labor office
Source: Author’s own illustration based on referenced articles (Table 4.1).
4.5 Conclusions
To improve future evaluation of start-up incentives for unemployed per-
sons, this paper provides an analytical framework for the institutional
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settings. Based on a broad literature review, it is shown that the state
of research in its current form of ex-post evaluation studies is not in
the position to provide the needed adequate evidence-based policy ad-
vice that is demanded by politicians. In order to meet this demand,
this paper initiates discussions and identifies research questions that
need to be clarified in order to approach the target of a more effective
policy design. This is necessary as the existing evaluation results are
not unambiguous.
The conclusive considerations are as follows: Firstly, evaluation stud-
ies of start-up incentives for unemployed persons have so far focused
on supposedly “positive” outcomes such as survival rate, employability,
job creation, change in self-employment rates, business growth, income
changes and access to social security. Important negative effects such
as displacement effects and dead-weight losses have so far been insuffi-
ciently investigated. Although these are much more difficult to record,
they are inherent in a comprehensive assessment of the measures. Up
to now, the literature has been largely limited to either pointing out
their general existence and the associated negative consequences, or, in
the case of dead-weight losses, a measurement through surveys of the
beneficiaries. Comprehensive studies at the micro level, taking into ac-
count individual decision making of the unemployed persons (including
existing job offers and other ALMPs) as well as local, sector-specific
labor markets are not yet available but might provide the necessary
insights.
Secondly, an appropriate evaluation of start-up incentives for unem-
ployed persons should consider to a larger extent the political per-
spective and economic circumstances. The present literature does not
sufficiently distinguish between what the original policy objective of
the measure is, that is, why it was introduced, and how the measure
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performed in respect of this stated objective. It is argued, that this is
partly due to a lack of clear formulation of the objectives by political
decision-makers. Not only is this a prerequisite for adequate state-
ments on external validity of these studies, but also this is of particular
interest as this paper discusses conflicts between the two policy areas
of ALMP and entrepreneurship policies. The former, ALMP, are ori-
ented towards the labor market prospects of an individual unemployed
person and the latter, entrepreneurship policies, towards the growth
and survival of businesses, which is a point that is often ignored in
the previous literature. In this respect, there is also a lack of basic
explanatory models for the fact that there are not only considerable
differences between countries in their financial commitment and their
number of participants in these kind of policies, but also that there
are considerable fluctuations of this measures within different coun-
tries. That is, times of intensive demand for these start-up incentives
are often followed by periods with considerable declines in the num-
ber of participants. Whether this is politically initiated, for example,
by the reduction of financial resources, whether the unemployed lose
confidence in the measure due to negative feedback by supported indi-
viduals and, as a result, the general demand for the start-up incentives
decreases or whether there are overarching interdependencies with the
unemployment rate, has not yet been clarified.
Thirdly, the use of start-up incentives for unemployed persons requires
verifiable economic justification by identifying market failures. In par-
ticular, the topic of credit constraints and capital market imperfection
requires further academic attention. Although research has already
been able to show that other groups such as women and migrants have
been discriminated against by banks, no such study is yet available for
unemployed persons with a desire to start-up a business. If this discrim-
ination exists at all, and there are reasons to believe that they don’t as
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unemployment is in fact associated with a higher risk of failure, then it
should be followed by a discussion on the appropriate type of funding.
So far, mainly grants have been provided to unemployed persons by
the governments, even though that the assumed market failure is that
the unemployed persons do not receive the credits demanded by pri-
vate banks. The granting of (micro)-loans by public banks, subsidized
interest rates or guarantees and warranties by the state are obvious
alternatives and have so far been neglected in research, although there
is a great deal of political interest in the subject.
Fourthly, due to the lack of clarification of these fundamental issues, it
is not yet possible to identify best practices with regard to the insti-
tutional framework. We are a long way from an evidence-based policy
making that aims to make the instrument of start-up incentives for
unemployed persons as effective as possible. This is because individual
funding conditions such as the type and amount of financial support,
the broad or restrictive definition of target groups (and the selection
process as such), the necessity of a screening process through the intro-
duction of business plans, etc. are not linked through empirical studies
to the investigated outcomes of the measures. This paper is a first step
in this respect, in that it introduces a uniform institutional framework
to compare the funding instruments studied in the literature so far. Not
only is it shown how different the individual funding instruments are
within and between countries (high / low restrictive eligibility criteria,
high / low level of financial support), but also the possible repercussions
on outcomes are discussed. Nevertheless, it remains on a descriptive
and theoretical level. The empirical examination of this consideration
is the responsibility of further studies.
To address these open research issues, cooperation between research
and politics in particular must be strengthened as more comprehensive
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studies by scholars largely depend on the availability of data from the
implemented measures. A promising source of longitudinal data for fur-
ther studies on the policy level may be the result and outcome indicator
system introduced for the funding period 2014-2020 by the European
Commission (European Union, 2013a, for an overview see McCann and
Ortega-Argilés, 2016). As all member states are equally obliged to col-
lect these data for their co-financed measures of the EU cohesion policy,
there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in terms of policy de-
signs and economic circumstances. Here, a contribution could be made
at the macro level to the considerations made between policy mak-
ing process, policy design and performance of the measures, whereby
economic conditions at the regional level such as unemployment rate
and GDP per capita could be taken into account. Additionally, as
more studies with information on the micro level are needed to ana-
lyze specifically the problems of displacement and dead-weight effects,
it is likely that especially the Nordic Countries can contribute to the
literature with their comprehensive individual information on income,
employment history and firm development in a valuable way (Fritsch
and Storey, 2014).
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Chapter 5
Unemployment Reduction through Self-Employ-
ment – A Gender Question?
“SHUI TA: Have they gone? All of them? I cannot hold out any longer. Illustrious Ones,
I have recognised you!
THE SECOND GOD: What have you done with our good person of Szechwan?
SHUI TA: Let me confess the frightful truth. I am your good person!
He takes off his mask and rips away his costume. Shen Teh stands there.
THE SECOND GOD: Shen Teh!
SHEN TEH: Yes, it is me. Shui Ta and Shen Teh, I am both of them.
Your original order
To be good while yet surviving
Split me like lightning into two people.”
— Brecht (2016, p. 181)
Abstract.64 Using macro-level panel data of 23 OECD countries dur-
ing the period 1991–2015, we empirically analyze whether an increase
in self-employment leads to a reduction of unemployment and whether
the effect depends on the gender of the self-employed. Estimating
population-weighted vector autoregressive models, we find that self-
employment exerts positive employment creation effects. Moreover,
male self-employment affects employment growth somewhat faster than
does female self-employment. However, we also find that unemploy-
ment pushes males into self-employment in the short-run while, in the
medium-run, we confirm a pull effect independent of the gender of the
self-employed.65
64 This chapter is based on joint work with Tina Haussen.
65 JEL-Classification: J23; J64; L26; L53; M13; O11; J16. Keywords: Unemploy-
ment; Self-employment; Gender; VAR; Entrepreneurship.
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5.1 Introduction
As entrepreneurship is considered one of the chief engines for economic
growth (Thurik, 2009; Kelley et al., 2013), its impact on unemploy-
ment is deemed important (Faria et al., 2010). The link between en-
trepreneurship and unemployment is, however, of a complex (causal)
nature. Some scholars empirically reveal that indeed self-employment
does contribute to a reduction in unemployment (Thurik et al., 2008).
Conversely, others find that the reverse holds true, i.e. that unem-
ployment pushes (Evans and Leighton, 1990; Fritsch and Falck, 2007;
Lasch et al., 2007) or pulls (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1994; Garofoli,
1994) individuals into self-employment.
As noted by Audretsch et al. (2015), a common feature of most empir-
ical studies on this topic is that they treat the groups of people under
consideration as if they consisted of homogeneous individuals. Clearly,
this is not the case. Self-employed individuals, in fact, differ in many
respects; for example in terms of their abilities, possibilities and pref-
erences. One characteristic that has received considerable attention
within the corresponding literature is the gender of the self-employed.
Not only is the likelihood of starting a new company out of unem-
ployment higher for men than for women (Cowling and Taylor, 2001;
Wagner, 2007) but also the economic performance of founded busi-
nesses differ, i.e. in terms of employment effects and earned income
(Cowling and Taylor, 2001; Andersson Joona and Wadensjö, 2008).
Building on these gender differences on the micro level, the aim of this
paper is to find out whether an increase in self-employment leads to a
reduction of unemployment at the macro level and whether this effect
depends on the gender of the self-employed. We, first, test the rela-
tionship between self-employment and unemployment rates in a panel
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of 23 OECD countries during the period 1991–2015. In order to estab-
lish whether self-employment affects unemployment and/or vice versa,
we run a population-weighted Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) and
perform Granger-causality tests (Granger, 1969). In a second step, we
re-run our baseline model separately for male and females.
Our empirical results indicate that self-employment exerts positive em-
ployment creation effects. Male self-employment affects employment
growth somewhat faster than does female self-employment. However,
we also find that unemployment pushes males into self-employment in
the short-run while, in the medium-run, we confirm a pull effect inde-
pendent of the gender of the self-employed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2,
we review, first, the existing theoretical and empirical literature deal-
ing with the ambiguous relationship between unemployment and self-
employment and, second, literature that deals with gender gaps in self-
employment. The empirical strategy is given in Section 5.3, before the
data used and some descriptive statistics are provided in Section 5.4.
Our results are given in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature review
5.2.1 The ambiguous link between self-employment and
unemployment
Among economists, a lively discussion exists about how unemployment
and self-employment rates are related. A possible positive link can be
traced back to Oxenfeldt (1943) who argues that individuals in the
labor force are confronted with three activity possibilities on how to
allocate their available time: wage-employment, unemployment, and
self-employment. Unemployment is assumed to represent the least at-
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tractive option for the individual since it spends the least utility. Ac-
cording to the so called ‘unemployment push hypothesis’ or “refugee
effect” (Audretsch et al., 2015), high levels of unemployment rates then
induce or “push” individuals with limited wage-employment prospects
to entering into self-employment since opportunity costs of starting a
business have decreased. A counterargument to this hypothesis may
be that unemployment potentially results in a lack of wealth and credit
constraints that may hinder unemployed individuals in becoming self-
employed (Cressy, 2000; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). The unemployed
also tend to lack other characteristics needed in order to become self-
employed, e.g. higher human capital levels, professional competencies,
and networks, amongst many others (Caliendo et al., 2014; Caliendo
et al., 2015).
The level of unemployment may also disproportionally affect self-em-
ployment because of the chain of reasoning that explains the “unem-
ployment pull hypothesis”. Economies that are characterized by low
unemployment rates are typically those with higher economic develop-
ment, i.e. higher demand and growth, and are therefore likely abundant
in entrepreneurial opportunities. Higher self-employment rates then re-
sult from demand-inducement. Conversely, high unemployment rates
may be associated with low economic growth and fewer entrepreneurial
opportunities (Thurik et al., 2008; Audretsch et al., 2015).66
Empirical support for the unemployment-push hypothesis is, for ex-
ample, provided by Evans and Leighton (1990) for the US, Guesnier
(1994) and Lasch et al. (2007) for France, and Fritsch and Falck (2007)
for Germany. Reynolds et al.’s (1995), Santarelli et al.’s (2009), and
Audretsch et al.’s (2010) findings, however, point towards a negative re-
66 However, based on the Gibrat’s law, the growth of firms is independent from
their size. An increasing number of small firms instead of large ones should
therefore not affect unemployment (Sutton, 1997).
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lationship between unemployment and self-employment for US, Italian,
and German regions, respectively, which underlines the unemployment
pull hypothesis. No clear evidence or insignificant results, on the con-
trary are found by Armington and Acs (2002), Ritsilä and Tervo (2002),
Sutaria and Hicks (2004), amongst others.
Using macro data from 23 OECD countries and applying a vector au-
toregressive model, Thurik et al.’s (2008) results indicate that unem-
ployment and self-employment simultaneously affect each other. Yet,
the negative effect of changes in self-employment on subsequent changes
in unemployment is stronger. That is, in addition to the two above-
mentioned relationships between unemployment, economic growth and
self-employment, dual and reverse causality may be present: Changes
in self-employment can affect economic development and therefore un-
employment (Van Stel et al., 2005). If founders enter the market, com-
petition likely increases and positive productivity effects may emerge
(Geroski, 1989; Acs and Audretsch, 2003), which can result in posi-
tive employment effects depending on the quality of start-ups and the
response of established companies to the competitive pressure caused
(Mueller et al., 2008; Fritsch and Storey, 2014). If these start-ups
hire more employees than established firms have to downsize due to
the increased competition, this can lead to a reduction in unemploy-
ment (“entrepreneurial effect”; Hart and Oulton, 1999; Pfeiffer and
Reize, 2000; Lawless, 2014; Doran et al., 2016). However, as famously
hypothesized by Shane (2009), both the survival rate and the employ-
ment contribution of start-ups are rather low which would imply a very
limited, if at all existing, unemployment lowering contribution of start-
ups as only a limited number of high-growth firms is responsible for
the majority of newly created jobs (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2009; Coad
et al., 2014; Daunfeldt et al., 2015; Bravo-Biosca et al., 2016).
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5.2.2 Gender gaps in self-employment
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, both a positive and a negative relation-
ship between unemployment and self-employment may be present. One
attempt to more closely investigate the presence of the one or the other
effect and underlying causes is to take a closer look at the individual
characteristics of the self-employed. Most empirical studies treat the
individuals in their sample as a homogeneous group which is misleading
in so far as there is ample evidence that especially the self-employed
strongly differ in their abilities, possibilities and preferences, among
other characteristics.
In this paper, we focus on gender gaps in self-employment. Despite a
rising trend in females’ self-employment rate in recent decades (Devine,
1994; Koellinger et al., 2013), in the EU, for example, men are nearly
twice as likely to enter into self-employment than women (see e.g. Leoni
and Falk, 2010; Verheul et al., 2012; Koellinger et al., 2013; OECD,
2016).
The gender gap in the propensity to move towards self-employment may
come as a surprise inasmuch women balance not only work and leisure
but – to a larger extent than do men – also perform child care and
housework (Lefebvre and Merrigan, 2008; Williams, 2012; Caliendo
and Künn, 2015). Employers may moreover practice statistical dis-
crimination towards women if their biographies include family-related
interruptions which, ultimately, reduces their wage-employment oppor-
tunities (Rosti and Chelli, 2005; Caliendo and Künn, 2015; Simoes et
al., 2016). Especially unemployed women should therefore be more
likely to become self-employed than men since self-employment pro-
vides more flexible work arrangements and independence than does
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traditional wage-employment (Edwards and Field-Hendrey, 2002).67
However, women and men may have different motives for becoming
self-employed. While women tend to value flexible work arrangements,
men start companies primarily because of the potentially higher finan-
cial benefits (Wellington, 2006; Gurley-Calvez et al., 2009).
But why are women less likely to become self-employed than men? In
a growing strand of literature possible reasons for this result are exam-
ined. First, in both empirical and experimental studies it is observed
that women tend to be more risk averse than men, and that they have
a stronger dislike of competition (Dohmen et al., 2011; Charness and
Gneezy, 2012). Since income from self-employment is very uncertain,
a higher risk aversion has a lower probability of preferring and actually
choosing an entrepreneurial career (Verheul et al., 2012).
Second, even if women become self-employed, they invest less capital
and show a different borrowing behaviour than do men. In particular,
they rely less on external capital but more on their own resources (Sena
et al., 2012; Simoes et al., 2016). However, a sufficient investment of
capital is an important prerequisite for the step into self-employment.
Third, as shown by Koellinger et al. (2013), women’s networks are
less diversified than those of men – e.g. because their relatively larger
family commitments are accompanied by less pronounced networks and
contacts. And these are moreover more likely to be found in the circle
of family and friends than in business and work-related environments.
Finally – with special focus on the group of unemployed – descriptive
statistics show that although unemployed women are typically better
educated than their male counterparts (Andersson Joona and Waden-
sjö, 2008), they are still relatively more affected by long-term unem-
67 Indeed, among those women who are actually self-employed, about half work
part-time whereas one third works from home (Fairlie and Robb, 2009).
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ployment and more likely to be single parents. The latter features may
lead to larger capital constraints and human capital depreciation and
an absence of labour-related networks and, thus, less valuable business
ideas (Caliendo and Künn, 2015).
5.3 Modeling the link between self-employment and un-
employment
We closely follow Thurik et al.’s (2008) model that builds upon the work
of Carree et al. (2002, 2007). Broadly speaking, the model builds the
framework for how actual self-employment and optimal self-employment
rates can influence economic performance, here the unemployment rate.
Assume that for each country 𝑖 in year 𝑡 an optimal self-employment
rate 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡 exists as a function of the stage of a country’s economic
development. 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡 is optimal in the sense that deviations from that
level in either direction decrease economic performance: If a country’s
self-employment rate 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is lower than the optimal one (𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 <
𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡), the economy’s competitiveness and dynamic efficiency are likely
diminished which negatively affects growth. Too high self-employment
rates (𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 > 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡), on the contrary, absorb too much (human)
capital in a large number of marginal entrepreneurs which induces an
underutilization of economies of scale and scope (Carree et al., 2002;
Thurik et al., 2008).
A country 𝑖’s unemployment rate 𝑈𝑖𝑡 in year 𝑡 can be decomposed
into two components: first, the unemployment rate 𝑈0𝑖,𝑡 that would be
present if the actual self-employment rate would equal the optimal one
(𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑆𝐸*𝑖𝑡) and, second, the impact on unemployment stemming
from deviations of 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is from the country-specific optimal self-
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employment rate; represented by equation (5.1)
𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈0𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾|𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡| with 𝛾 > 0, (5.1)
where the coefficient 𝛾 is assumed to be positive, that is, any positive
or negative deviation from the optimal self-employment rate increases
unemployment. Taking the first differences of equation (5.1) leads to
Δ𝑈𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑈𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑖,𝑡−1
= Δ𝑈0𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾
(︁
|𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡| − |𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡|
)︁
.
(5.2)
The optimal self-employment rate is assumed to vary only little over
time given its dependence on firmly established institutional and socio-
economic factors (Thurik et al., 2008; Prieger et al., 2016). In case
both the self-employment rate in period 𝑡−1 and that in 𝑡−2 (𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
and 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2) are above the optimal self-employment rate (𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡), the
term in brackets in equation (5.2) reduces to Δ𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡. Adding start-
ups to an economy with an already larger than optimal start-up rate
therefore increases unemployment. In case both 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2
are below 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡, the term in brackets reduces to −Δ𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1. Increasing
the self-employment rate in an economy that consists of too few start-
ups thus decreases unemployment. In case the self-employment rate in
one period is lower whereas in the other it is higher than 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡, and
both are close to the optimal one (𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 ≈ 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−2 ≈ 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡), the term
in brackets vanishes. Then, 𝑆𝐸*𝑖,𝑡 does not affect Δ𝑈𝑖,𝑡.
Following Audretsch et al. (2002) and Thurik et al. (2008), we under-
take some further transformations of equation (5.2) in order to derive
an empirically estimable equation. First, we assume 𝑈0𝑖,𝑡 to be idiosyn-
cratic with respect to country and time (captured in the error term
𝜖𝑖,𝑡). Time dummies 𝐷𝑡 are therefore included in order to control for
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business cycle effects common to all countries. Since we use first dif-
ferences, country-specific effects are differentiated out which is why an
inclusion of country dummies is not needed. Second, we include the
lagged difference in unemployment rates as an explanatory variable to
test for the direction of causality. Third, we include multiple time lags
in a one-by-one manner so as to test whether the expected effects are
of short-run or medium-run in nature. Lastly, we additionally run the
complementary model where the difference in the self-employment rates
are related to a function of its lagged differences and the difference in
unemployment rates (and time dummies and the error term) to test for
the case of reverse causality related to the entrepreneurial effect. The
resulting models (5.3a) and (5.3b) then read
𝑈𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑈𝑖,𝑡−𝐿 = 𝛼+
𝐽∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛽𝑗
(︁
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝐿 − 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−(𝑗+1)𝐿
)︁
+
𝐽∑︁
𝑗=1
𝜁𝑗
(︁
𝑈𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝐿 − 𝑈𝑖,𝑡−(𝑗+1)𝐿
)︁
+
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=1
𝛿𝐷𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
(5.3a)
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝐿 = 𝛼+
𝐽∑︁
𝑗=1
𝜑𝑗
(︁
𝑈𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝐿 − 𝑈𝑖,𝑡−(𝑗+1)𝐿
)︁
+
𝐽∑︁
𝑗=1
𝜙𝑗
(︁
𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝑗𝐿 − 𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−(𝑗+1)𝐿
)︁
+
𝑇∑︁
𝑡=1
𝜓𝐷𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡
(5.3b)
Based on equations (5.3a) and (5.3b) we run a population-weighted
Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR). In order to establish whether un-
employment causes self-employment and/or vice versa, we perform
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Granger-causality tests (Granger, 1969). Hereby we can test how
much of the variation in self-employment (unemployment) can be ex-
plained by previous self-employment (unemployment). In a second
step, it can be found out whether lagged values of unemployment (self-
employment) can increase the explanatory power of the model. To be
precise, if the coefficients of lagged unemployment (self-employment)
are significant, then self-employment (unemployment) is said to be
Granger-caused by unemployment (self-employment). In the choice of
the lag length, we follow Thurik et al. (2008) and include, four, eight,
and twelve-year lags. Likelihood ratio tests are applied in order to test
whether the inclusion of extra lags improves the model significantly.
Finally, as to test whether the effects found differ by the gender of
the founders, we additionally run sub-sample analyses for males and
females.
5.4 Data
To estimate equations (5.3a) and (5.3b), we construct a country-level
dataset encompassing 23 OECD countries for the 1991 to 2015 period.
In most related empirical studies, the Compendia database (Van Stel,
2005) is used. The advantage of this data is that the rates of self-
employment have been harmonized over years and countries. This is
necessary because countries report self-employment rates to the OECD
(the underlying data source of Compendia) based on different defini-
tions. The disadvantage, however, is that the data are not put out sep-
arately for men and women. We therefore use the data provided by the
World Bank (2017) for self-employment rates, which are part of the ILO
(2017) estimates. Like Compendia, these data are harmonized across
countries and years “by accounting for differences in data source, scope
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of coverage, methodology, and other country-specific factors” (World
Bank, 2017). In principle, there are rates of self-employment for far
more than 23 countries, especially for many developing countries. How-
ever, the World Bank (2017) warns against using the self-employment
rates of women from certain, mostly developing countries for analyses
or comparing these rates with those of women from developed coun-
tries, as social, legal and cultural disagreement may exist over the def-
inition of women’s self-employment. Given this reference, we limit our
empirical analysis to those countries that are also used in Compendia.
These all belong to the developed, western world, which is why possible
differences in the definition of women’s work should be rather small.
The share of self-employed workers 𝑆𝐸 is defined as the percentage of
own-account workers (or those who work with one or a few partners or
in cooperative) among the total labor force (World Bank, 2017). This
self-employment measure comes at the cost that it neither differenti-
ates by type of self-employment (start-up or already established) nor
by high- or low-tech sectors, or by qualification needed. Still, opera-
tionalizating entrepreneurial activity by self-employment rates is well
established given its comparability over countries and time (Storey,
1991; Thurik et al., 2008). Unemployment rates 𝑈 are defined as a
country’s share of the labor force that is without work but available for
and seeking employment. In the subdivision of self-employed and un-
employment rates by gender, the corresponding Figures 5.1a and 5.1b
are given as a percentage of this subgroups’ labor force.68
Figure 5.1 shows the average self-employment and unemployment rates
of all 23 countries for the period from 1991 to 2015, with both measures
also being broken down by gender. The average total, male, and female
68 For example, the female self-employment rate is the number of self-employed
females expressed as a percentage of the female labor force (World Bank, 2017).
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self-employment rate shows a decreasing trend over the whole obser-
vation period. They were highest at the beginning of the 90s (ranging
from 18 to 23%) and lowest in 2015 (ranging from 12 to 18%). The
share of male self-employed is higher than that of females at each year
throughout the observation period.
The average unemployment rate, on the contrary, ranges between 5
and 10%. It decreased after the early 1990s before it increased again
at the start of the financial crisis in 2007/08. Until that latter event,
women had consistently higher unemployment rates than men whereas
since 2007/08, unemployment is rather similar across gender.
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Figure 5.1: Average self-employment and unemployment rates 1991-
2015 of 23 countries
Source: World Bank (2017)
Figure 5.1 does not, however, reveal variation in the self-employment
and unemployment rates within countries over time. Given this pa-
per’s focus on the effect of self-employment on unemployment rates,
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in Table 5.1, we show 8-year changes69 of those six country/time com-
binations with the highest and lowest changes in the self-employment
rate from 1991 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2007. In the total sample,
four out of the six country/time combinations with the largest increase
in self-employment are characterized by a subsequent decrease in total
unemployment whereas two show the opposite. Similarly, for four of
the six country/year combinations with the strongest decline in self-
employment rates an increase in unemployment rates in the following
eight-year period is recorded. A similar, somewhat more mixed result
can be seen when the self-employed rates are broken down by gender.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Self-employment Unemployment
𝑆𝐸𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 𝑈𝑡+8 − 𝑈𝑡
Country Year 𝑡 Total Males Females Total Males Females
Canada 1999 2.2 1.8 2.8 -1.6 -1.5 -1.7
Netherlands 2007 1.7 3.0 0.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
Germany 2007 1.2 1.2 1.5 -4.1 -3.5 -4.6
Germany 1999 1.1 2.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4
United Kingdom 2007 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2
New Zealand 1999 0.7 1.0 0.6 -3.4 -3.9 -2.8
Austria 1999 -4.4 -4.8 -3.8 0.2 -0.2 0.5
Iceland 2007 -4.6 -5.2 -3.9 1.7 1.7 1.7
Greece 1999 -4.7 -3.8 -6.0 -3.5 -2.5 -5.3
Norway 1999 -6.1 -7.8 -4.0 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8
Iceland 1999 -6.8 -9.3 -3.5 0.1 0.6 -0.5
Greece 2007 -6.8 -5.4 -8.6 16.5 16.5 16.0
Notes: 𝑆𝐸𝑡 and 𝑈𝑡 denote the self-employment and unemployment rate in year 𝑡.
Source: World Bank (2017).
69 We use eight-year changes based on our regression results in Section 5.5. De-
scriptive statistics for other time intervals can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
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5.5 Empirical results
The research question in this paper is whether self-employment among
men and women has different effects on unemployment given the gender
differences in the motivation to found a business and its survival and
success probability (see Section 5.2). To this end, we use a population-
weighted VAR model (equations (5.3a) and (5.3b)) to, first, estimate
the effect of self-employment on unemployment for the entire sample
(Table 5.2) and then, in a second step, divide the self-employment rate
into female and male self-employed persons (Table 5.3).
As explained in more detail in Section 5.3, the 115 observations in the
corresponding Models (Ia) represent the 23 countries in our sample
observed in 1999, 2003, until 2015, that is, in 4-year steps. We closely
follow the procedure of Thurik et al. (2008) and step-by-step include
additional lags in order to control for a possible delay in the effect. In
Models (IIa) and (III) we add the second and third lag ((𝑡−8)−(𝑡−12)
and (𝑡 − 12) − (𝑡 − 16)), respectively. Note that including these extra
lags comes at the cost of a reduction in the sample size, i.e. to 92 and
69 observations. We run likelihood ratio tests in order to test whether
the inclusion of extra lags improves the model significantly. Since for
this test the numbers of observations of the models to be compared
have to be the same, in Models (Ib) and (IIb) we re-run Models (Ia)
and (IIa) with the observations included in Models (II) and (III) only.
From the upper panel of the initial Model (Ia) in Table 5.2, we obtain
an insignificant coefficient for the lagged change in self-employment on
a change in unemployment. Also, the p-value of the Granger-causality
test is above 0.1 suggesting that self-employment does not significantly
cause unemployment to decrease after a four-year lag. When includ-
ing a second and especially a third lag, however, it appears that self-
153
employment significantly causes unemployment to decrease after an
eight- (Models IIa, b) and twelve-year lag (Model (III)), respectively.
The finding that those countries that are characterized by a larger in-
crease in self-employment rates are also those with lower unemployment
rates may be interpreted in the light of Kirzner (1973) who describes en-
trepreneurship as an exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities and
the recognition of hitherto untapped profit possibilities. In a Schum-
peterian process (Schumpeter, 1934), old products and production pro-
cesses are then replaced by new ones being generated by small, newly
founded businesses. This process increases consumer satisfaction and,
ultimately, triggers employment and economic growth (Sutton, 1997;
Thurik et al., 2008). However, the results show that these changes
take time. The establishment of new companies in the market and
their contribution to reducing unemployment is not initial, but needs
an adjustment process in the range of eight to twelve years. These
findings also support the conclusions by Fritsch and Mueller (2004),
who state that it is not the direct employment effect of new businesses
creation that contributes to the regional development, but the indirect
effect through the gradual increase in competition, the improvement of
supply and the displacement of established companies. Interestingly,
their study for Germany, considering the years 1983 to 2002, shows the
maximum contribution to employment creation also after a period of
eight years.
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Table 5.2: Estimation results VAR model for 1, 2, and 3 two-year
time lags, full sample
All
Model (Ia) Model (Ib) Model (IIa) Model (IIb) Model (III)
1 lag 1 lag 2 lags 2 lags 3lags
Equation (5.3a): 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑈𝑡−4
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 -0.055 0.130 0.404 0.381 -0.063
(0.225) (0.287) (0.323) (0.415) (0.319)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 -0.491* -0.790* -0.303
(0.286) (0.431) (0.320)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 -0.656**
(0.247)
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 -0.055 -0.050 -0.088 -0.099 -0.322***
(0.099) (0.114) (0.111) (0.131) (0.097)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.247* -0.033 -0.058
(0.137) (0.193) (0.137)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 -0.712***
(0.118)
Constant -0.907* 0.062 0.200 -1.820*** -1.500***
(0.537) (0.592) (0.581) (0.628) (0.448)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.270 0.290 0.345 0.361 0.683
p-value 0.807 0.652 0.216 0.192 0.002
Granger-causality test
Equation (5.3b): 𝑆𝐸𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−4
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 0.006 0.033 0.047 0.058* 0.065*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.154*** -0.196*** -0.196***
(0.042) (0.051) (0.052)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 0.032
(0.045)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 0.493*** 0.622*** 0.440*** 0.439*** 0.464***
(0.079) (0.092) (0.099) (0.109) (0.121)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 0.297*** 0.381*** 0.368***
(0.087) (0.114) (0.121)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 0.008
(0.093)
Constant -0.714*** -0.073 0.076 -0.038 -0.054
(0.189) (0.191) (0.178) (0.165) (0.169)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.267 0.348 0.456 0.512 0.501
p-value 0.862 0.378 0.000 0.000 0.001
Granger-causality test
Notes: Population weighted vector autoregressive model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Coefficients for year dummies are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Looking at how this effect varies by gender (upper panels in Table 5.3),
we find that male self-employment affects employment growth some-
what faster, i.e. after the mentioned eight-year lag, than does female
self-employment where a significant effect can only be found after a
twelve-year lag. This is an interesting result because, for example, Con-
roy and Weiler (2016) point out in their study on employment growth
that there are significant differences between male- and female-owned
firms for the years 2000 to 2007 in the USA. The authors argue that
gender differences in general employment growth may especially de-
pend on industries, sales and the share of employer and non-employer
firms. The differences found here in the time lag after eight and twelve
years make further analysis of the long-term differences in employment
growth between male and female firms therefore necessary.
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Table 5.3: Estimation results VAR model for 1, 2, and 3 two-year
time lags, by gender
Male self-employment Female self-employment
Model (Ia) Model (Ib) Model (IIa) Model (IIb) Model (III) Model (Ia) Model (Ib) Model (IIa) Model (IIb) Model (III)
1 lag 1 lag 2 lags 2 lags 3lags 1 lag 1 lag 2 lags 2 lags 3lags
Equation (5.3a): 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑈𝑡−4
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 0.039 0.252 0.604* 0.668 0.016 -0.055 0.060 0.038 -0.143 -0.181
(0.239) (0.313) (0.323) (0.421) (0.345) (0.164) (0.210) (0.270) (0.356) (0.264)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 -0.653** -1.035** -0.475 -0.071 -0.048 0.074
(0.278) (0.411) (0.322) (0.229) (0.349) (0.264)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 -0.585** -0.505**
(0.257) (0.198)
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 -0.063 -0.059 -0.104 -0.105 -0.348*** -0.057 -0.045 -0.053 -0.079 -0.272***
(0.100) (0.114) (0.109) (0.126) (0.102) (0.097) (0.114) (0.112) (0.135) (0.097)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.210 0.004 -0.045 -0.317** -0.175 -0.115
(0.137) (0.189) (0.142) (0.136) (0.188) (0.132)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 -0.673*** -0.772***
(0.125) (0.113)
Constant -0.847 0.135 0.256 -1.828*** -1.417*** -0.918* 0.011 0.182 -1.633** -1.246***
(0.529) (0.577) (0.564) (0.592) (0.453) (0.533) (0.582) (0.573) (0.636) (0.446)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.270 0.294 0.369 0.391 0.665 0.270 0.289 0.321 0.331 0.675
p-value 0.872 0.422 0.043 0.042 0.009 0.738 0.775 0.951 0.784 0.004
Granger-causality test
Equation (5.3b): 𝑆𝐸𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−4
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 0.042 0.068* 0.076** 0.079** 0.075* -0.044 -0.020 -0.004 0.015 0.016
(0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.170*** -0.222*** -0.232*** -0.109** -0.145*** -0.144**
(0.045) (0.057) (0.057) (0.046) (0.054) (0.055)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 0.068 -0.021
(0.051) (0.047)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 0.370*** 0.469*** 0.352*** 0.393*** 0.477*** 0.558*** 0.660*** 0.453*** 0.485*** 0.448***
(0.087) (0.105) (0.106) (0.126) (0.139) (0.064) (0.074) (0.092) (0.103) (0.110)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 0.289*** 0.424*** 0.444*** 0.249*** 0.200* 0.156
(0.091) (0.123) (0.130) (0.078) (0.100) (0.110)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 -0.115 0.082
(0.104) (0.082)
Constant -0.703*** 0.004 0.193 -0.095 -0.160 -0.755*** -0.231 -0.172 -0.081 -0.087
(0.193) (0.195) (0.185) (0.177) (0.182) (0.210) (0.206) (0.195) (0.183) (0.186)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.190 0.246 0.363 0.431 0.433 0.432 0.485 0.545 0.544 0.537
p-value 0.255 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.257 0.613 0.065 0.032 0.069
Granger-causality test
Notes: Population weighted vector autoregressive model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Coefficients for year dummies are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Conversely, we find that an increase in the unemployment rate in the
short term (after 4 years) causes an increase in the self-employment
rate, a confirmation of the unemployment push hypothesis (Models
(IIb) and (III) in lower panel of Table 5.2). In the short run, a lack
of employment opportunities thus pushes the unemployed into self-
employment. From Models (IIb) and (III) in Table 5.3, however, it
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is evident that an increase in the unemployment rate only increases
males’ self-employment rate while we do not find any significant ef-
fect for females’ self-employment rate in the short-run. After some
more years, however, the unemployment pull effect is at work as a de-
crease in unemployment rates fosters an increase in self-employment;
irrespective of the gender of the self-employed (Tables 5.2 and 5.3).
Here, low unemployment rates suggest high economic growth and am-
ple entrepreneurial opportunities, which pull the unemployed into self-
employment (Audretsch et al., 2015). In the short term, on the con-
trary, especially personal hardship seems to be of importance, i.e. the
desire to end unemployment by setting up a company of one’s own.
Additionally, these results show that only when a corresponding eco-
nomic climate of declining unemployment has occurred in the medium
to long term then people are increasingly willing to start a company
due to opportunities.
In the regressions of Table 5.3, we use total unemployment rates. One
may, however, argue that the effects found may also differ by the gen-
der of the group of unemployed persons. With respect to the effect
of self-employment on unemployment, there may be gender-related hu-
man resource decisions. Weber and Zulehner (2010), for example, find
for Austrian start-ups that females’ first hires induce an increase in
the female worker share in the firm’s first year. Regarding the effect
of unemployment on self-employment, Saridakis et al. (2014) find in a
study for the UK that only for male unemployed persons can a signif-
icant effect on the male business formation rate be found. In the case
of female unemployed persons, this relationship is not confirmed. That
is, aggregating the group of the unemployed by gender may hide the
effect. Therefore, as a robustness check, we once again estimate the re-
gressions from Table 5.3, but we do not only classify the self-employed
according to their gender, but also the group of unemployed (see Table
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5.4). However, the effects found are very similar to those in Table 5.3
– both with regard to the sign of the coefficients and their significance.
In this analysis, therefore, we find no evidence that company founders
only hire employees of the same gender.
Table 5.4: Estimation results VAR model for 1, 2, and 3 four-year
time lags, by gender
Male self-employment and unemployment Female self-employment and unemployment
Model (Ia) Model (Ib) Model (IIa) Model (IIb) Model (III) Model (Ia) Model (Ib) Model (IIa) Model (IIb) Model (III)
1 lag 1 lag 2 lags 2 lags 3lags 1 lag 1 lag 2 lags 2 lags 3lags
Equation (5.3a): 𝑈𝑡 − 𝑈𝑡−4
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 0.016 0.177 0.561 0.650 0.003 0.068 0.211 0.166 -0.219 -0.122
(0.249) (0.323) (0.337) (0.439) (0.367) (0.164) (0.212) (0.267) (0.333) (0.272)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 -0.719** -1.247*** -0.620* -0.036 0.188 0.278
(0.293) (0.429) (0.348) (0.226) (0.330) (0.272)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 -0.519* -0.520**
(0.280) (0.206)
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 -0.077 -0.090 -0.138 -0.159 -0.379*** -0.004 0.031 0.038 0.019 -0.140
(0.102) (0.115) (0.111) (0.130) (0.108) (0.096) (0.112) (0.109) (0.123) (0.097)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.138 0.115 0.006 -0.326*** -0.244 -0.068
(0.146) (0.204) (0.159) (0.122) (0.153) (0.120)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 -0.692*** -0.583***
(0.134) (0.110)
Constant -0.830 0.489 0.540 -1.931*** -1.394*** -0.933* -0.336 -0.150 -1.472** -1.139**
(0.549) (0.598) (0.592) (0.622) (0.492) (0.533) (0.579) (0.564) (0.591) (0.455)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.305 0.331 0.389 0.429 0.667 0.217 0.244 0.292 0.300 0.589
p-value 0.948 0.586 0.042 0.018 0.012 0.678 0.321 0.787 0.795 0.033
Granger-causality test
Equation (5.3b): 𝑆𝐸𝑡 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−4
𝑈𝑡−4 − 𝑈𝑡−8 0.053 0.080** 0.094*** 0.103*** 0.099** -0.053 -0.035 -0.024 -0.005 -0.002
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039)
𝑈𝑡−8 − 𝑈𝑡−12 -0.164*** -0.220*** -0.230*** -0.106** -0.139*** -0.144***
(0.046) (0.057) (0.059) (0.042) (0.046) (0.048)
𝑈𝑡−12 − 𝑈𝑡−16 0.067 -0.011
(0.049) (0.044)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−4 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 0.363*** 0.463*** 0.351*** 0.413*** 0.492*** 0.564*** 0.668*** 0.461*** 0.486*** 0.442***
(0.087) (0.104) (0.105) (0.124) (0.135) (0.065) (0.075) (0.091) (0.101) (0.108)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−8 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 0.295*** 0.425*** 0.438*** 0.257*** 0.217** 0.169
(0.092) (0.121) (0.128) (0.077) (0.100) (0.108)
𝑆𝐸𝑡−12 − 𝑆𝐸𝑡−16 -0.114 0.102
(0.103) (0.082)
Constant -0.715*** 0.008 0.200 -0.126 -0.194 -0.744*** -0.236 -0.180 -0.066 -0.080
(0.191) (0.193) (0.185) (0.175) (0.181) (0.209) (0.205) (0.193) (0.180) (0.181)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 92 92 69 69 115 92 92 69 69
R2 adj. 0.197 0.259 0.368 0.446 0.448 0.435 0.488 0.552 0.555 0.552
p-value 0.135 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.382 0.034 0.014 0.027
Granger-causality test
Notes: Population weighted vector autoregressive model. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Coefficients for year dummies are not reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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5.6 Concluding remarks
The link between self-employment and unemployment is of a complex
causal nature. In addition to the growing micro-level literature on
that relationship, it is also of great political relevance to reveal the
macroeconomic unemployment–self-employment nexus, especially since
employment creation is at the heart of the interest of policy makers
(Thurik et al., 2008; Dennis Jr., 2011). However, the simple presumed
connection between new market entries and positive outcomes, i.e. job
creation, is being, at least partially, questioned (e.g. Santarelli and
Vivarelli, 2007; Nightingale and Coad, 2013; Fritsch and Storey, 2014;
Nightingale and Coad, 2016) as various influencing factors exist. While
some scholars empirically reveal that unemployment pushes or pulls in-
dividuals into self-employment, others find that self-employment indeed
contributes to a reduction in unemployment. One possible reason for
these ambiguous results could be that many studies do not take into
account the heterogeneity of the observed individuals. In this paper,
we explicitly concentrate on the gender of the self-employed as well as
unemployed persons and empirically test whether and how it affects
the link between self-employment and unemployment.
The empirical results from our population-weighted VAR model sug-
gest that self-employment exerts positive employment creation effects.
Male self-employment Granger-causes employment growth somewhat
faster, i.e. after eight years, while female self-employment reduces un-
employment only after twelve years. This finding could, for example,
result from gender differences in the industries selected for start-ups or
in the ratio of employer to non-employer firms. Further, the time delay
in the effect indicates that entrepreneurship does not have an initial
positive impact on unemployment but can contribute to job creation
only in the mid- and long-term. Whereas starting-up from unemploy-
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ment does not immediately contribute to a reduction of unemployment
in a country, the effect found is rather of indirect nature through a
firm growth channel and, thus, an increase in demand for dependent
employment. Policies that encourage individuals to take advantage
of existing profit opportunities in the market and to create long-term
employment effects through them should therefore be implemented or
strengthened.
Additionally, we find that, in the short-run, increasing unemployment
rates push males into self-employment. Given the fact that women
are under-represented in the self-employed, this result could justify the
initiation start-up incentives for women out of unemployment. In the
medium-run, however, our results are evident of an unemployment pull
effect, that is, a decrease in unemployment rates fosters an increase in
self-employment; irrespective of the founders’ gender.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
Table 5.5: Summary statistics
Self-employment Unemployment
Country Total Males Females Total Males Females
Australia 19.0 23.0 14.1 6.7 6.7 6.6
Austria 14.1 15.6 12.2 4.9 4.9 4.9
Belgium 15.8 18.1 13.0 7.9 7.1 9.1
Canada 15.7 19.2 11.7 8.0 8.4 7.4
Denmark 9.3 12.4 5.8 6.2 5.8 6.6
Finland 14.5 18.9 9.7 10.4 10.8 10.0
France 12.2 14.9 8.8 10.2 9.4 11.2
Germany 11.1 13.4 8.3 7.6 7.4 7.8
Greece 39.6 42.0 35.9 13.4 10.2 18.2
Iceland 16.0 21.5 9.6 4.0 4.1 3.9
Ireland 18.9 26.2 8.5 9.3 10.1 8.3
Italy 26.8 30.5 21.0 10.0 8.2 12.7
Japan 16.4 16.5 16.3 3.9 4.1 3.8
Luxembourg 9.1 9.8 7.9 4.0 3.4 4.9
Netherlands 13.3 15.4 10.8 5.0 4.4 5.8
New Zealand 18.7 23.0 13.5 6.1 6.1 6.2
Norway 8.6 11.4 5.3 4.1 4.4 3.8
Portugal 24.8 26.9 22.5 8.1 7.3 8.9
Spain 20.0 22.4 16.6 17.3 14.8 21.3
Sweden 11.2 15.7 6.3 7.3 7.7 6.9
Switzerland 16.7 18.3 14.6 3.8 3.4 4.2
United Kingdom 13.6 17.9 8.6 6.7 7.4 5.8
United States 11.3 13.8 8.2 6.0 6.2 5.8
Notes: The shares are calculated as the number of total (male/female) self-employed (un-
employed) persons.
Source: World Bank (2017)
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
As has been discussed in this dissertation, the interrelationships be-
tween unemployment, self-employment and start-up incentives for un-
employed persons has neither theoretically nor empirically been con-
clusively clarified so far and only selected research questions on this
topic were addressed in the Chapters 2 to 5. This dissertation, thus,
concludes with the following monologue from “The Good Person of
Szechwan” by Bertolt Brecht (2016). It is to be understood as an invi-
tation for further research on these interrelationships and, in particular,
the reduction of unemployment:
“THE PLAYER: [...]
We for our part feel well and truly done.
There’s only one solution that we know:
That you should consider as you go
What sort of measure you would recommend
To help good people to a happy end.
Ladies and gentleman, in you we trust:
There must be happy endings, must, must, must!”
— Brecht (2016, p. 185)
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